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ABSTRACT
HESNA MUGE YAYLA-KULLU: Product Line Design Under Capacity and
Competition
(Under the direction of Dr. Jayashankar M. Swaminathan)
Firms have long recognized the importance of quality based market segmentation
and designed their product lines to make use of this phenomenon. However, product
line decisions are traditionally made without regard to capacity limitations. It is usually
ignored that a ﬁrm has limited resources for oﬀering its products and needs to use these
resources eﬃciently. This dissertation provides managerial insights by simultaneously
studying the product line design problem and capacity limitations faced by the ﬁrms in
a stylized two product setting.
The optimal choice of product mix and pricing of these products when the products
have diﬀerent quality levels is a well-known problem. It has been studied extensively
in both the marketing and economics literatures. However, the impact of capacity con-
straints has never been investigated in these literatures. On the other hand, the eﬀects
of product variety on operational decisions and how to mitigate these eﬀects are fun-
damental questions in the operations literature. However, the eﬀects of segmentation
and cannibalization have not been understood well in the operations literature. This
dissertation aims to ﬁll these gaps in the literature.
In the ﬁrst essay, the problem is solved from a monopolist ﬁrm’s point of view. This
solution is compared to a socially eﬃcient solution subject to capacity limitations.
In the second essay, we introduce competition into the model. We characterize the
solutions for both duopoly and oligopoly market structures. We investigate how competi-
tor entry changes the optimal product mix, how industry supply and prices of products
are aﬀected when the number of competing ﬁrms changes, and how these results under
capacity limitations are diﬀerent from the existing literature.
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In the third essay, we study ﬁrms that have focused product line strategies. We derive
the proﬁtability limits of the focused strategy ﬁrms under both monopoly and duopoly
settings where the competition may be asymmetric.
In the fourth essay, we extend the monopoly model into a multiperiod setting and we
study the eﬀects of customer valuation uncertainty. We discuss how the results from the
deterministic case compare to the stochastic case and how increasing uncertainty aﬀects
the ﬁrm’s product line decisions.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
This dissertation studies the management of product variety. In particular, we focus the
design of a vertically diﬀerentiated product line in the face of capacity constraints. A ﬁrm
typically has to consider product variety implementation issues at the same time with
the product variety design issues as often discussed in the operations literature (Ramdas,
2003). In this dissertation, we contribute to this literature and show that simultaneous
consideration of capacity limitations (an implementation issue) and product line choice
(a design issue) leads to fundamentally diﬀerent results than the previous literature.
Quality based segmentation is prevalent in almost all industries. Whether it is the
comfort of the seats in the airline industry, or the speed and clarity of connection in the
telecommunications industry, or the customer service in a bank, or the index of refraction
(sparkle) and intricacy of the cut in the glass industry or the display resolutions in the
television industry; there is always an attribute or a combination of attributes that
exhibits the “more is better” property in the eyes of the customers. Moreover, each
customer is diﬀerent in his/her willingness to pay for quality. An executive oﬃcer who
plans to attend a meeting right oﬀ the plane surely values the comfort of the seat more
than a student traveling to his/her hometown on a tight budget.
Firms have long recognized this quality based segmentation. They design the ﬁnal
product mix taking segmentation opportunities into account. However, traditionally, the
product mix choices are made without regard to the capacity limitations. Indeed, a ﬁrm
does not have unlimited resources for oﬀering its products and it often faces capacity
constraints in diﬀerent forms: For an airline, the space in an aircraft; for the telecommu-
nications service provider, the total bandwidth; for a bank, number of customer represen-
tatives; and for a durable goods manufacturer, amount of available raw material, labor,
equipment within the manufacturing facility are limited. These resources are critical for
the ﬁrm and they have to be allocated among the products eﬃciently. Moreover, the
products of diﬀerent quality levels generally consume diﬀerent amounts of the resources.
In particular, high quality product usually consumes greater amount from the critical
resource: The size of the seat has to be greater to achieve more comfortable seating in
an aircraft or a glass artist has to pay more attention and spend more time to cut the
crystals into the perfect shape.
Hence, it is essential for the ﬁrm to understand the implications of capacity limitations
on the optimal product mix and design its product line taking its resources into account.
1.1 Motivation
In this dissertation, we investigate the economic forces that determine multiproduct
ﬁrms’ product line design decisions. There are many conﬂicting pressures and tradeoﬀs
that ﬁrms have to face when making strategic business decisions. Examples of these
conﬂicting pressures are varying demand and customer valuations, changing cost struc-
tures, decreasing resources and intensiﬁed competition. We analyze the impact of these
trade-oﬀs on strategic product mix decisions of the ﬁrms.
One of the most important business decisions is the choice of product mix that will
be oﬀered in the market. By choosing the right products, ﬁrms would like to extract
as much proﬁt as possible from the market. They use market segmentation techniques
in order to increase the demand. They present multiple products with diﬀerent quality
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levels and diﬀerent prices; and customers self select from this menu of oﬀerings. This in
turn creates the risk that lower priced low quality products may cannibalize the demand
for higher priced high quality products. Hence, it is not always beneﬁcial for the ﬁrm to
segment the market: Firms need to employ well-designed product line strategies in order
to increase the overall proﬁtability of the product variety oﬀered in the market.
On the supply side, an increase in the product variety builds pressure on the limited
and precious resources of the ﬁrms. Often, high quality products consume more resources
in return for higher unit proﬁts. On the other hand, lower quality products consume less
of these critical resources and leave room for economies of scale. Hence, allocation of the
critical resources becomes a strategic business decision for the ﬁrm: Firms need to dwell
on capacity limitations in order to increase the overall eﬃciency of the resources.
Moreover, external competition is tougher than ever. New entrants act fast to copy
the proﬁtable products and steal market shares of the incumbents. Competitive threats
apparently aﬀects the decisions of the ﬁrms. Any ﬁrm that wants to stay on top of
the game needs to respond to the competition and adjust its product variety whenever
necessary.
Under such conﬂicting pressures, ﬁrms need to better understand the economic forces
behind their decisions and how they relate to each other. As these eﬀects act in opposite
ways, it is not clear a priori whether a ﬁrm should follow a segmentation or a focus strat-
egy. Increasing the product variety requires a well designed segmentation and resource
allocation policy. On the other hand, if the ﬁrm chooses to follow a focus strategy, the
direction of the focus is unclear: should the ﬁrm focus on the high quality market or
focus on the low quality market?
We address these questions in Chapters 2 and 3. We focus on the following tradeoﬀs
in our analysis. For symmetric multiproduct ﬁrms, (1) there is an intra-ﬁrm competition
among the products for the demand; (2) there is another intra-ﬁrm competition among
the products for the resources; and (3) there is an interﬁrm competition among the ﬁrms
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for the market shares.
In Chapter 4, we study the ﬁrms that follow a pre-determined focused strategy. Some
ﬁrms may choose to oﬀer only low quality products and some others may choose to oﬀer
only high quality products in the market. This may be due to technological capabilities or
executive board decisions among other reasons. We investigate the proﬁtability bounds
for these focused strategy ﬁrms. For example, the airline industry has seen all kinds
of product line strategies: airlines focusing on the economy class like JetBlue, airlines
focusing on the ﬁrst class like EOS, and airlines following a traditional strategy and
oﬀering all classes like Delta.
Lufthansa has been the ﬁrst airline to successfully operate a business-class only ﬂight
in the market (Lufthansa, 2008). They have redesigned commercial jets into business
jets and targeted the executives who have been traveling on the route from New York to
Du¨sseldorf which required at least one connection. The executives were ready to pay the
high premium in return to a more comfortable, direct and quicker service. They oﬀer
only 48 very spacious and comfortable seats in an Airbus A319 and 44 such seats in a
Boeing 737. The routes include Munich-New York, Du¨sseldorf-New York and Du¨sseldorf-
Chicago as of August 2008 and Munich-Boston, Frankfurt-Dubai, and Frankfurt-Pune as
of February 2009.
On the other end, there are economy-class only airlines, like JetBlue Airways and
Southwest Airlines. These airlines dedicate their whole capacity to economy class cus-
tomers. Although a passenger cannot expect complimentary gourmet dinners on board,
the cost eﬀectiveness of these airlines allow them to oﬀer lower prices than a traditional
airline.
Besides the success of JetBlue, Southwest and Lufthansa Airlines, the market has
experienced many failures when it comes to focused strategy ﬁrms. In 2005, the in-
troduction of two small-size ﬁrms to the market created a stir (Brancatelli, 2005). EOS
Airlines and MaxJet Airlines entered the transatlantic ﬂight market during Fall 2005 with
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a better quality customer service and competitive prices. MaxJet redesigned Boeing 767
aircrafts, that typically seats around 200 passengers, to seat 102 premium seats (Maxjet,
2008). However, on December 24, 2007, the company announced that “due to a number
of material factors such as competitive pressure and operating cost increases”, they had
ﬁled Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. EOS Airlines also ﬁled bankruptcy on
April 26, 2008.
As an economy class focused airline, Skybus Airlines was founded to operate on the
basis of ultra-low cost structure. They targeted secondary markets rather than heavy
traﬃc airports in order to keep the competition to a minimum. When Skybus had ceased
operations on April 5, 2008, its ﬂeet consisted of 13 Airbus A319 each of which were
designed to have all economy class seats.
Following these examples of failures and successes of focused strategy ﬁrms in practice,
we explore the underlying reasons that lead to success or failure of these ﬁrms in Chapter
4. We analyze the driving economic factors for focused strategy ﬁrms in the existence
of capacity constraints and ﬁnd out the limits of their proﬁtability. We investigate how
well a focused strategy ﬁrm performs compared to a traditional ﬁrm.
The world has been going through a serious recession period. Many customers prefer
to be conservative in terms of their expenditures, especially when it comes to luxurious
(high quality) goods. These luxurious purchases are substituted by economical (low
quality) counterparts. We observe from ﬁrst hand that customers’ willingness to pay for
quality has decreased as the recession progressed. This observation is also recorded by
the Federal Reserve System’s 2009 Beige Book (FederalReserve, 2009): “Overall economic
activity continued to weaken across almost all of the Federal Reserve Districts since the
previous reporting period. Most Districts noted reduced or low activity across a wide range
of industries... Reports of retail sales during the holiday season were generally negative
in most Districts.”
Moreover, forecasters are quite cautious about predicting what may happen next.
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The demand and customer willingness to spend may get better soon especially with the
governmental interventions or it may stay low for a longer while. What is clear is the
fact that there is uncertainty about the customer spending in all industries.
Mindful of such volatility in the economic climate, ﬁrms need to take customer val-
uation uncertainty into account before making commitments, in particular in terms of
capacity building. In Chapter 5, we introduce this uncertainty into the formulation and
investigate the problem in a stylized setting where there are multiple periods.
1.2 Overview of the Dissertation
In this dissertation, we study the eﬀects of limited capacity on vertically diﬀerentiated
product line design decisions of the ﬁrms. We analyze the situation in various market
structures including monopoly, oligopoly and socially eﬃcient markets.
The ﬁrm oﬀers two diﬀerent product types: high and low quality products. These
products also diﬀer in their unit costs and resource consumptions. The ﬁrm decides
how to allocate its limited capacity among the products and their prices. For example,
consider an airline determining how many ﬁrst and economy class seats to install in an
aircraft. First and economy class seats oﬀer diﬀerent quality of service and they diﬀer
in their unit operating costs. Furthermore, each seat type requires diﬀerent amount of
space per unit and the number of total seats is constrained by the size of the aircraft.
In the demand model, we consider a market with heterogenous customers that vary
in their willingness to pay for quality. Customer preference is private information, but
the ﬁrm knows its distribution. Each customer decides among the two products and the
no purchase option, and chooses the one that maximizes his/her utility.
In Chapter 2, we solve the resulting equilibrium from a monopolist ﬁrm’s point of
view and study its characteristics. We also look at the problem from a social planner’s
point of view. Among other results, our key ﬁndings are as follows.
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When there are increasing costs to quality, i.e., when the unit cost to quality ratio
of high quality product is larger than that of the low quality product, we ﬁnd that the
ﬁrm may be better oﬀ focusing on one product and oﬀering either the low or the high
quality product for suﬃciently small capacity levels. The focus depends on the maximum
margin as well as the resource consumption of each product type. This is in contrast
to the existing literature (Mussa and Rosen (1978), Itoh (1983), Moorthy (1984), Desai
(2001), Johnson and Myatt (2003)) that argues that the ﬁrm should serve both products
oﬀering a diﬀerentiated product line in this case. When the ﬁrm’s capacity is suﬃciently
large, our results coincide with the existing literature.
When there are decreasing costs to quality, the ﬁrm’s optimal strategy is either to
oﬀer both products or only one of the products depending on its capacity. In this case,
the existing literature that disregards the capacity constraint shows that the ﬁrm should
always focus on the high quality product (Johnson and Myatt (2003), Bhargava and
Choudhary (2001)). While our results agree with the existing literature when the ﬁrm’s
capacity is suﬃciently large, we show that the ﬁrm might be better oﬀ with a diametrically
opposite policy focusing on the low quality product, when its capacity is suﬃciently small,
and for intermediate capacity levels the ﬁrm prefers oﬀering both product types.
We also show that limited capacity can induce a monopoly to oﬀer the higher end
customers a better quality product compared to a social planner. Furthermore, a mo-
nopolist can cover a greater portion of the market than a social planner. These are in
contrast to existing literature which shows that the customers (except those at the high
end) get either a lower quality product or nothing at all from a monopoly compared to
a social planner’s assignment (Mussa and Rosen (1978), Moorthy (1984), Desai (2001)).
In Chapter 3, we study the system in competitive settings. There are n ≥ 2
symmetric ﬁrms that engage in a Cournot competition. We aim to understand the
eﬀects of competition on the optimal product lines of ﬁrms.
We ﬁnd that the capacity availability is again a critical component in the competi-
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tive ﬁrm’s product line design decisions. The decisions made by ignoring the capacity
constraint would provide insights for the cases when there is abundant resources; as it
was done in the existing literature (Gal-Or (1983), DeFraja (1996), Johnson and Myatt
(2003), and Johnson and Myatt (2006a)). We show that these decisions may no longer
be optimal when the capacity is limited. For instance, when the cost structure favors
the high quality product (cost to quality ratio is decreasing), if the ﬁrm has unlimited
resources, best response to the competition is to focus and oﬀer only the high quality
product. In this case, the economic force leading the product line decisions of the ﬁrms
is to eliminate the intraﬁrm competition for demand among products. However, if the
capacity is limited for the ﬁrm and resource consumption is high for the high quality
product, eﬃcient use of resources becomes the leading force and low quality product is
optimally introduced into the product mix. If the available capacity is even lower, then
the ﬁrms optimally focus and oﬀer only the low quality product regardless of the fact
that the cost to quality ratio favors the high quality product.
We also investigate the inﬂuence of external competition on the prices and the product
variety supplied in the market in this chapter. The impact depends on the cost structures
of the industry as well as the available capacities. As opposed to the acquired wisdom
in the literature, we show that the total industry supply may decrease as the number of
ﬁrms increase in the market for a speciﬁc range of total industry capacity levels when
the potential proﬁt per unit resource consumed is greater for the high quality product.
Moreover, we show that the price of a product may increase as the number of ﬁrms
increase for a speciﬁc range of total industry capacity levels, if the product has a low
potential proﬁt per unit resource consumed and when the cost to quality ratio is increasing
and resource consumption ratio is small.
Another impact of increasing competition could be increasing the product variety. For
instance, if the low quality product has high potential proﬁt per unit resource consumed,
for a speciﬁc range of total industry capacity levels, increasing competition force the ﬁrms
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to introduce the low quality product into the product mix, even when the cost structures
favor the high quality product (cost to quality ratio is decreasing).
Among other results, we also ﬁnd that an incumbent ﬁrm should revise its product
line decisions once a new ﬁrm enters the market with extra capacity. The outcome
may be deleting or introducing new products to the market depending on the individual
ﬁrm capacity and cost and resource structure of the products. For example, the ﬁrm
is forced to delete the low quality product from the product mix in response to entry
for a certain range of individual ﬁrm capacity levels when the potential proﬁt per unit
resource consumed is greater for the low quality product and cost structure favors the
high quality product. In this case, both the increase in total industry capacity and
existence of interﬁrm competition aﬀects the optimal decisions of the ﬁrms.
In Chapter 4, we study ﬁrms that have focused product line strategies. We discuss
the proﬁtability limits of the focused strategy ﬁrms under both monopoly and duopoly
settings. In this essay, competition is between asymmetric ﬁrms. While the product line
choice is ﬁxed for the focused strategy ﬁrm, the competitor ﬁrm may respond with any
strategy: it has the necessary capability to oﬀer any product combination.
We observe that the high quality focused ﬁrm may earn as much as 99.9% of a
competitor ﬁrm that has the capability to follow the optimal strategy, depending on the
cost and resource consumption conditions. We also observe that the proﬁtability of the
high quality focused ﬁrm could go as low as 6.63% when the capacity is scarce, depending
on the cost and resource consumption conditions. If the cost structure in which the high
quality focused ﬁrm operates is favorable, then it will survive just ﬁne in competitive
settings. However, if the cost conditions change in an unfavorable direction, this could
be detrimental for the high quality focused ﬁrm as observed in our numerical study.
More interestingly, we ﬁnd that the competitor ﬁrm may change its product line in
response to the high quality focused ﬁrm. We found instances where the competitor
ﬁrm actually focus on the low quality product for all capacity levels; while the optimal
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strategy would be oﬀering both products in a monopoly.
On the other hand, we observe that the ﬁrm with a low quality focus may earn as
low as 1.18%, depending on the cost and resource consumption conditions. These low
proﬁtability levels may help us explain the failures of many low-cost carriers in the airline
industry. As the unit cost increases, the marginal proﬁt of the low quality product also
decreases dramatically. These changes in the cost structures explain the extremely low
proﬁts in the face of competition and the failures of the low quality focused strategy
ﬁrms.
Until this point in the dissertation, we study the economic forces behind the ﬁrms’
product line decisions under deterministic assumptions. In Chapter 5, we incorporate
a very important dimension to our analysis: the customer valuation uncertainty.
In our model, we recognize the fact that ﬁrms make their strategic capacity deci-
sions well before the markets clear for prices. In the ﬁrst period, the ﬁrm decides for
the committed capacity for each product based on the available resources and expected
customer valuation distribution. In the second period, the speciﬁcs of the customer valu-
ation distribution is realized and the ﬁrm makes its actual production and sales decisions
constrained by the initial capacity commitment.
We ﬁrst solve the second period problem where the capacity allocations and product
line decisions are known. As opposed to the conventional wisdom in the economics
literature, we ﬁnd that when the capacity commitment of the low quality product is
below a certain threshold and cost to quality ratio is increasing, the sales decision favors
the low quality product. If the market valuations are low, then the ﬁrm only sells a
limited amount of the low quality product in order to keep its price high. In this case,
capacity constraints are not binding. If the valuations get a little better, then the ﬁrm
optimally sells all the low quality product. Only if the market valuations are high enough,
the ﬁrm starts selling the high quality product.
When the capacity commitment of the low quality product is above a certain threshold
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and cost to quality ratio is increasing, we ﬁnd that the low quality product is oﬀered for a
longer range of valuations. Nevertheless, the ﬁrm does not wait to sell all the low quality
production but introduces high quality product together with the low quality product.
Given the optimal sales decisions of the second period, we solve the problem to ﬁnd the
optimal capacity allocation in the ﬁrst period. When capacity constraint is not binding
and the cost to quality ratio is increasing, we have shown that the optimal strategy is
to diﬀerentiate and oﬀer both products in the market as is the case when there is no
uncertainty. Nevertheless, there is one important diﬀerence: the quantity of the high
quality product increases with the level of uncertainty.
When the capacity constraint is binding, achieving the closed form solutions is not
analytically tractable. We present some numerical examples and observe how the results
of the deterministic models change under uncertainty. When the cost to quality ratio
is increasing and marginal proﬁt per unit resource is better for the low quality product;
for a medium range of capacity levels, high quality commitment increases as the level
of uncertainty increases. However, since the capacity constraint is binding at this level,
the required resources are gained from decreasing the commitment of the low quality
product. The increase in the high quality commitment comes at the expense of low
quality commitment: the commitment levels decrease as uncertainty increases for the
low quality product.
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CHAPTER 2
Impact of Shared Capacity on
Vertically Diﬀerentiated Product
Lines
In this chapter, we investigate a monopolist ﬁrm with limited capacity that serves ver-
tically diﬀerentiated products to a heterogeneous customer market. We also look at the
problem from a social planner’s point of view and compare the monopolist’s solution to
this socially eﬃcient assignment.
2.1 Related Literature
There is rich literature in marketing and economics on the monopolist’s choice of vertically
diﬀerentiated product lines (e.g., Mussa and Rosen (1978), Itoh (1983), Moorthy (1984),
Gabszewicz et al. (1986), Desai (2001), Kim and Chhajed (2002), Johnson and Myatt
(2003)). This literature has studied product choice, pricing, market segmentation, and
cannibalization among other things. However, it has ignored the eﬀects of capacity
limitations on the ﬁrm’s product line choice. Indeed, a ﬁrm does not have unlimited
resources for oﬀering its products and it often faces capacity constraints in the form of
time, labor, equipment, space and inventory. With this study, we aim to contribute to
the above literature by incorporating such a capacity constraint. We also contribute to
the emerging literature in the marketing-manufacturing interface that looks at the eﬀects
of operational elements on a ﬁrm’s product-line. Heese and Swaminathan (2006), Desai
et al. (2001) and Kim and Chhajed (2000) study the eﬀects of component commonality
on product line design. Netessine and Taylor (2007) characterize the eﬀect of production
technology (production to order vs. production to stock). Dobson and Yano (2002) and
Chayet et al. (2007) consider a shared resource used for oﬀering a product-line similar
to our set-up, however there are fundamental diﬀerences. In Dobson and Yano (2002),
products have independent demands, there is no cannibalization. In Chayet et al. (2007)
high and low quality products have equal resource consumptions (equal production time
in their context), while the diﬀerence in capacity consumption of product types is one of
the key elements of our model.
2.2 Model
We study two product types, high and low quality products. Our main model assumes
exogenous quality levels qh > ql, we later relax this assumption and allow for endogenous
quality levels in Section 2.5. Each unit of product i costs ci and it consumes si units of
the capacity. We assume ch > cl and sh > sl. For example, consider an airline oﬀering
ﬁrst and economy class seats. First class seats are perceived as better quality by the
customers (qh > ql); they are bigger in size (sh > sl) and it costs more to operate them
(ch > cl) due to better quality customer service (greater number of ﬂight attendants,
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more expensive food and drinks, private aisle check-in process, airport lounges, etc).
The ﬁrm decides how to allocate its limited capacity K to the product types. To serve
xi units of product i, the ﬁrm needs to allocate si · xi units of its capacity. We assume
that the parameters are such that the trivial case (xl = 0 and xh = 0) is not optimal. The
ﬁrm sets prices pi, and this in turn determines the demand of each product Di, which
will be derived in the following. Clearly, the ﬁrm sells the minimum of allocated capacity
xi and demand Di for product i. So, the ﬁrm’s proﬁt is
ΠM = (ph − ch)min(Dh, xh) + (pl − cl)min(Dl, xl). (2.1)
We adopt the classical vertical diﬀerentiation demand model (cf. Tirole (1988)). The
customers vary in their willingness to pay for quality. Speciﬁcally, the customer types θ
are uniformly distributed in the unit interval [0,1] with unit total mass. When type θ
customer buys product i at price pi, his utility is equal to
U(qi, pi, θ) = θqi − pi.
If the customer does not buy a product, his utility is zero. Thus, each customer has three
options, buying the high quality product, buying the low quality product and not buying
a product, and he chooses the one that maximizes his utility. This yields 0 ≤ θl ≤ θh ≤ 1
such that customers in [0, θl) do not buy a product, customers in [θl, θh) buy the low
quality product and customers in [θh, 1] buy the high quality product. So, the demand
for the high quality and the low quality products are Dh = 1− θh and Dl = θh− θl. It is
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straightforward to show that the marginal customer θh who is indiﬀerent between buying
the high and the low quality products is given by θh = (ph − pl)/(qh − ql) and similarly,
the marginal customer θl who is indiﬀerent between buying the low quality product and
not buying a product at all is given by θl = pl/ql. Thus, we can express the demands for
the two product types as follows,
Dh(pl, ph) = 1− ph − pl
qh − ql Dl(pl, ph) =
ph − pl
qh − ql −
pl
ql
. (2.2)
2.3 Monopoly
In this section, we solve the monopoly ﬁrm’s problem and discuss our ﬁndings. The ﬁrm
chooses the capacity allocations xi and prices pi to maximize its proﬁt Π
M given in (2.1)
subject to the capacity constraint. Speciﬁcally the ﬁrm solves,
max
pl,ph,xl,xh≥0
ΠM
subject to shxh + slxl ≤ K.
Without loss of generality, we can restrict the analysis to xi = Di. If Di > xi, the
ﬁrm can increase price pi and achieve a higher proﬁt, similarly if Di < xi, the ﬁrm can
decrease xi without aﬀecting the proﬁt. Following xi = Di(pl, ph), the optimal prices
can be expressed as a function of capacity allocations xi, and the above problem can be
simpliﬁed to
15
max
xl,xh≥0
(ph(xl, xh)− ch)xh + (pl(xl, xh)− cl)xl
subject to shxh + slxl ≤ K.
The objective function of this problem is jointly concave on a convex set deﬁned by
linear constraints, therefore the optimal solution can be obtained by solving the ﬁrst
order conditions (Bazaraa et al. (2006)).
In the following passages, we characterize a monopoly ﬁrm’s optimal product line and
contrast it to the existing literature. Propositions 1 and 2 describe the optimal policy
when there are increasing cost to quality (i.e., ch/qh > cl/ql) and decreasing cost to
quality (i.e., ch/qh < cl/ql) respectively. Let us deﬁne two threshold capacities,
K¯M1 =
sl(sh(ql − cl)− sl(qh − ch))
2ql(sh − sl) (2.3)
K¯M2 =
sh(sl(qh − ch)− sh(ql − cl))
2qhsl − 2qlsh (2.4)
which will be useful for describing the ﬁrm’s optimal policy. All proofs appear in
Appendix A.
Proposition 1 Suppose cl/ql < ch/qh. For a monopolist, the optimal product line strat-
egy is as follows:
i) If ql − cl ≥ qh − ch, then the optimal strategy for the ﬁrm is to focus and oﬀer only
the low quality product for all capacity levels.
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ii.a) If qh − ch > ql − cl and qh−chsh <
ql−cl
sl
, then
- if K ≤ K¯M1 , the optimal product line strategy is to focus and oﬀer only the
low quality product.
- if K > K¯M1 , the optimal product line strategy is to diﬀerentiate and oﬀer both
products.
ii.b) If qh − ch > ql − cl and qh−chsh ≥
ql−cl
sl
, then
- if K ≤ K¯M2 , the optimal product line strategy is to focus and oﬀer only the
high quality product.
- if K > K¯M2 , the optimal product line strategy to diﬀerentiate and oﬀer both
products.
Part (i) in Proposition 1 describes the trivial case where it is always better to sell only
the low quality product. Note that the maximum price that can be charged for product i
is equal to the willingness to pay of the highest valuation customer (θ = 1), that is equal
to the quality of product qi. Thus, in this case, the maximum proﬁt margin for the low
quality product ql − cl is larger than that of the high quality product qh − ch.
Part (ii.a) and (ii.b) describe what happens when the maximum margin for the high
quality product qh−ch is larger. In this case, the optimal product line of the ﬁrm depends
on its capacity. The Proposition shows that when the ﬁrm has a suﬃciently large capacity,
it prefers selling a diﬀerentiated product line oﬀering both products, which is is in line
with the existing literature (Mussa and Rosen (1978), Itoh (1983), Moorthy (1984), Desai
(2001), Johnson and Myatt (2003)). Serving a diﬀerentiated product line helps the ﬁrm
17
segment the market, which in turn enables attracting a larger demand with a smaller
sacriﬁce in the proﬁt margin of the high quality product. However, when the ﬁrm is
already capacity constrained, a larger demand has little value and the ﬁrm may not
beneﬁt from oﬀering both product types. Indeed, in contrast to existing literature, we
show that when the ﬁrm has a suﬃciently small capacity, it is better oﬀ focusing on
one product and selling only either the low or the high quality product. The right focus
depends on the capacity adjusted maximum margins qi−ci
si
, that is, the maximum proﬁt
margin per unit capacity.
In part (ii.a) of Proposition 1, the lower quality product has a higher capacity adjusted
maximum margin and the ﬁrm sells only the low quality product when its capacity is
smaller than K¯M1 . Suppose that the airline AX is acting as a monopolist on a ﬂight leg
from city A to city B. The potential market size for this city pair is 1,000 customers per
day and the customer valuations are such that the highest amount of money any customer
would pay is $3,000 for the business class seat and $1,000 for the economy class seat.
Also suppose that the interior design of this airline’s aircrafts is such that the business
class seat occupies 20 sq. ft. and the economy class seat occupies 5 sq. ft. inside the
aircraft. It costs $1,500 to operate a business class seat and $300 an economy class seat.
If this airline optimizes the product line without taking the capacity availability into
account, then the optimal solution is to oﬀer 200 business class seats and 150 economy
class seats with a proﬁt of $202,500 and requirement of 4,750 sq. ft. of space. While this
requirement could be satisﬁed with multiple ﬂights in a day, if the airline has only 1,000
sq. ft. plane available for one ﬂight only, then they can only oﬀer 42 business class and
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31 economy class seats for a proﬁt of $76,288. However, if the company would take this
capacity limitation into account upfront, they would have found that the real optimal is
to focus on the economy class in this single ﬂight. They would have oﬀered 200 economy
class seats for a proﬁt of $100,000 with a dramatic increase of $23,712 per day.
On the other hand, in part (ii.b), the high quality product has a better capacity
adjusted maximum margin and the ﬁrm sells only the high quality product when its
capacity is smaller than K¯M2 . Suppose that another airline BX is acting as a monopolist
on a ﬂight leg from city B to city C. The potential market size for this city pair is also
1,000 customers per day and the customer valuations are such that the highest amount
of money any customer would pay is $4,000 for the business class seat and $1,000 for
the economy class seat. Also suppose that the interior design of this airline’s aircrafts is
such that the business class seat occupies 15 sq. ft. and the economy class seat occupies
5 sq. ft. inside the aircraft. It costs $1,500 to operate a business class seat and $300 an
economy class seat. If this airline optimizes the product line without taking the capacity
availability into account, then the optimal solution is to oﬀer 300 business class seats and
50 economy class seats with a proﬁt of $392,500 and requirement of 4,750 sq. ft. of space.
While this requirement could be satisﬁed with multiple ﬂights in a day, if the airline has
only 500 sq. ft. plane available for one ﬂight only, then they can only oﬀer 31 business
class and 6 economy class seats for a proﬁt of $77,448. However, if the company would
take this capacity limitation into account upfront, they would have found that the real
optimal is to focus on the economy class in this single ﬂight. They would have oﬀered
33 economy class seats for a proﬁt of $78,889 with an increase of $1,440 per day.
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Proposition 2 Suppose ch/qh ≤ cl/ql. For a monopolist the optimal product line strategy
is as follows:
i) If qh−ch
sh
< ql−cl
sl
, then
- if K ≤ K¯M1 , the optimal product line strategy is to focus and oﬀer only the
low quality product.
- if K¯M1 < K ≤ K¯M2 , the optimal product line strategy is to diﬀerentiate and
oﬀer both products.
- if K > K¯M2 , the optimal product line strategy is to focus and oﬀer only the
high quality product.
ii) If qh−ch
sh
≥ ql−cl
sl
, then the optimal strategy for the ﬁrm is to focus and oﬀer only the
high quality product for all capacity levels.
Proposition 2 characterizes the ﬁrm’s optimal policy when there are decreasing costs to
quality i.e., ch/qh ≤ cl/ql. For this case, the existing literature (Bhargava and Choudhary
(2001), Johnson and Myatt (2003)) has shown that the ﬁrm should oﬀer only the high
quality product when there are no capacity limitations. Our ﬁndings coincide with the
existing literature when the ﬁrm has a suﬃciently large capacity or when the high quality
product has a larger capacity adjusted maximum margin. A ﬁrm with unlimited capacity
does not oﬀer the low quality product due to its cannibalization eﬀect. However, when the
low quality product has a larger capacity adjusted maximum margin (i.e., maximum proﬁt
margin per unit capacity qi−ci
si
), it is more proﬁtable than the high quality product for a
capacity constrained ﬁrm and the optimal product line choice critically depends on the
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ﬁrm’s capacity. Speciﬁcally, the optimal policy can be diametrically opposite: The ﬁrm is
better oﬀ selling only the low quality product when its capacity is suﬃciently small (i.e.,
K ≤ K¯M1 ). In this case, a ﬁrm that disregards the capacity constraint would be oﬀering
the wrong product. In addition, for intermediate capacity levels (i.e., K¯M1 < K ≤ K¯M2 ),
the ﬁrm prefers oﬀering both products contrary to the existing literature. It is interesting
that its limited capacity induces the ﬁrm to expand its product line, oﬀering more product
types in this case. The capacity constraint gives incentive to the ﬁrm to allocate more
resources to the product that has a greater capacity adjusted maximum margin. This
leads to adding the low quality product to the portfolio.
Suppose that another airline CX is acting as a monopolist on a ﬂight leg from city C
to city D. The potential market size for this city pair is also 1,000 customers per day and
the customer valuations are such that the highest amount of money any customer would
pay is $3,000 for the business class seat and $1,000 for the economy class seat. Also
suppose that the interior design of this airline’s aircrafts is such that the business class
seat occupies 35 sq. ft. and the economy class seat occupies 5 sq. ft. inside the aircraft.
It costs $1,500 to operate a business class seat and $750 an economy class seat. If this
airline optimizes the product line without taking the capacity availability into account,
then the optimal solution is to oﬀer 250 business class seats only with a proﬁt of $187,500
and requirement of 8,750 sq. ft. of space. While this requirement could be satisﬁed with
multiple ﬂights in a day, if the airline has only 100 sq. ft. plane available for one ﬂight
only, then they can only oﬀer 3 business class only seats for a proﬁt of $4,261 or cancel
the ﬂight all together. However, if the company would take this capacity limitation into
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account upfront, they would have found that the real optimal is to focus on the economy
class in this single ﬂight. They would have oﬀered 20 economy class seats for a proﬁt of
$4,600 with almost 8% increase in proﬁts per day.
Our results show that scarcity of the capacity forces a ﬁrm to drop the product with
the smaller capacity adjusted maximum margin from its product line and dedicate the
whole capacity to the more proﬁtable product. This is formally stated in the following
Corollary.
Corollary 1 Suppose qi−ci
si
<
qj−cj
sj
. There exist Kˆ > 0 such that xi is non-decreasing in
K with xi = 0 for K < Kˆ in the optimal solution.
2.4 Social Planner
In this section, we solve for the social planner’s problem and compare it to the monopoly.
Social planner maximizes the sum of customers’ and ﬁrm’s surplus, which is given by,
ΠS =
∫ 1−xh
1−xh−xl
(θql − cl)dθ +
∫ 1
1−xh
(θqh − ch)dθ (2.5)
Thus, the social planner solves
max
xh,xl≥0
ΠS
subject to shxh + slxl ≤ K. (2.6)
The solution to this problem is fully characterized in Lemma A2 in the Appendix
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A. Here, we discuss our ﬁndings and contrast them to the existing literature. We deﬁne
additional capacity thresholds K¯M3 , K¯
M
4 , K¯
M
5 , K¯
S
1 , and K¯
S
2 given in (A-7)-(A-9) and (A-
16)-(A-17) in the Appendix A that will be helpful in stating our results.
In the standard vertical diﬀerentiation literature, it is well known that each customer
gets a lower quality product or nothing at all from a monopolist compared to a social
planner except the high end customer who gets the same assignment in both cases (e.g.,
Mussa and Rosen (1978), Moorthy (1984), Desai (2001)). In contrast, we show that a
monopoly ﬁrm may oﬀer a higher quality product than that of a social planner to some
customer segments due to the capacity constraint. Speciﬁcally, when the maximum proﬁt
margin of the high quality product is larger, but its capacity adjusted maximum margin
is smaller, the high end customers get a higher quality product from the monopolist than
the social planner’s assignment for a range of capacity levels. This is formally stated in
the following proposition.
Proposition 3 When qh − ch > ql − cl and qh−chsh <
ql−cl
sl
, the monopoly oﬀers the high
quality product whereas the social planner does not oﬀer it for K¯M1 < K ≤ K¯S1 .
Under the condition in Proposition 3, the monopolist and the social planner prefer
oﬀering only the low quality product for suﬃciently small capacity levels (i.e., K ≤ K¯M1 )
and similarly, they both oﬀer both product types for suﬃciently large capacity levels
(i.e., K > K¯S1 ). However, when K¯
M
1 < K ≤ K¯S1 , the social planner does not oﬀer the
high quality product in order to increase its market coverage whereas the monopolist
driven by the higher proﬁt margins oﬀers the high quality product. In this case, while
the higher end customer segment is getting better quality under monopoly, the lower end
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customer segment is getting worse oﬀ: they are getting nothing. The better quality at
the high end comes at the expense of the lower customer segment.
The conventional wisdom in the literature states that the social planner serves a larger
portion of the market compared to a monopolist (e.g., Mussa and Rosen (1978)). This
is indeed the case when one ignores the capacity constraint. However, we show that,
depending on the capacity level, a monopolist may serve a greater portion of the market
than a social planner. Speciﬁcally, this happens when there are increasing costs to quality
and the high quality product has a larger capacity adjusted maximum margin.
Proposition 4 When qh−ch
sh
> ql−cl
sl
and cl/ql ≤ ch/qh, the monopoly covers a greater
portion of the market than the social planner for K¯M2 < K < min{K¯S2 , K¯M3 }.
Under the condition in Proposition 4, both the monopolist and the social planner
oﬀer only the high quality product for suﬃciently small capacity levels (i.e., K ≤ K¯M2 )
and similarly they both oﬀer both product types for suﬃciently large capacity levels
K > K¯S2 (the monopolist does not use all of its capacity for K > K¯
M
3 ). However, when
K¯M2 < K < min{K¯S2 , K¯M3 }, only the monopoly serves the low quality product. By
oﬀering the low quality product, monopoly serves the high quality product to a smaller
market segment and this in turn keeps its price higher. Whereas the social planner is not
concerned about prices, it sells only the high quality product. This results in a larger
market coverage under monopoly since both the monopoly and the social planner utilize
all the capacity and high quality product consumes greater amount of capacity per unit.
Proposition 5 When the capacity is suﬃciently small, all customers get their socially
eﬃcient assignment from the monopolist.
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It is well-established in the literature that the monopolist degrades the quality level
oﬀered to low valuation customers (e.g. Mussa and Rosen (1978), Moorthy (1984)).
However, we show that when the capacity is suﬃciently small, the optimal policy for
both the monopolist and the social planner is to dedicate all the capacity to the most
valuable product type (in terms maximum surplus per unit capacity, i.e., qi−ci
si
). Because
all the capacity is dedicated to the same product, the segment of customers who get the
high quality product, the low quality product and nothing are the same for both the
monopolist and the social planner.
2.5 Endogenous Quality Levels
In this section, through numerical examples, we study what happens when quality levels
are endogenous. The ﬁrm decides whether to oﬀer one or two products in a quality
diﬀerentiated product line as well as its capacity allocation to the products oﬀered. In
addition, the ﬁrm determines the quality levels qi ∈ [0, q], where q is the maximum
possible quality level. Functions c(·) and s(·) show how cost and required capacity depend
on quality. Speciﬁcally, each product with quality qi costs c(qi) and it requires capacity
s(qi). To maximize its proﬁt, the monopoly solves
max
xl,xh,pl,ph≥0, ql,qh∈[0,q]
(ph − c(qh))min(Dh, xh) + (pl − c(ql))min(Dl, xl) (2.7)
subject to s(qh)xh + s(ql)xl ≤ K (2.8)
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where demand for product i, Di, is given in (2.2). Similarly, the social planner solves
max
xl,xh,pl,ph≥0, ql,qh∈[0,q]
∫ 1−xh
1−xh−xl
(θql − c(ql))dθ +
∫ 1
1−xh
(θqh − c(qh))dθ
subject to s(qh)xh + s(ql)xl ≤ K
In our numerical examples, we use polynomial unit costs c(q) = αqβ as commonly
assumed in the literature (e.g. Moorthy (1984), Desai (2001)). Notice that a strictly
convex unit cost function, i.e., β > 1, results in ch/qh > cl/ql, that is in increasing costs
to quality. Similarly, a strictly concave unit cost results in decreasing costs to quality.
In the following passages, we discuss how our results in Sections 2.3 and 2.4 carry
over when the quality levels become endogenous decisions. Figure 2.1.a shows the opti-
mal quality levels chosen by a monopolist as a function of its capacity when there are
increasing costs to quality. Recall that the existing literature (e.g. Mussa and Rosen
(1978), Itoh (1983), Moorthy (1984), Johnson and Myatt (2003)), while disregarding the
limited capacity, has shown that the ﬁrm should oﬀer a quality diﬀerentiated product
line in this case. Indeed, Figure 2.1.a is consistent with the existing literature when
the ﬁrm’s capacity is suﬃciently large, i.e., when K > 0.29. However, when the ﬁrm’s
capacity is small, i.e., when K < 0.29, the ﬁrm prefers following a focus strategy and
oﬀers only one product type as in Proposition 1. The ﬁrm is better oﬀ dedicating all of
its capacity to the high quality product, this enables it to oﬀer the high quality product
to more customers. The ﬁrm should introduce the low quality product to diﬀerentiate
only if its capacity is suﬃciently high.
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FIGURE 2.1: Optimal quality levels: Monopoly vs. Social Planner (c(q) = 0.1q2, s(q) =
q1/2 and q = 2)
Figure 2.3.a plots the optimal quality levels for a monopoly when there are decreasing
costs to quality. In this case, the existing literature suggests that the ﬁrms should focus
on one product, oﬀering only a high quality product to avoid cannibalization (Johnson
and Myatt (2003), Bhargava and Choudhary (2001)). Figure 2.3.a coincides with the
existing literature when the ﬁrm’s capacity is large, i.e., when K > 2. However, the
ﬁrm prefers the diﬀerentiation strategy oﬀering a high and a low quality product when
the capacity is scarce. Oﬀering a low quality product enables the ﬁrm to serve a larger
market in this case, as the low quality product consumes less capacity. Notice that these
ﬁndings are consistent with Proposition 2.
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Now, we discuss the social welfare results. Figures 2.2 and 2.4 show the optimal
market coverage chosen by a monopolist (Figures 2.2.a and 2.4.a) and by a social planner
(Figures 2.2.b and 2.4.b) as a function of their capacities. The existing literature shows
that compared to a social planner, a monopolist degrades the quality of products oﬀered
except to the high-end customers. However, Figures 2.3 and 2.4 show an example where
a monopoly oﬀers a higher quality product than a social planner due to the capacity
limitation as in Proposition 3. For example, when capacity K = 1, the customers that
are at the high end (θ ≥ 0.80, see Figure 2.4.a and b) get a better quality product from
a monopoly (qh = 2.0, see Figure 2.3.a) than from a social planner (qh = 1.423, see
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Va
lu
at
io
n 
(?
)
Capacity (K)
(a) Monopoly
High Quality 
( xh )
Low Quality 
( xl )
Not Served
+
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Va
lu
at
io
n 
(?
)
Capacity (K)
(b) Social Planner
High Quality 
( xh )
Low Quality 
( xl )
Not Served
?
FIGURE 2.4: Market Coverage: Monopoly vs. Social Planner (c(q) = 0.01q1/2, s(q) = q2
and q = 2)
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Figure 2.3.b). This happens because for a given capacity, the social planner can serve
more customers at the low end by degrading the quality level at the high end.
The existing literature also shows that the monopoly chooses to serve a smaller market
than that of a social planner. Figures 2.2.a and b, similar to Proposition 4, show that this
result does not necessarily hold when the capacity constraint is taken into account. In
this example, when the capacity is suﬃciently small, the monopoly serves a larger market
compared to a social planner. For example, in Figure 2.2 at K = 0.50, both ﬁrms utilize
all their capacity and the monopolist serves the customers with valuation θ ≥ 0.635
whereas the social planner serves only the customers with valuation θ ≥ 0.646. In this
case, the social planner oﬀers only high quality product type while the monopolist oﬀers
both a high and a low quality product type. This helps the monopolist limit the amount
of high quality product oﬀered in the market and keep its prices high. On the other hand,
social planner prefers oﬀering only the high quality product type to a larger customer
segment and consequently generating greater surplus for the customers. Although this
leads to smaller market coverage under social planner, the total surplus of the customers
is greater than the monopoly outcome.
In addition, Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show that a monopoly can lead to the socially eﬃcient
outcome due to the limited capacity. For example, when capacity K = 0.2, both the
social planner and the monopolist oﬀer only a single product type at quality qh = 2, they
both utilize their whole capacity and serve the same customer segment (i.e. θ ≥ 0.86).
Notice that these ﬁndings are consistent with Proposition 5; although the quality levels
are chosen endogenously.
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Finally, Figures 2.1 and 2.3 also show that the quality of the products oﬀered depend
on the capacity level in a non-trivial way. The quality of the lower quality product can be
decreasing in capacity as in Figure 2.1 or it can be increasing in capacity as in Figure 2.3.
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CHAPTER 3
Vertically Diﬀerentiated Product
Line Design Under Competition
In this chapter, we study the vertically diﬀerentiated market problem in duopoly and
oligopoly markets. We analyze the impact of competitor entry and increasing number
of ﬁrms on the optimal product line decisions of the ﬁrm in the existence of capacity
limitations. We also discuss the social welfare eﬀects in competitive settings.
3.1 Related Literature
Competition in vertically diﬀerentiated markets have been studied in diﬀerent contexts.
The oligopolistic setting where each ﬁrm oﬀers only one distinct product has attracted
a lot of attention from the researchers (e.g. Gabszewicz and Thisse (1980), Shaked and
Sutton (1982), Gal-Or (1985), Moorthy (1988), Motta (1993), Wauthy (1996), Chambers
et al. (2006), Jing (2006)). In addition, there is a line of research where the authors
study the eﬀects of vertical diﬀerentiation with the eﬀects of horizontal diﬀerentiation
and brand loyalty (e.g., Gilbert and Matutes (1993), Verboven (1999), Armstrong and
Vickers (2001), Desai (2001), Doraszelski and Draganska (2006), Alderighi (2007)). In
our model, we consider multiproduct competition since ﬁrms have the options of oﬀering
multiple products in their product lines.
The competition in vertically diﬀerentiated multiproduct markets have been studied
under two separate contexts: price-setting games and quantity-setting games. Funda-
mental result in the price setting games is that the symmetric ﬁrms do not oﬀer sym-
metric product lines (e.g. Champsaur and Rochet (1989), Rochet and Stole (2002),
Schmidt-Mohr and Villas-Boas (2008)). This approach fail to explain the head-to-head
competition that is the dominant form of competition in most industries. In practice,
ﬁrms oﬀer similar products. Firms adjust their product lines in response to competitor
entry and try to match the products already oﬀered in the market rather than moving
away from them as claimed in the price-setting games. We will follow the quantity game
approach which has proved to be eﬀective in explaining the head-to-head competition.
We investigate the product line design and capacity allocation problem in a Cournot
setting. Moreover, Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) have shown in a general model that
the price competition would yield same outcomes as the quantity competition when the
capacity is limited for the ﬁrms.
The fundamental result in the quantity setting games is that the symmetric ﬁrms of-
fer symmetric product lines (Gal-Or (1983), DeFraja (1996), Johnson and Myatt (2003),
Johnson and Myatt (2006a)). Although these few papers are related to our work, they
do not take capacity limitations into account. The competition between capacity con-
strained multiproduct ﬁrms in vertically diﬀerentiated markets have not been studied in
the literature. So, we investigate the product line design and capacity allocation problem
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in a Cournot setting; extend the existing results and provide new insights for capacity
constrained cases.
The competition between capacity constrained multiproduct ﬁrms in vertically dif-
ferentiated markets have not been studied in the literature. Although the following few
papers are related to our work, they do not take capacity limitations into account. Gal-
Or (1983) presents an oligopolistic framework where she considers simultaneous quality
and quantity competition among ﬁrms. She studies symmetric equilibria where the av-
erage quality supplied to the market decreases with entry of new ﬁrms. In contrast, in
a duopoly setting, we show that when the capacity is limited for the ﬁrm and the high
quality product has a better capacity-adjusted proﬁt margin, average quality supplied is
greater under competition.
DeFraja (1996) also studies the quantity competition in vertically diﬀerentiated mar-
kets. He aims to explain the head-to-head competition among ﬁrms. The fundamental
result of this paper is that any equilibrium is symmetric if ﬁrms compete in quantities.
We extend this result and show that the symmetric equilibrium is unique even for limited
capacity cases when the market structure is a duopoly. DeFraja (1996) also shows that
the total quantity supplied for any quality or higher increases with competition. Our
ﬁndings for high capacity levels coincide with this result. However, when the capacity
is limited; capacity adjusted proﬁt of high quality product is greater and there is in-
creasing cost to quality ratio, the total quantity supplied by the monopolist is greater
than the total duopoly quantity. Another result discussed in DeFraja (1996) is that the
high quality product is always supplied under competition. We ﬁnd that this result no
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longer holds when capacity is limited for the ﬁrm: if the capacity adjusted proﬁt of low
quality product is greater, then there exists a threshold capacity below which both ﬁrms
optimally oﬀer only the low quality product.
Johnson and Myatt (2003) and Johnson and Myatt (2006a) provide a comprehensive
analysis of the multiproduct quality competition in duopoly and oligopoly settings and
aim to explain how the ﬁrms adjust their product lines in response to competition. They
consider the asymmetric cases as well as diﬀerent marginal revenue and cost assumptions.
When there is decreasing marginal revenues, they show that the incumbent ﬁrm does
not produce distinct products than its monopoly solution in response to competition.
For large capacity levels, our ﬁndings are in line with this result. However, when the
capacity constraint is binding, the ﬁrm may have to adjust its product line in response
to competition. The change could be in the form of pruning a product from the line or
introducing new products depending on the relationships between size, cost and quality
parameters. Johnson and Myatt (2003) and Johnson and Myatt (2006a) also show that if
the ﬁrms are symmetric, then there exists a pure strategy equilibrium that is symmetric.
When there is increasing returns to quality (in our model, decreasing cost to quality
ratio), then both ﬁrms oﬀer only the highest quality that they can produce. Our ﬁndings
coincide with this result for high capacity levels. However, there exists a range of low
capacity levels where the ﬁrms are better oﬀ oﬀering only the low quality product when
the capacity adjusted proﬁt margin is greater for the low quality product.
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3.2 Duopoly
In this chapter, the market structure is a duopoly; there are two ﬁrms, Y and Z, competing
against each other. The ﬁrms simultaneously decide the amount of each product that
will be oﬀered in the market. They participate in a quantity (Cournot) competition
and then the prices are used to clear the market. This setting is more appropriate for
product line design problems with shared capacity where the ﬁrm has to decide how
to allocate the production capacity among products long before the price games are
played between ﬁrms. Moreover, the price competition fails to explain the head-to-head
competition that exists in many industries. It is shown in the literature that a unique
pure strategy equilibrium is not guaranteed under a price competition in a vertically
diﬀerentiated market with multiproduct duopolists (e.g. Champsaur and Rochet (1989),
Rochet and Stole (2002), Schmidt-Mohr and Villas-Boas (2008)). Even for the cases
where an equilibrium exist, it is not symmetric. Nevertheless, in practice many ﬁrms
oﬀer multiple products and target same customer segments as their competitors rather
than focusing on segments away from their competitors.
The ﬁrms, Y and Z have the same limited capacity (K). In this one-shot game, ﬁrms
simultaneously decide how to allocate this capacity among the product oﬀerings given the
competitor’s oﬀerings and customers’ self selection constraints. They set quantities, (yh,
yl) and (zh, zl) respectively. Then the prices (ph,pl) are set to clear the demand of each
product (Dh,Dl). Without loss of generality, we will restrict the analysis to yi + zi = Di
as explained in Chapter 2. Following yi + zi = Di(ph, pl), the optimal prices of the
products can be expressed as a function of capacity allocations yi and zi: ph(yh, yl, zh, zl)
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and pl(yh, yl, zh, zl) respectively.
3.2.1 Analysis
We will solve the problem for symmetric ﬁrms where the available technology and the
business strategies of the ﬁrms do not put any restrictions on the menu of oﬀerings: Both
ﬁrms have the ability to choose and oﬀer both products. The ﬁrm Y solves the following
optimization problem given the best response function (z∗h, z
∗
l ) of ﬁrm Z, self selection of
the customers, and the available capacity K:
max
yh,yl≥0
(ph(yh, yl, z
∗
h, z
∗
l )− ch)yh + (pl(yh, yl, z∗h, z∗l )− cl)yl
subject to shyh + slyl ≤ K
The objective function of this problem is jointly concave on a convex set deﬁned by
linear constraints, therefore the optimal solution can be obtained by solving the ﬁrst
order conditions (Bazaraa et al. (2006)).
In the following paragraphs, we characterize the symmetric duopolists’ optimal prod-
uct line in a simultaneous game. We look for a pure strategy (Nash) equilibrium under
various unit cost, quality and resource consumption assumptions. Propositions 6 and 7
describe the optimal policy when there are increasing cost to quality (i.e., ch/qh > cl/ql)
and decreasing cost to quality (i.e., ch/qh < cl/ql) respectively.
In the literature, Gal-Or (1983), DeFraja (1996), and Johnson and Myatt (2003) have
shown that a quantity competition in a vertically diﬀerentiated market yields a unique
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symmetric equilibrium. Our ﬁndings extend this result: Unique symmetric equilibrium
exists even for limited capacity levels. All proofs appear in the Appendix B. Additional
threshold capacities (K¯D1 − K¯D5 and K¯TD1 − K¯TD5 ) are deﬁned in Appendix B Equations
(B-7)-(B-16) which will be useful for describing the ﬁrm’s optimal policy.
Proposition 6 Suppose cl/ql < ch/qh. The game has a unique, symmetric pure strategy
Nash equilibrium as follows:
i) If ql − cl ≥ qh − ch, then the optimal strategy for the duopolist ﬁrm is to focus and
oﬀer only the low quality product for all capacity levels.
ii.a) If qh − ch > ql − cl and qh−chsh <
ql−cl
sl
, then
- if K ≤ K¯D1 , the optimal product line strategy for the duopolist ﬁrm is to focus
and oﬀer only the low quality product.
- if K > K¯D1 , the optimal product line strategy for the duopolist ﬁrm is to
diﬀerentiate and oﬀer both products.
ii.b) If qh − ch > ql − cl and qh−chsh ≥
ql−cl
sl
, then
- if K ≤ K¯D2 , the optimal product line strategy for the duopolist ﬁrm is to focus
and oﬀer only the high quality product.
- if K > K¯D2 , the optimal product line strategy for the duopolist ﬁrm is to
diﬀerentiate and oﬀer both products.
Part (i) in Proposition 6 describes the trivial case where it is always better to focus
on the economy class. Part (ii.a) and (ii.b) describe what happens when the maximum
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margin for the ﬁrst class qh− ch is greater. In this case, we ﬁnd that the optimal product
line of the duopolist ﬁrm depends on its capacity. It is a generalization of the result that
is established for the monopoly case.
Johnson and Myatt (2003) characterize the solution for this problem with no capacity
constraints and show that the optimal strategy for the ﬁrm is to diﬀerentiate and produce
both products like the monopoly case. The ﬁrm oﬀers low quality product together with
the high quality product in order to price-discriminate among customers and make higher
proﬁts even under competitive threats. Our ﬁndings are in line with this result when the
capacity is large enough. However, as we have shown for the monopoly and generalize it
here for the duopoly that the ﬁrm’s choice of product oﬀerings could be diﬀerent when
the capacity is limited. Then, the ﬁrm should choose the product that potentially brings
more proﬁt per unit resource consumed which may not be the high quality product, even
under competitive threats.
It is also suggested in the literature that the high quality product is always oﬀered
in a duopoly market (DeFraja (1996), Johnson and Myatt (2003)). In contrast, we show
that focusing on the low quality product may be the optimal strategy when the ﬁrm is
capacity constrained and the potential proﬁt per unit resource consumed is greater for
the low quality product.
Proposition 7 Suppose ch/qh ≤ cl/ql. The game has a unique, symmetric pure strategy
Nash equilibrium as follows:
i) If qh−ch
sh
< ql−cl
sl
, then
- if K ≤ K¯D1 , the optimal product line strategy for the duopolist ﬁrm is to focus
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and oﬀer only the low quality product.
- if K¯D1 < K ≤ K¯D2 , the optimal product line strategy for the duopolist ﬁrm is
to diﬀerentiate and oﬀer both products.
- if K > K¯D2 , the optimal product line strategy for the duopolist ﬁrm is to focus
and oﬀer only the high quality product.
ii) If qh−ch
sh
≥ ql−cl
sl
, then the optimal strategy for the duopolist ﬁrm is to focus and oﬀer
only the high quality product for all capacity levels.
Proposition 7 generalizes the result to competitive markets that is discussed for the
monopoly case in Proposition 2. Here, we characterize the duopolist ﬁrm’s optimal policy
when there are decreasing costs to quality i.e., ch/qh ≤ cl/ql. In this case, maximum
margin for the ﬁrst class qh− ch is always greater. The result in the literature is to focus
and oﬀer only the high quality product under these conditions (DeFraja (1996), Johnson
and Myatt (2003)). Our ﬁndings are consistent with this result: when the capacity is
large enough, the ﬁrm should focus and oﬀer only the high quality product even under
competition. Nevertheless, we also show that when the capacity is limited, this result no
longer holds for some cases. Part (i) describes the case where the potential proﬁt per unit
resource consumed is greater for the low quality product. The resources become more
important than the self selection and cannibalization hazards; the ﬁrm has to focus on
the low quality product as opposed to the high quality product and slowly introduce the
high quality product to the market. In this case, the ﬁrm that disregards the capacity
constraint would be oﬀering the wrong product to the market. Part (ii) describes the
case where it is always better to focus on the ﬁrst class.
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3.2.2 Eﬀects of Firm Entry
There are many cases in practice where a ﬁrm changes its product line when another ﬁrm
enters the market. These eﬀects of competitor entry on the product line decisions of an
incumbent ﬁrm are widely discussed in the product line design literature (e.g. DeFraja
(1996), Johnson and Myatt (2003)). The incumbent ﬁrm either oﬀers new products that
are not sold otherwise or deletes some products from its product line. The situation we
study in this section is as follows: At the beginning, the incumbent ﬁrm is a monopoly.
Its solution is as provided in Section 2.3. Then, a symmetric ﬁrm enters the market.
We assume there are no barriers or ﬁxed costs for entry and the market is stable with
these two ﬁrms. In response to entry from this new ﬁrm, the incumbent ﬁrm adjusts its
product line. In the following paragraphs, we will compare the incumbent ﬁrm’s solution
under competition to its monopoly solution and try to understand the eﬀects of ﬁrm
entry on the ﬁrm’s optimal product line. The market size is kept the same whereas the
total capacity in the market doubles with the symmetric entrant acting in the market.
Johnson and Myatt (2003) aim to explain the product line pruning and emergence
of new products in response to entry. They provide many examples from a variety of
industries including computer hardware, airlines and the market for watches where the
ﬁrms adjust their product lines in response to entry from other ﬁrms. They explain
these phenomena through diﬀerent assumptions for revenue and technology functions.
We show that product line pruning and emergence of new products can also be explained
by the capacity limitations of the ﬁrms.
Proposition 8 When (qh− ch > ql− cl) , and (qh− ch)/sh < (ql− cl)/sl, the incumbent
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ﬁrm introduces the high quality product to the product mix in response to entry for K¯D1 <
K < K¯M1 when there is increasing cost to quality ratio; and for K¯
D
1 < K < min{K¯M1 , K¯D2 }
when there is decreasing cost to quality ratio.
The condition in Proposition 8 covers the instances where the potential proﬁt per
unit resource consumed by low quality product is greater. Then, the incumbent ﬁrm is
better oﬀ focusing on the low quality product when it has very limited capacity both
as a monopolist and as a duopolist. The thresholds are K¯M1 and K¯
D
1 respectively. The
supply is so low below these thresholds such that the focus of the ﬁrm is to produce as
much as it can and keep the prices as high as possible for the available supply in the
market. The prices are too high for the products such that the demand for the high
quality product diminishes below these thresholds. However, in the case of duopoly,
prices drop a lot faster than in the case of monopoly both due to capacity increase and
competitive pressures. With the falling prices, the demand for the high quality product
starts to establish at K¯D1 for the ﬁrm under competition and at only K¯
M
1 for the ﬁrm
when it acts as a monopolist. We note that when there is decreasing cost to quality ratio,
the ﬁrm ceases the low quality production all together at a second capacity threshold
(K¯M2 , K¯
D
2 respectively where K¯
D
2 < K¯
M
2 ). Thus, for the range of capacities presented in
the Proposition 8, the ﬁrm’s best response to competition is to introduce high quality
product to the market due to the price decrease as well as the supply increase. In a way,
eﬀect of entry of a competitor is relaxing the capacity constraint a little for the ﬁrm. The
response of the ﬁrm may also be introducing low quality products to the market.
Proposition 9 When (qh − ch)/sh > (ql − cl)/sl and there is increasing cost to quality
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ratio, the incumbent ﬁrm introduces the low quality product to the product mix in response
to entry for K¯D2 < K < K¯
M
2 .
The condition in Proposition 9 covers the case when there is increasing cost to quality
ratio and the potential proﬁt per unit resource consumed by high quality product is
greater. Then, the ﬁrm sells high quality product for high prices and introduce low
quality product when there is enough capacity and demand in the market. Then, the
thresholds are K¯M1 and K¯
D
1 respectively for the ﬁrm acting as a monopoly and the ﬁrm
under competition. The supply is so low below these thresholds such that the focus of
the ﬁrm is to produce as much as it can and keep the prices as high as possible for the
available supply in the market. The capacity is so tight that the no capacity remains for
the low quality product below these thresholds. However, in the case of duopoly, capacity
increases with the entry of the competitor increasing the available supply in the market
which eventually drives the prices down a lot faster. With the falling prices, the demand
for the low quality product starts to establish at K¯D2 for the ﬁrm under competition and
at only K¯M2 for the ﬁrm when it acts as a monopolist. Thus, for the range of capacities
presented in the Proposition 9, the ﬁrm’s best response to competition is to introduce low
quality product to the market. Another response of ﬁrms may be pruning the products
from the product lines.
Proposition 10 When (qh− ch)/sh < (ql − cl)/sl and there is decreasing cost to quality
ratio, the incumbent ﬁrm prunes the low quality product from the product mix in response
to entry for K¯D2 < K < K¯
M
2 .
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When there is decreasing cost to quality ratio, if the ﬁrm has large enough capacity,
the optimal solution is to focus and oﬀer only the high quality product both under
monopoly and duopoly markets. However, if the capacity is below a threshold level,
the ﬁrm has to oﬀer the low quality product in addition due to capacity limitations.
The thresholds are K¯M2 and K¯
D
2 respectively for the ﬁrm acting as a monopoly and the
ﬁrm under competition. For the range of capacities given in Propositions 10 if the ﬁrm
keeps low quality product even in the existence of competitor, it will only result in the
cannibalization of demand for the high quality product due to the excess supply in the
market. Thus, the ﬁrm ceases the production of low quality product at those capacities
in response to competitor entry.
Under the conditions presented in Propositions 8, 9, 10 the literature suggests that
the ﬁrm does not produce any distinct products than the monopoly solution in response
to entry (Johnson and Myatt (2003)). Similarly, in an oligopolistic framework, DeFraja
(1996) shows that number of products supplied in the market is non-increasing in the
number of ﬁrms entering the market. Our ﬁndings in a duopoly setting coincide with
these results when the capacity is large enough. However, for limited capacity levels, the
monopolist may choose to adjust its product line in response to entry. This adjustment
could be in the form of pruning some products from the product line or introducing new
products. There are two drivers behind these actions: one is the competition and the
other is the increased capacity in the market. With the entrant in the market, prices
decrease and demand increases for the products as well as the available supply. While
in the monopoly market, the ﬁrm would be still concerned about the eﬃcient use of
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resources due to limited capacity levels; in the duopoly market, the ﬁrm has to share
the same market with its competitor. More supply is available to the market. With this
increased supply, the ﬁrm is more concerned with price discrimination policies compared
to its strategy as a monopolist.
3.2.3 Eﬀects of Capacity Consolidations
In this section, we will discuss pure eﬀects of competition on the product line decisions
of ﬁrms through a discussion of ﬁrm mergers. Mergers and acquisitions are relevant to
many industries. The merger between two ﬁrms causes the elimination of the competition
from the market. We will compare the solutions of two duopolists to the solution of an
integrated ﬁrm formed by the merger of these two ﬁrms. Hence, the change in the product
line could be explained solely by the elimination of competitive pressures. The eﬀect of
a merger between two competitive ﬁrms can be introducing or pruning some products
from the product line.
Proposition 11 When (qh− ch > ql− cl) , and (qh− ch)/sh < (ql− cl)/sl, the integrated
ﬁrm introduces the high quality product to the product mix whereas the non-cooperative
duopolists do not oﬀer it for the total market capacity levels of K¯M1 < K < K¯
TD
1 when
there is increasing cost to quality ratio; and for the total market capacity levels of K¯M1 <
K < min{K¯M2 , K¯TD1 } when there is decreasing cost to quality ratio.
Under the conditions presented in Proposition 11, both the non-cooperative duopolists
and the integrated monopolist optimally focus on the low quality product below a spe-
ciﬁc threshold, K¯TD1 and K¯
M
1 respectively. However, the competitive pressure leads the
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duopolist ﬁrms increase the supply for a given product (low quality product in this case)
and drive the prices down. The integrated monopolist has the power to keep the total
supply under control and not let the prices go ineﬃciently low. This way the monopolist
can introduce the high quality product and price-discriminate among the customers for
lower capacity levels than the non-cooperative duopolists. When there is decreasing cost
to quality ratio, the ﬁrms actually cease the low quality production all together at a sec-
ond capacity threshold (K¯M2 , K¯
TD
2 respectively where K¯
M
2 < K¯
TD
2 ). Thus, for the range
of capacities presented in the Proposition 11, the elimination of competition leads the
ﬁrms to introduce the high quality product to the market. In other words, competition
requires greater capacity availability to have the price-discrimination policies come into
eﬀect. The result of the elimination of competition may also be introducing low quality
products to the market.
Proposition 12 When (qh− ch)/sh > (ql − cl)/sl and there is increasing cost to quality
ratio, the integrated ﬁrm introduces the low quality product to the product mix whereas
the non-cooperative duopolists do not oﬀer it for K¯M2 < K < K¯
TD
2 .
The condition in Proposition 12 covers the case when there is increasing cost to
quality ratio and the potential proﬁt per unit resource consumed by high quality product
is greater. Then, the ﬁrms sell high quality product for high prices and introduce low
quality product when there is enough capacity and demand in the market. Then, the
thresholds are K¯TD2 and K¯
M
2 respectively for the non-cooperative duopolists and the
integrated ﬁrm. The competitive pressure leads the duopolist ﬁrms increase the supply
for the high quality product and drive the prices down. The integrated monopolist has
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the power to keep the total supply under control and not let the prices go ineﬃciently
low. This way the monopolist can introduce the low quality product and keep the price
high for the high quality product while increasing the overall demand by introducing
the low quality product to the market. Thus, for the range of capacities presented in
the Proposition 12, the elimination of competition leads the ﬁrms to introduce the low
quality product to the market. The result of the elimination of competition may also be
pruning low quality products from the product line.
Proposition 13 When (qh− ch)/sh < (ql − cl)/sl and there is decreasing cost to quality
ratio, the integrated ﬁrm prunes the low quality product from the product mix whereas the
non-cooperative duopolists continue to oﬀer it for K¯M2 < K < K¯
TD
2 .
Under the conditions presented in Proposition 13, below the total market capacity
threshold K¯M2 , the ﬁrms optimally oﬀer both products to the market. Again, the com-
petitive pressure forces the ﬁrms to drive prices down and oﬀer ineﬃciently high supply
to the market. On the other hand, the integrated ﬁrm can keep the prices and the supply
at the optimal level. Thus, for the range of capacities given in Proposition 13, the inte-
grated ﬁrm ceases the production of the low quality product, decrease the total supply
and increase the prices when the competition is eliminated from the market.
When there is increasing cost to quality ratio and the capacity adjusted proﬁt margin
is greater for the high quality product, the total quantity sold by the integrated ﬁrm
is greater than the total quantity sold by the non-cooperative duopolists for a range of
capacity levels. Moreover, average quality may increase with competition as opposed to
the results presented in the literature.
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Proposition 14 When (qh− ch)/sh > (ql − cl)/sl and there is increasing cost to quality
ratio,
∑
i xi >
∑
i yi + zi for K¯
M
2 < K < min{K¯M3 , K¯TD2 }. Moreover, the average quality
of the products supplied increases as a result of the competition.
We showed that the actual amount of products supplied in the market is greater for the
monopolist. This is in contrast with the literature where the monopoly quantity is shown
to be smaller than the total duopoly quantity (DeFraja (1996)). In addition, we show
that the average quality of the products supplied under the integrated ﬁrm is less than
the average quality of the products supplied in the duopoly market. This is in contrast
to Gal-Or (1983) who shows that the average quality supplied to the market decreases
with entry of new ﬁrms. When the capacity and resource consumptions are taken into
account, under the conditions presented in Proposition 14, the competition forces the
duopolist ﬁrms decrease prices lower than most proﬁtable levels and no capacity is left to
price-discriminate the customer base. However, the integrated monopolist has the power
to keep the prices high and use the remaining capacity for low quality production. Since
both the duopolists and the integrated monopolist are capacity constrained at the given
range of capacities and low quality product consumes less resources, the actual amount
of products supplied in the market is greater for the monopolist.
3.3 Oligopoly
In this section, the market structure is an oligopoly; there are n ≥ 2 ﬁrms. The ﬁrms
simultaneously decide the amount of each product that will be oﬀered in the market.
They participate in a quantity (Cournot) competition and then the prices are used to
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clear the market. The ﬁrms have the same limited capacity (K). Since the market size
is normalized to the unit mass, the capacity parameter in this formulation could also be
regarded as the capacity-to-market size ratio. In the thesis, limited capacity should be
perceived as small capacity relative to the market size.
In this one-shot game, ﬁrms simultaneously decide how to allocate their capacity
among the product oﬀerings given the competitors’ oﬀerings and customers’ self selec-
tion constraints. The available technology and the business strategies of the ﬁrms do not
put any restrictions on the menu of oﬀerings: All ﬁrms have the ability to choose and
oﬀer both products. The ﬁrm W sets quantities, (wh and wl) given the best response
functions (t(−w)∗h, t(−w)∗l ) of all ﬁrms except W, self selection of the customers, and
the available capacity K. Then the prices (ph,pl) are set to clear the demand of each
product (Dh,Dl). Since this is a single period game with no inventory or backlog consid-
erations and since the capacity allocation is a costly action, we will restrict the analysis
to Di = t(−w)∗i +w∗i = t∗i without loss of generality. Then, the optimal prices of the prod-
ucts can be expressed as a function of capacity allocations: ph(w
∗
h, w
∗
l , t(−w)∗h, t(−w)∗l )
and pl(w
∗
h, w
∗
l , t(−w)∗h, t(−w)∗l ) respectively. Then the ﬁrm W solves the following opti-
mization problem given the best response functions and self selection of the customers
subject to the available capacity K:
max
wh,wl≥0
(ph(wh, wl, t(−w)∗h, t(−w)∗l )− ch)wh + (pl(wh, wl, t(−w)∗h, t(−w)∗l )− cl)wl
subject to shwh + slwl ≤ K
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We look for a symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium under various unit cost, qual-
ity and resource consumption assumptions. Since the objective function of this problem
is jointly concave on a convex set deﬁned by linear constraints, the optimal solution
can be obtained by solving the ﬁrst order conditions (Bazaraa et al. (2006)). In the
following paragraphs, we characterize the symmetric oligopolists’ optimal product line
in a simultaneous game. Propositions 15 and 16 describe the optimal policy when there
are increasing cost to quality (i.e., ch/qh > cl/ql) and decreasing cost to quality (i.e.,
ch/qh < cl/ql) respectively. Additional threshold capacities that depend on the num-
ber of ﬁrms (n) (K¯
(n)
1 − K¯(n)5 and K¯T (n)1 − K¯T (n)5 ) are deﬁned in Appendix B Equations
(B-17)-(B-26) which will be useful for describing the ﬁrm’s optimal policy.
Proposition 15 Suppose cl/ql < ch/qh. The game has a symmetric pure strategy Nash
equilibrium as follows:
i) If ql− cl ≥ qh− ch, then the optimal strategy for the oligopolist ﬁrm is to focus and
oﬀer only the low quality product for all capacity levels.
ii.a) If qh − ch > ql − cl and qh−chsh <
ql−cl
sl
, then
- if K ≤ K¯(n)1 , the optimal product line strategy for the oligopolist ﬁrm is to
focus and oﬀer only the low quality product.
- if K > K¯
(n)
1 , the optimal product line strategy for the oligopolist ﬁrm is to
diﬀerentiate and oﬀer both products.
ii.b) If qh − ch > ql − cl and qh−chsh ≥
ql−cl
sl
, then
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- if K ≤ K¯(n)2 , the optimal product line strategy for the oligopolist ﬁrm is to
focus and oﬀer only the high quality product.
- if K > K¯
(n)
2 , the optimal product line strategy for the oligopolist ﬁrm is to
diﬀerentiate and oﬀer both products.
Part (i) in Proposition 15 describes the trivial case where it is always better to focus on
the low quality product. Part (ii.a) and (ii.b) describe what happens when the maximum
margin for the high quality product qh−ch is greater. In this case, we ﬁnd that the optimal
product line of the oligopolist ﬁrm depends on its capacity.
Johnson and Myatt (2003) and Johnson and Myatt (2006a) characterize the solution
for this problem with no capacity constraints and show that the optimal strategy for the
ﬁrm is to diﬀerentiate and produce both products. The ﬁrm oﬀers low quality product
together with the high quality product in order to price-discriminate among customers
and make higher proﬁts. Our ﬁndings are in line with this result when the capacity is
large enough. Firms choose to price discriminate to keep the prices of the high quality
product high but at the same time beneﬁt from the low costs and high demand for the
low quality product.
However, the proposition suggest that the ﬁrm’s choice of product oﬀerings could be
diﬀerent when the capacity is limited. For low capacity levels, the ﬁrm should choose the
product that potentially brings more proﬁt per unit resource consumed which may not
be the high quality product. Below a threshold capacity level, the economic force leading
the ﬁrm’s decision is no longer the beneﬁts of price discrimination nor the competitive
threats: it is the intraﬁrm competition of the products for the limited resources. The
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resources of the ﬁrm is so scarce that the demand even for all those ﬁrms is high enough
such that all that can be produced will surely be sold. At that point the ﬁrm should
decide which product has more potential to bring more proﬁt with the limited resources
at hand and make that decision even if it means ceasing the production of the high
quality product.
Proposition 16 Suppose ch/qh ≤ cl/ql. The game has a symmetric pure strategy Nash
equilibrium as follows:
i) If qh−ch
sh
< ql−cl
sl
, then
- if K ≤ K¯(n)1 , the optimal product line strategy for the oligopolist ﬁrm is to
focus and oﬀer only the low quality product.
- if K¯
(n)
1 < K ≤ K¯(n)2 , the optimal product line strategy for the oligopolist ﬁrm
is to diﬀerentiate and oﬀer both products.
- if K > K¯
(n)
2 , the optimal product line strategy for the oligopolist ﬁrm is to
focus and oﬀer only the high quality product.
ii) If qh−ch
sh
≥ ql−cl
sl
, then the optimal strategy for the oligopolist ﬁrm is to focus and
oﬀer only the high quality product for all capacity levels.
Proposition 16 characterizes the oligopolist ﬁrm’s optimal policy when there are de-
creasing costs to quality i.e., ch/qh ≤ cl/ql. In this case, maximum margin for the high
quality product (qh − ch) is always greater. The result in the literature is to focus and
oﬀer only the high quality product under these conditions (DeFraja (1996), Johnson and
Myatt (2003), Johnson and Myatt (2006a)). Our ﬁndings are consistent with this result:
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when the capacity is large enough, the ﬁrm should focus and oﬀer only the high quality
product. In this case, the cannibalization hazards outweighs the beneﬁts of price dis-
crimination and the ﬁrms choose to eliminate the low quality product from their product
lines. High quality product wins the intraﬁrm competition for demand due to higher
expected proﬁts.
Nevertheless, we also show that when the capacity is limited, this result no longer
holds for some cases. Part (i) describes the case where the potential proﬁt per unit
resource consumed is greater for the low quality product. Economic forces that lead the
ﬁrms’ decisions change below K¯
(n)
2 . At that capacity level, the ﬁrm’s solution is already
capacity constrained which means that the demand is high enough for the industry such
that all production will surely be sold. Then, the intraﬁrm competition starts to prevail.
We show that below K¯
(n)
2 , the intraﬁrm competition for the resources is the economic
force behind the ﬁrms’ actions. The ﬁrm has to oﬀer low quality product which consumes
less resources together with the high quality product. The ﬁrm has to beneﬁt from the
economies of scale that could be realized with the production of the low quality product.
Moreover, we show that there exists another threshold K¯
(n)
1 belwo which the ﬁrm has
no longer have the luxury to oﬀer high proﬁt high quality product. When the capacity
is so limited, the ﬁrm is better oﬀ oﬀering only the low quality product. Low quality
product wins the competition for resources in spite of the lower unit proﬁts due to higher
potential proﬁts per unit resource consumed. In this case, remember that the ﬁrm that
disregards the capacity constraint would be oﬀering only the high quality product which
is the wrong product to the market. Part (ii) describes the case where it is always better
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to focus on the high quality product.
3.3.1 Eﬀects of Competition From a Firm’s Point of View
We will look for the generalization of the results that we have obtained for the duopoly
case. The situation we study in this section is as follows: At the beginning, the ﬁrm is
competing with (n-1) ﬁrms; hence, there are n ﬁrms in the market with capacity K. Then,
another symmetric ﬁrm enters the market; now there are (n+1) ﬁrms in the market with
capacity K. The market size is kept the same whereas the total capacity in the market
increases with the symmetric entry to the market. In response to entry from this new
ﬁrm, we try to understand whether the ﬁrms adjust their product lines. In the following
paragraphs, we will compare the ﬁrm’s solution under competition with (n-1) ﬁrms to
its solution under competition with n ﬁrms.
Proposition 17 When (qh − ch > ql − cl) , and (qh − ch)/sh < (ql − cl)/sl, the ﬁrm
introduces the high quality product to the product mix in response to increasing competition
for K¯
(n+1)
1 < K < K¯
(n)
1 when there is increasing cost to quality ratio; and for K¯
(n+1)
1 <
K < min{K¯(n)1 , K¯(n+1)2 } when there is decreasing cost to quality ratio.
The condition in Proposition 17 covers the instances where the potential proﬁt per
unit resource consumed by low quality product is greater. Then, the ﬁrm is better oﬀ
focusing on the low quality product when it has very limited capacity in both cases. The
thresholds are K¯
(n)
1 and K¯
(n+1)
1 respectively. The supply is so low below these thresholds
such that the focus of the ﬁrm is to produce as much as it can. However, in the case with
n+1 ﬁrms, prices drop a lot faster than in the case with n ﬁrms both due to increasing
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capacity and competitive pressures. We note that when there is decreasing cost to quality
ratio, the ﬁrm ceases the low quality production all together at a second capacity thresh-
old (K¯
(n)
2 , K¯
(n+1)
2 respectively where K¯
(n+1)
2 < K¯
(n)
2 ). Thus, for the range of capacities
presented in the Proposition 17, the ﬁrm’s best response to increasing competition is to
introduce high quality product to the market due to the price decrease as well as the
supply increase. In a way, eﬀect of more competition is relaxing the capacity constraint a
little for the ﬁrm. The response of the ﬁrm may also be introducing low quality products
to the market.
Proposition 18 When (qh − ch)/sh > (ql − cl)/sl and there is increasing cost to qual-
ity ratio, the ﬁrm introduces the low quality product to the product mix in response to
increasing competition for K¯
(n+1)
2 < K < K¯
(n)
2 .
The condition in Proposition 18 covers the case when there is increasing cost to
quality ratio and the potential proﬁt per unit resource consumed by high quality product
is greater. Then, the ﬁrm sells high quality product for high prices and introduce low
quality product when there is enough capacity and demand in the market. Then, the
thresholds are K¯
(n)
1 and K¯
(n+1)
1 respectively for the ﬁrm in two markets. The capacity is
so tight that the no capacity remains for the low quality product below these thresholds.
However, in the case of n+1 ﬁrms, capacity increases with the entry of new ﬁrm increasing
the available supply in the market which eventually drives the prices down a lot faster.
With the falling prices, the demand for the low quality product starts to establish at
K¯
(n+1)
2 . Thus, for the range of capacities presented in the Proposition 18, the ﬁrm’s best
response to increasing competition is to introduce low quality product to the market.
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Another response of ﬁrms may be pruning the products from the product lines.
Proposition 19 When (qh − ch)/sh < (ql − cl)/sl and there is decreasing cost to qual-
ity ratio, the ﬁrm prunes the low quality product from the product mix in response to
increasing competition for K¯
(n+1)
2 < K < K¯
(n)
2 .
When there is decreasing cost to quality ratio, if the ﬁrm has large enough capacity,
the optimal solution is to focus and oﬀer only the high quality product. However, if
the capacity is below a threshold level, the ﬁrm has to oﬀer the low quality product in
addition due to capacity limitations. The thresholds are K¯
(n)
2 and K¯
(n+1)
2 respectively.
Under the conditions presented in Propositions 17, 18, 19, DeFraja (1996) shows
that number of products supplied in the market is non-increasing in the number of ﬁrms
entering the market. Our ﬁndings coincide with these results when the capacity is large
enough. However, for limited capacity levels, the ﬁrm may choose to adjust its product
line in response to increasing competition. This adjustment could be in the form of
pruning some products from the product line or introducing new products. There are
two drivers behind these actions: one is the competition and the other is the increased
capacity in the market. With the new ﬁrm in the market, prices decrease and demand
increases for the products as well as the available supply. We also note that the thresholds
have greater impact when n is small. The eﬀect of increasing competition diminishes as
n increases.
In general, the supply of a single ﬁrm decreases as new ﬁrms enter the market. We ﬁnd
that under some conditions, individual supply of the high quality product may actually
increase as the number of ﬁrms increases in the market.
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Proposition 20 When (qh − ch)/sh < (ql − cl)/sl, ∂nw∗h ≥ 0 for 0 < K < K¯(n)3 when
ch/qh > cl/ql; and for 0 < K < K¯
(n)
4 when ch/qh ≤ cl/ql.
In particular, when the potential proﬁt per unit resource consumed by high quality
product is smaller than the low quality product, the threshold is K¯
(n)
3 when there are in-
creasing costs to quality; and it is K¯
(n)
4 when there are decreasing costs to quality. Below
either threshold, the dominating economic force is the eﬃcient allocation of resources.
We would expect that the increasing competition should decrease the production for
both products. The competition is tougher on the more eﬃcient product, i.e. low quality
product. The individual production of the low quality product decreases because the
whole industry supply increases and prices decrease as well. With the decrease in the
production of one product, the ﬁrm has excess resources that it can dedicate for produc-
tion of the less preferred product, i.e. the high quality product. As a result, individual
supply of the high quality product increases as the number of ﬁrms increases in the mar-
ket. We also ﬁnd that individual supply of the low quality product may also increase as
the number of ﬁrms increase in the market.
Proposition 21 When (qh − ch)/sh > (ql − cl)/sl and ch/qh > cl/ql, ∂nw∗l ≥ 0 for
0 < K < K¯
(n)
3 .
On the other hand, when the potential proﬁt per unit resource consumed by low
quality product is smaller than the high quality product, the threshold is K¯
(n)
3 when
there are increasing costs to quality; and the low quality production is no longer optimal
when there are decreasing costs to quality. With the similar argument, the competition
is tougher on the more eﬃcient product, i.e. high quality product. The individual
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production of the high quality product decreases because the whole industry supply
increases and prices decrease as well. With the decrease in the production of one product,
the ﬁrm has excess resources that it can dedicate for production of the less preferred
product, i.e. the low quality product. As a result, individual supply of the low quality
product increases as the number of ﬁrms increases in the market.
3.3.2 Eﬀects of Competition on Industry Supply
We discuss the eﬀects of market concentration on the product line decisions of ﬁrms.
In this case, the total market capacity is kept constant at K in order to have a fair
comparison on the total supply quantities between diﬀerent concentrations of the market.
In this setting, if there are n ﬁrms, then each ﬁrm has capacity K/n. When the number
of ﬁrms acting in the market increases, market concentration decreases and each ﬁrm
has smaller capacity. The following propositions discuss the eﬀect of changing market
concentration on the product variety. The eﬀect of increasing the market concentration
can be introducing or pruning some products from the market.
Proposition 22 When (qh − ch > ql − cl) , and (qh − ch)/sh < (ql − cl)/sl, the n+1
ﬁrm market do not oﬀer high quality product whereas the n-ﬁrm market oﬀer it for the
total capacity levels of K¯
T (n)
1 < K < K¯
T (n+1)
1 when there is increasing cost to quality
ratio; and for the total capacity levels of K¯
T (n)
1 < K < min{K¯T (n)2 , K¯T (n+1)1 } when there
is decreasing cost to quality ratio.
Under the conditions presented in Proposition 22, both markets optimally focus on
the low quality product below a speciﬁc threshold K¯
T (n)
1 . Below this threshold, ﬁrms do
57
not have the luxury to think about the beneﬁts of segmentation but they need to use
the limited resources most eﬃciently and choose to focus on the product that potentially
brings more proﬁt per unit resource it consumes, i.e. low quality product. However, when
the n-ﬁrm market reaches K¯
T (n)
1 total capacity level, the ﬁrms ﬁnd it more proﬁtable to
start segmenting the market and oﬀer high quality product together with the low quality
product. For the (n+1)-ﬁrm market, the competitive forces dominate the decision process
leading to an increase in the current supply of the low quality product further. This
increase in the total supply leaves no room for the high quality production in terms of
resources. The ﬁrms do not start the production of the high quality product if total
capacity is less than K¯
T (n+1)
1 . When there is decreasing cost to quality ratio, since the
industry supply of low quality product is zero beyond K¯
T (n)
2 for the n-ﬁrm market and
the order of K¯
T (n)
2 and K¯
T (n+1)
1 } is ambiguous, the upper limit of the capacity range
is presented as the minimum of the two. Thus, due to increasing interﬁrm competitive
pressures (decreasing market concentration), the product variety oﬀered in the market
is diﬀerent for the ranges presented in Proposition 22. In this case, competitive forces
delay the high quality production. The result of the increasing competition may also be
delaying the low quality production as presented in the following proposition.
Proposition 23 When (qh− ch)/sh > (ql − cl)/sl and there is increasing cost to quality
ratio, the n+1 ﬁrm market do not oﬀer the low quality product whereas the n-ﬁrm market
oﬀers it for K¯
T (n)
2 < K < K¯
T (n+1)
2 .
The condition in Proposition 23 covers the case when there is increasing cost to qual-
ity ratio and the unit proﬁt as well as the potential proﬁt per unit resource consumed by
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high quality product is greater. Then, the ﬁrms sell high quality product for eﬃcient use
of resources and introduce low quality product when there is enough capacity compared
to the demand in the market. The speciﬁc thresholds for n-ﬁrm and (n+1)-ﬁrm markets
are K¯
T (n)
2 and K¯
T (n+1)
2 respectively. The increasing competitive pressure leads the indi-
vidual ﬁrms decrease the production for the high quality product while the total supply
increase in the industry which drives the prices down. The less competitive market has
comparatively more power to keep the total supply under control. This way they can
keep the price for the high quality product higher while increasing the overall demand
by introducing the low quality product to the market for the remaining capacity. Thus,
for the range of capacities presented in the Proposition 23, competitive forces delay the
low quality production. In contrast, the result of decreasing market concentration may
also be increasing the product variety as presented in the following proposition.
Proposition 24 When (qh− ch)/sh < (ql − cl)/sl and there is decreasing cost to quality
ratio, the n+1 ﬁrm market oﬀer the low quality product whereas the n-ﬁrm market prunes
it for K¯
T (n)
2 < K < K¯
T (n+1)
2 .
Under the conditions presented in Proposition 24, below the total market capacity
threshold K¯
T (n)
2 , the ﬁrms in both markets optimally oﬀer both products to the market.
In that case, the intraﬁrm competition for the resources is the economic force behind the
ﬁrms’ actions as presented in Proposition 16. The ﬁrm has to oﬀer low quality product
which consumes less resources together with the high quality product regardless of the
fact that cost to quality ratio favors the high quality product in the market. Beyond
K¯
T (n)
2 , n-ﬁrm market discontinues the low quality production and proﬁtably focus on the
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high quality product. Under the set of conditions presented in Proposition 24, when the
demand becomes small relative to the available capacity, the optimal decision for the ﬁrm
is to focus on the high quality production. Beyond the capacity threshold K¯
T (n+1)
2 , the
leading economic force is the fact that the low quality may cannibalize the demand for
the high quality product. However, greater competition in the (n+1) ﬁrm market results
in lower prices which leads the ﬁrms to increase the production for the the product that
potentially brings more proﬁt per unit resource it consumes, i.e. low quality product.
This behavior in turn delays the ﬁrms’ decision to cease low quality production. This
in turn leads to greater product variety for the range of capacities presented in the
Proposition 24 due to decreasing market concentration.
In the standard textbook explanation of the eﬀects of market concentration, it says
that the total market supply of a product increases as the number of ﬁrms acting in the
market increases for homogeneous goods industries. It also mentions that the market
clearing prices of the products decrease as the market concentration decreases. The liter-
ature investigating vertically diﬀerentiated industries has found similar results. DeFraja
(1996) shows that the total quantity supplied for each quality and higher quality products
increase and the price of each quality product strictly decreases with entry. Johnson and
Myatt (2006a) also ﬁnd an expansion of total supply of each quality and higher quality
products and reduction in each of the prices of the products in a symmetric oligopoly.
They also mention that under some conditions the low quality supplies may fall; but
this only leaves room for more increase in the supply of higher qualities. Thus, in their
setting, in a two product market, the supply of the high quality product would never
60
decrease as the number of ﬁrms increase. However, neither of these papers look at the
capacity constrained case. In the following propositions, we show that industry supply
of a particular quality type may decrease and particular price of a product type may
increase as the number of ﬁrms increase in the market as opposed to the established
wisdom in the literature.
Proposition 25 Suppose (qi − ci)/si < (qj − cj)/sj. There exists Kˆ > 0 such that t∗i is
non-increasing in n for K < Kˆ at the equilibrium.
In particular, when the potential proﬁt per unit resource consumed by high quality
product is smaller than the low quality product, the threshold is K¯
T (n)
3 when there are
increasing costs to quality; and it is K¯
T (n)
4 when there are decreasing costs to quality.
Below either threshold, the dominating economic force is the eﬃcient allocation of re-
sources. At this range of capacity, there is enough demand to sell all the production
that the ﬁrm is capable of. We would expect that the increasing competition should
increase the industry supply for both products. However, since the capacity constrained
is binding, there is no excess resource to allocate in order to accommodate that. At that
point, the supply of the more eﬃcient product, i.e. low quality product is preferred to
be increased with the trade oﬀ of decreasing the less eﬃcient product, i.e. high quality
product. On the other hand, when the potential proﬁt per unit resource consumed by
low quality product is smaller than the high quality product, the threshold is K¯
T (n)
3 when
there are increasing costs to quality; and the low quality production is no longer optimal
when there are decreasing costs to quality. With the similar argument, the supply of
the more eﬃcient product, i.e. high quality product is preferred to be increased with
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the trade oﬀ of decreasing the less eﬃcient product, i.e. low quality product wherever
possible.
Suppose that on a ﬂight leg from city E to city F, there are 2 airlines competing for the
demand of 1,000 customers per day with a combined capacity of 4,000 sq ft. The customer
valuations are such that the highest amount of money any customer would pay is $3,000
for the business class seat and $1,000 for the economy class seat. Also suppose that the
interior design of this airline’s aircrafts is such that the business class seat occupies 20
sq. ft. and the economy class seat occupies 5 sq. ft. inside the aircraft. It costs $1,500
to operate a business class seat and $300 an economy class seat. Assuming both airlines
are rational and implement the optimal strategy, the customers get 139 business class
seats and 242 economy class seats oﬀered in the market in total. Now, suppose that on a
ﬂight leg from city G to city H, there are 3 airlines competing with a combined capacity
of 4,000 sq ft. Assume that all other conditions are equal to city pair E-F in the market.
In this lower concentration market, the customers get 130 business class seats and 282
economy class seats. While the only diﬀerence is the number of ﬁrms in the market,
the results have changed. The impact is not trivial: We observe that while the number
of economy class seats increased, the number of business class seats have decreased as
opposed to the conventional wisdom in the literature.
The acquired wisdom maintains that the market clearing price of a particular product
decreases as the number of ﬁrms acting in that market increase. We ﬁnd that under some
conditions, price of a product may actually increase as the number of ﬁrms increase in
the market as presented in the following proposition.
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Proposition 26 When ch/qh > cl/ql and qh/sh > ql/sl,
i) If (qh − ch)/sh < (ql − cl)/sl, then p∗h is non-decreasing in n for 0 < K < K¯T (n)3 .
ii) If (qh − ch)/sh > (ql − cl)/sl, then p∗l is non-decreasing in n for 0 < K < K¯T (n)3 .
The main condition in Proposition 26 covers the case when the cost ratio of the
products (ch/cl) is strictly greater than the quality ratio (ch/cl > qh/ql) and the resource
consumption ratio is the smallest of the three (ch/cl > qh/ql > sh/sl). It suggests
that the resource diﬀerential between the two products is small relative to the quality
and cost diﬀerentials. Under these conditions, same economic forces explained in the
Proposition 25 is active: Capacity constraint is binding; eﬃcient allocation of resources is
the dominant factor; and the interﬁrm competition forces the industry to produce more
of the product that has a potential to bring more proﬁt per unit resource consumed.
However, in this case, making room by decreasing some of the production of the less
eﬃcient product alone is not enough: more resources has to be created. The solution is
found by decreasing the production further for the less eﬃcient product which in turn
creates an upward turn in the price for this product which help decrease the demand in the
market. Thus, for the range of capacities presented in Proposition 26, both the industry
supply decrease and price increase is realized with decreasing market concentration as
opposed to the conventional wisdom established in the literature.
Suppose that on a ﬂight leg from city P to city R, there are 10 airlines competing
for the demand of 1,000 customers per day with a combined capacity of 8,000 sq ft. The
customer valuations are such that the highest amount of money any customer would pay
is $4,000 for the business class seat and $1,000 for the economy class seat. Also suppose
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that the interior design of this airline’s aircrafts is such that the business class seat
occupies 15 sq. ft. and the economy class seat occupies 5 sq. ft. inside the aircraft. It
costs $1,500 to operate a business class seat and $300 an economy class seat. Assuming
both airlines are rational and implement the optimal strategy, the customers get 509
business class seats and 73 economy class seats oﬀered in the market in total. The prices
are $1,890.91 and $418.18 respectively for business class and economy class seats.
Now, suppose that on a ﬂight leg from city R to city S, there are 15 airlines competing
with a combined capacity of 8,000 sq ft. Assume that all other conditions are equal to
city pair P-R in the market. In this lower concentration market, the customers get 511
business class seats and 68 economy class seats. The prices are $1,889.29 and $421.43
respectively for business class and economy class seats. While the only diﬀerence is the
number of ﬁrms in the market, the results have changed. The impact is not trivial: We
observe that while the number of business class seats increased, the number of economy
class seats have decreased with increasing competition. Moreover, while we would expect
that all prices decrease, in this case price of the economy class seat has increased with
increasing competition. Too much decrease in the production of the low quality product
(due to capacity limitations and increase in the production of high quality product)
eventually resulted in an increase in the prices as shown in the Proposition 26.
As a ﬁnal remark, we note that the eﬀects of market concentration diminishes as the
number of ﬁrms increase in the industry. The greatest impact mentioned in the above
propositions are realized when the market is highly concentrated. In other words, the
rate of change of the capacity thresholds decrease as the number of ﬁrms increase in
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the market. Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) empirically show that postentry competition
increases at a rate that decreases with the number of incumbents. Although they study
homogeneous products, we found similar results as n increases in a vertically diﬀerentiated
model.
3.4 Welfare Eﬀects in Competitive Settings
We also study the social welfare implications in the competitive markets. This analysis
requires comparing the solutions of the n-ﬁrms (n ≥ 2) to the social planner’s solution.
We have shown that when there is only one ﬁrm acting in the market, the distortion no
longer exists when the capacity is very limited for all cases (Proposition 5). Here, we
generalize this result for competitive markets as well.
In the standard vertical diﬀerentiation literature, it is well known that each customer
gets a lower quality product or nothing at all from a monopolist compared to a social
planner except the high end customer who gets the same assignment in both cases (e.g.,
Mussa and Rosen (1978), Moorthy (1984), Desai (2001)). In contrast, we show that a
proﬁt maximizing ﬁrm may oﬀer a higher quality product than that of a social planner to
some customer segments due to the capacity constraint even under competitive pressures.
Speciﬁcally, when the maximum proﬁt margin of the high quality product is larger, but
its capacity adjusted maximum margin is smaller, the high end customers get a higher
quality product from the ﬁrm than the social planner’s assignment for a range of capacity
levels. This is formally stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 27 When qh − ch > ql − cl and qh−chsh <
ql−cl
sl
, the oligopoly market oﬀers
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the high quality product whereas the social planner does not oﬀer it for K¯
T (n)
1 < K ≤ K¯S1 .
Under the condition in Proposition 27, the oligopolist ﬁrm and the social planner
prefer oﬀering only the low quality product for suﬃciently small capacity levels (i.e., K ≤
K¯
T (n)
1 ) and similarly, they both oﬀer both product types for suﬃciently large capacity
levels (i.e., K > K¯S1 ). However, when K¯
T (n)
1 < K ≤ K¯S1 , the social planner does not oﬀer
the high quality product in order to increase its market coverage whereas the oligopolist
driven by the higher proﬁt margins oﬀers the high quality product. In this case, while
the higher end customer segment is getting better quality under oligopoly, the lower end
customer segment is getting worse oﬀ: they are getting nothing. The better quality at
the high end comes at the expense of the lower customer segment, as in the case of the
monopoly.
The conventional wisdom in the literature states that the social planner serves a larger
portion of the market compared to a monopolist (e.g., Mussa and Rosen (1978)). This
is indeed the case when one ignores the capacity constraint. However, we show that,
depending on the capacity level, an oligopolist may serve a greater portion of the market
than a social planner. Speciﬁcally, this happens when there are increasing costs to quality
and the high quality product has a larger capacity adjusted maximum margin.
Proposition 28 When qh−ch
sh
> ql−cl
sl
and cl/ql ≤ ch/qh, the oligopoly market covers a
greater portion of the market than the social planner for K¯
T (n)
2 < K < min{K¯S2 , K¯T (n)3 }.
Under the condition in Proposition 28, both the oligopolist and the social planner oﬀer
only the high quality product for suﬃciently small capacity levels (i.e., K ≤ K¯T (n)2 ) and
similarly they both oﬀer both product types for suﬃciently large capacity levels K > K¯S2
66
(the oligopoly market does not use all of their capacities for K > K¯
T (n)
3 ). However,
when K¯
T (n)
2 < K < min{K¯S2 , K¯T (n)3 }, only the oligopoly serves the low quality product.
By oﬀering the low quality product, oligopoly ﬁrms serve the high quality product to
a smaller market segment and this in turn keeps the price higher. Whereas the social
planner is not concerned about prices, it sells only the high quality product. This results
in a larger market coverage under oligopoly since both the markets utilize all the capacity
and high quality product consumes greater amount of capacity per unit.
Proposition 29 When the capacity is suﬃciently small, all customers get their socially
eﬃcient assignment from the oligopoly market.
It is well-established in the literature that the proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms degrade the
quality level oﬀered to low valuation customers. However, we show that when the capacity
is suﬃciently small, the optimal policy for both the proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms and the
social planner is to dedicate all the capacity to the most valuable product type (in terms
maximum surplus per unit capacity, i.e., qi−ci
si
). Because all the capacity is dedicated to
the same product, the segment of customers who get the high quality product, the low
quality product and nothing are the same for both the proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms and the
social planner.
Proposition 30 Limitn→∞K¯
T (n)
i = K¯
S
i
We also ﬁnd that as the number of competing ﬁrms goes to inﬁnity, the solution
converges to the solution of the social planner’s. Thus, the ﬁrms lose any power on the
prices and the quantities if there is inﬁnitely large competition in the market.
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CHAPTER 4
Product Line Design Issues For
Focused Strategy Firms
In this chapter, we study the ﬁrms with focused strategies in more detail. The ﬁrm
either oﬀers only low or only high quality product in the market. We investigate their
proﬁtability levels. We provide analytical bounds for the monopoly case and numerical
bounds for the asymmetric duopoly cases.
4.1 Related literature
This study is closely related to the literature that investigates competition in vertically
diﬀerentiated industries. The oligopolistic setting where each ﬁrm oﬀers only one dis-
tinct product has attracted a lot of attention from the researchers (e.g. Gabszewicz
and Thisse (1980), Shaked and Sutton (1982), Gal-Or (1985), Moorthy (1988), Motta
(1993), Wauthy (1996), Mazzeo (2002), Chambers et al. (2006), Jing (2006)). In our
model, we extend these models and consider an asymmetric multiproduct competition
where one ﬁrm is a single-product ﬁrm while the other ﬁrm has the option of oﬀering
multiple products. The multiproduct competition have been studied under two sepa-
rate frameworks: price-setting (Bertrand) games and quantity-setting (Cournot) games.
Fundamental result in the price setting games is that the ﬁrms move away from their
competitors and oﬀer non-overlapping product lines at the equilibrium (e.g. Champsaur
and Rochet (1989), Desai (2001), Rochet and Stole (2002), Schmidt-Mohr and Villas-
Boas (2008)). However, in practice, ﬁrms oﬀer similar products and the competition over
prices fail to explain this head-to-head competition. In many industries, ﬁrms try to
match the products already oﬀered in the market rather than moving away from them as
claimed in the price-setting games. We will follow the quantity game approach which has
proved to be eﬀective in explaining the head-to-head competition. In addition, Haskel
and Martin (1994) shows empirically that if the ﬁrms are capacity constrained, the ap-
propriate way to model competition is the Cournot model. So, the quantity competition
setting is a more appropriate tool to model our focus on capacity allocation decisions of
ﬁrms under competitive pressures.
The fundamental result in the quantity setting games is that the symmetric ﬁrms oﬀer
symmetric product lines (Gal-Or (1983), DeFraja (1996), Johnson and Myatt (2003)).
However, competition models with asymmetric ﬁrms are rare. There are notable excep-
tions. Champsaur and Rochet (1989) study ﬁrms with diﬀerent technology capabilities
in a duopolistic setting. Due to the nature of the price competition, they ﬁnd that there
is always a gap between the product lines at the equilibrium. Johnson and Myatt (2003)
study how ﬁrms adjust their product lines in response to entry in a quantity game. In
particular, they compare a monopolist’s solution to its decision in a duopolistic setting.
When the entrant has lower technological capabilities than the incumbent and enters
69
the market with low-end products, the incumbent ﬁrm may also introduce low-end prod-
ucts to the market in response to entry. On the other hand, if the entrant has better
technological capabilities, the incumbent may choose to exit the low-end markets.
Among the few papers investigating asymmetric technological capabilities, none has
looked at the impact of capacity limitations. Moreover, we discuss the proﬁtability levels
of focus strategy ﬁrms when they have to face the more diverse competitors at the market
place which was never done before in the literature.
4.2 Monopoly
In this section we will investigate the proﬁtability levels of focused strategy ﬁrms when
they act as a monopoly in a market. After we solve the problem for these focused strategy
monopolists, we compare their results with the case of a multiproduct monopolist. The
model and its assumptions are presented below which is similar to the previous chapters.
We study a single product in this case. The ﬁrm oﬀers either a high or a low quality
product. Given a focused strategy on product type i, the ﬁrm decides its optimal pro-
duction quantity subject to the limited capacity K. To serve x units of product i, the
ﬁrm needs to have at least s · x units of capacity. Clearly, the ﬁrm sells the minimum of
its capacity K/s and demand D.
We adopt the classical vertical diﬀerentiation demand model (cf. Tirole (1988)). The
customers vary in their willingness to pay for quality. Speciﬁcally, the customer types θ
are uniformly distributed in the unit interval [0,1] with unit total mass. When type θ
customer buys the product at price p, his utility is equal to U(q, p, θ) = θq − p. If the
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customer does not buy a product, his utility is zero. Thus, customers in [0, θ) do not
buy the product and customers in [θ, 1] buy it where θ = p/q. Then, we can express the
demand as follows: D(p) = 1− p
q
.
Given this demand, the ﬁrm chooses the quantity x and price p to maximize its proﬁt
subject to the capacity constraint. Speciﬁcally the ﬁrm that has a strategy to focus on
product type i solves,
max
x≥0
π = (p(x)− c)x
subject to sx ≤ K.
The objective function of this problem is strictly concave on a convex set deﬁned by
linear constraints, therefore the optimal solution can be obtained by solving the ﬁrst
order conditions (Bazaraa et al. (2006)).
4.2.1 High Quality Focused Firm
In practice, a ﬁrm may choose to focus on high quality for a variety of reasons including
the promising high proﬁtability levels, better customer service with a focus on luxury,
etc. At the time of capacity building and technology choice, the market may favor this
high quality focus. We analyzed in detail the cases where the focus on high quality might
be the optimal choice. For instance, when there is decreasing cost to quality ratio and
abundant capacity, then it is optimal for the ﬁrm to focus on the high quality product
type. In the following proposition, we provide the optimal solution for the high quality
focused ﬁrm.
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Proposition 31 For a high quality focused monopolist, the optimal production schedule
is as follows: x = K
s
, if K ≤ K¯M4 ; and x = q−c2q , if K > K¯M4 .
The solution presented in Proposition 31 was proved to be the optimal solution for a
multiproduct monopolist under various set of conditions which was presented in Chapter
2. However, after the execution of this strategy, the economic conditions may change and
this high quality advantage may become a disadvantage for the ﬁrm. For instance, if the
cost to quality ratio changes in favor of the low quality product type, it may be better
for the ﬁrm to oﬀer both products to the market. However, since the ﬁrm has dedicated
all its resources to the high quality production, they may not be able to oﬀer the low
quality product easily and obliged to stick with the focus strategy. In such a sub-optimal
case, we study the worst case proﬁtability levels of the ﬁrms. Let π∗h be the optimal proﬁt
that can be achieved by the high quality focused ﬁrm and π∗ be the optimal proﬁt that
is achieved by a multiproduct ﬁrm that has the capability to follow an optimal strategy.
Proposition 32 Suppose ql − cl > qh − ch and ch/cl > qh/ql > sh/sl. Then, π
∗
h
π∗ ≥
ql (qh−ch)2
qh (ql−cl)2 .
A high quality focused ﬁrm would do worst in a parametric setting where the optimal
strategy is to focus on the low quality. As analyzed in the Chapter 2, this setting is the
one when the traditional proﬁt margin of the low quality product is better than that of
high quality product (ql − cl > qh − ch). The worst proﬁt ratio calculated in this setting
would provide a worst-case bound for all other parametric settings.
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4.2.2 Low Quality Focused Firm
On the other hand, a ﬁrm may choose to focus on low quality for a bunch of other reasons
such as technology limitations, positioning away from competition, etc. At the time of
capacity building and technology choice, the market may favor this low quality focus.
We analyzed in detail the cases where the focus on low quality might be the optimal
choice. For instance, when there is increasing cost to quality ratio and limited capacity,
it is optimal for the ﬁrm to focus on the low quality product type. In the following
proposition, we provide the optimal solution for the low quality focused ﬁrm.
Proposition 33 For a low quality focused monopolist, the optimal production schedule
is as follows: x = K
s
, if K ≤ K¯M5 ; and x = q−c2q , if K > K¯M5 .
The solution presented in Proposition 33 was proved to be the optimal solution for a
multiproduct monopolist under various set of conditions which was presented in Chapter
2. However, after the execution of this strategy, the economic conditions may change
and this strategy may become a disadvantage for the ﬁrm. For instance, if the cost to
quality ratio changes in favor of the high quality product type, it may be better for the
ﬁrm to focus on the high quality product. However, since the ﬁrm has dedicated all
its resources to the low quality production, it may not be able to oﬀer the high quality
product easily and obliged to stick with the focus strategy. In such a sub-optimal case,
we study the worst case proﬁtability levels of the ﬁrms. Let π∗l be the optimal proﬁt
that can be achieved by the high quality focused ﬁrm and π∗ be the optimal proﬁt that
is achieved by a multiproduct ﬁrm that has the capability to follow an optimal strategy.
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Proposition 34 Suppose (ql − cl)/sl < (qh − ch)/sh and qh/ql > ch/cl > sh/sl. Then,
π∗l
π∗ ≥ qh (ql−cl)
2
ql (qh−ch)2 .
A low quality focused ﬁrm would do worst in a parametric setting where the optimal
strategy is to focus on the high quality. As analyzed in the Chapter 2, this setting is the
one when the capacity adjusted proﬁt margin of the high quality product is better than
that of low quality product ((ql − cl)/sl < (qh − ch)/sh). Then, the worst proﬁt ratio
calculated in such a setting would provide a worst-case bound for all parametric settings.
4.3 Duopoly
In this section, we will study the focused strategy ﬁrm’s performance under competition.
We assume that the competitor ﬁrm has the ability to produce any product type. This
means that the competitor can respond to the focused strategy ﬁrm in any way. This
situation best reﬂects the problems of focused strategy ﬁrms in practice. For example,
MaxJet had to compete with British Airlines on the non-stop route from London to Las
Vegas. This market is a duopoly where a business class focused airline had to face an
airline with multiple class capability under rapidly changing cost structure of the airline
industry. We aim to gain insights for the proﬁtability of the focus strategy ﬁrm in such
a situation. The model and its assumptions are presented below which is similar to the
previous chapters.
As in the case of monopoly, we study two product types, high and low quality products
with quality levels qh > ql. Each unit of product i costs ci and it consumes si units of the
capacity. We assume ch > cl and sh > sl. We adopt the classical vertical diﬀerentiation
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demand model (cf. Tirole (1988)). The customers vary in their willingness to pay for
quality. Speciﬁcally, the customer types θ are uniformly distributed in the unit interval
[0,1] with unit total mass. When type θ customer buys product i at price pi, his utility is
equal to U(qi, pi, θ) = θqi−pi. If the customer does not buy a product, his utility is zero.
Thus, each customer has three options, buying the high quality product, buying the low
quality product and not buying a product, and he chooses the one that maximizes his
utility. This yields 0 ≤ θl ≤ θh ≤ 1 such that customers in [0, θl) do not buy a product,
customers in [θl, θh) buy the low quality product and customers in [θh, 1] buy the high
quality product. So, the demand for the high quality and the low quality products are
Dh = 1− θh and Dl = θh − θl. It is straightforward to show that the marginal customer
θh who is indiﬀerent between buying the high and the low quality products is given by
θh = (ph−pl)/(qh−ql) and similarly, the marginal customer θl who is indiﬀerent between
buying the low quality product and not buying a product at all is given by θl = pl/ql.
Thus, we can express the demands for the two product types as follows,
Dh(pl, ph) = 1− ph − pl
qh − ql Dl(pl, ph) =
ph − pl
qh − ql −
pl
ql
.
The ﬁrms simultaneously decide the amount of each product that will be oﬀered in
the market. They participate in a quantity (Cournot) competition and then the prices
are used to clear the market. The ﬁrms have the same limited capacity (K). In this one-
shot game, ﬁrms simultaneously decide how to allocate their capacity among the product
oﬀerings given the competitors’ oﬀerings and customers’ self selection constraints. We
investigate the competition proﬁts of both a high quality focused ﬁrm and a low quality
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focused ﬁrm in each of the below subsections.
4.3.1 High Quality Focused Firm
The high quality focused ﬁrm Z chooses only the quantity of the high quality product.
The competitor ﬁrm Y has the ability to choose among products and allocate its capacity
as a best response to ﬁrm Z’s decisions. Then, Firm Z solves the following optimization
problem given the best response function (y∗h, y
∗
l ) of ﬁrm Y, self selection of the customers,
and the available capacity K:
max
zh≥0
(ph(zh, y
∗
h, y
∗
l )− ch)zh
subject to shzh ≤ K
The objective function of the problem is strictly concave on a convex set deﬁned by
linear constraints, therefore the optimal solution can be obtained by solving the ﬁrst
order conditions (Bazaraa et al. (2006)). The best response functions and feasibility
conditions are provided in the Appendix C Lemma C1. On the other hand, ﬁrm Y solves
the following optimization problem given the best response function (z∗h) of ﬁrm Z, self
selection of the customers, and the symmetric capacity K:
max
yh,yl≥0
(ph(yh, yl, z
∗
h)− ch)yh + (pl(yh, yl, z∗h)− cl)yl
subject to shyh + slyl ≤ K
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The objective function of the problem is strictly concave on a convex set deﬁned by
linear constraints, therefore the optimal solution can be obtained by solving the ﬁrst order
conditions (Bazaraa et al. (2006)). The best response functions and feasibility conditions
are provided in the Appendix C Lemma C2. After obtaining the best response functions
of both ﬁrms, the equilibriums are found by solving them simultaneously.
Since the analytical analysis of these equilibriums get intractable, we conduct com-
prehensive numerical experiments to ﬁnd out the bounds on the proﬁtability of these
focused strategy ﬁrms. First we study the parametric setting (ql − cl > qh − ch) where
the optimal strategy in the symmetric case is focusing on the low quality product.
The bounds achieved from 135 examples are presented in Figure 4.1. We observe that
the proﬁtability of the high quality ﬁrm could go as low as 0.24% under such circum-
stances. These low proﬁtability levels may help us explain the recent failures of MaxJet,
EOS and Silverjet. As the cost numbers increase, if the marginal proﬁts of the business
class seats has decreased below the marginal proﬁts of the economy class seats, then the
ﬁrms may have experienced extremely low proﬁts in the face of competition from the
traditional ﬁrms and failed as a result of these changes in the cost structures.
We also study the parametric setting (ql− cl < qh− ch) where the optimal strategy in
the symmetric case is oﬀering both products for high capacity levels whereas focusing on
the low quality product for low capacity levels. Although this setting does not provide
the worst case boundaries for the proﬁtability of the ﬁrms, it is the most common setting
studied in the literature.
The bounds achieved from 230 examples are presented in Figure 4.2. The ﬁrm with a
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?FIGURE 4.1: Proﬁtability Bounds for High Quality Focused Firm in Duopoly when
ql − cl > qh − ch
?
FIGURE 4.2: Proﬁtability Bounds for High Quality Focused Firm in Duopoly when
ql − cl < qh − ch
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high quality focus may earn as much as 99.9% of a ﬁrm that has the capability to follow
the optimal strategy. We also observe that the proﬁtability of the high quality ﬁrm could
go as low as 6.63% when the capacity is scarce.
More interestingly, we ﬁnd that the competitor ﬁrm may adjust its product line in
response to the high quality focused ﬁrm. While the optimal strategy for the competitor
would be oﬀering both products for high capacity levels in the symmetric game; we found
instances where the competitor ﬁrm may adjust its strategy in response to high quality
focused ﬁrm and actually focus on the low quality product for all capacity levels in this
asymmetric game.
4.3.2 Low Quality Focused Firm
The low quality focused ﬁrm Z chooses only the quantity of the low quality product. The
competitor ﬁrm Y has the ability to choose among products and allocate its capacity
as a best response to ﬁrm Z’s decisions. Then, Firm Z solves the following optimization
problem given the best response function (y∗h, y
∗
l ) of ﬁrm Y, self selection of the customers,
and the available capacity K:
max
zl≥0
(pl(zl, y
∗
h, y
∗
l )− cl)zl
subject to slzl ≤ K
The objective function of the problem is strictly concave on a convex set deﬁned by
linear constraints, therefore the optimal solution can be obtained by solving the ﬁrst
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order conditions (Bazaraa et al. (2006)). The best response functions and feasibility
conditions are provided in the Appendix D. On the other hand, ﬁrm Y solves the following
optimization problem given the best response function (z∗h) of ﬁrm Z, self selection of the
customers, and the symmetric capacity K:
max
yh,yl≥0
(ph(yh, yl, z
∗
l )− ch)yh + (pl(yh, yl, z∗l )− cl)yl
subject to shyh + slyl ≤ K
The objective function of the problem is strictly concave on a convex set deﬁned by
linear constraints, therefore the optimal solution can be obtained by solving the ﬁrst order
conditions (Bazaraa et al. (2006)). The best response functions and feasibility conditions
are provided in the Appendix. After obtaining the best response functions of both ﬁrms,
the equilibriums are found by solving them simultaneously. Since the analytical analysis
of these equilibriums get intractable, we conduct comprehensive numerical experiments
to ﬁnd out the bounds on the proﬁtability of these focused strategy ﬁrms.
In this case, we study the parametric setting ((qh − ch)/sh > (ql − cl)/sl) where the
optimal strategy in the symmetric case is focusing on the high quality product. It is
also the most common setting studied in the literature. The bounds achieved from 255
examples are presented in Figure 4.3. We observe that the proﬁtability of the low quality
ﬁrm could go as low as 1.18% under such circumstances.
These low proﬁtability levels may help us explain the failures of many low-cost car-
riers in the airline industry. As the cost numbers increase, the marginal proﬁts of the
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?FIGURE 4.3: Proﬁtability Bounds for Low Quality Focused Firm in Duopoly when
(qh − ch)/sh > (ql − cl)/sl
economy class seats has also decreased extensively. Then, the ﬁrms may have experienced
extremely low proﬁts in the face of competition from the traditional ﬁrms and failed as
a result of these changes in the cost structures.
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CHAPTER 5
Vertically Diﬀerentiated Product
Line Design Under Uncertainty
In a recent business report, IBM Consulting Services discuss how careful consideration of
customer valuation during the planning process can increase proﬁtability (Meckley and
Toscano, 2005). They note that “improved decision-making for spending scarce resources
can have signiﬁcant impacts on growth, risk and proﬁtability”. In this chapter, we extend
the model along these lines. We analyze the system in a multiperiod setting and study
the eﬀects of customer valuation uncertainty on the product line decisions of the capacity
constrained ﬁrms.
In our model, we recognize the fact that ﬁrms make their strategic capacity decisions
well before the markets clear for prices. The amount of capacity that is initially allocated
to a product is a constraint on the number of those products produced and sold later in
the market. In this initialization period, ﬁrm decides for the committed capacity for each
product based on the available resources and expectations on the customers’ valuations.
During the later period(s), customers’ valuation distribution is realized and the ﬁrm
makes its actual production and sales decisions constrained by the initial production
capacity commitment.
Then, we further extend the model to investigate the impact of use of revenue man-
agement techniques. In this multiperiod formulation, the initialization period is again
the product line decision and capacity allocation stage. Later periods have diﬀerent
demand distributions which presents opportunities for the implementation of revenue
management techniques.
5.1 Related Literature
Operations literature study the revenue management issues rather extensively. Talluri
and vanRyzin (2004b) provide a broad review of revenue management theory, applications
and history. The aim of the traditional revenue management literature is to devise pricing
mechanisms for ﬁrms where the product mix is already given. Moreover, the literature
ignores the cannibalization eﬀects of oﬀering multiple products to the customer base.
We address the segmentation and complex pricing decisions jointly in this model. McGill
and van Ryzin (1999) provide a review on revenue management. One of the key aspects
they emphasize with regard to the advance of research is the integration of revenue
management decisions with other planning decisions such as the product design and
pricing. Bitran and Caldentey (2003) further review the literature on pricing models for
revenue management. The authors state that analysis of optimal pricing policies for the
multi-product case is a challenging and practically important venue of research.
Consumer behavior is an aspect which has recently started to be studied by the oper-
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ations literature. In a recent survey, Shen and Su (2007) reviews the emerging literature
on customer behavior modeling in revenue management context. Talluri and vanRyzin
(2004a) study the revenue management under a general discrete choice model of consumer
behavior. They formulate the problem as a dynamic program and study the nested al-
location policies. However, the model assumes exogenous prices which is a key aspect of
our formulation and primary driver of the cannibalization phenomenon. Ng (2006) also
proposes strategies for the ﬁrms to follow vertically diﬀerentiated segmentation strategies
together with the traditional revenue management strategies. Following this promising
line of research, we study the revenue management problem jointly with segmentation
decisions.
On the other hand, economics and marketing literatures lack the thorough discussion
of the eﬀects of uncertainty in customer valuations on the ﬁrm’s product choice. There
is a line of research where the authors study the eﬀects of uncertainty in quality levels of
product. Bester (1998) studies how consumers’ uncertainty about the quality of products
eﬀects the ﬁrm’s incentives for horizontal diﬀerentiation. Cavaliere (2005) also works out
the uncertainty faced by customers with regard to the quality of the products where
the ﬁrms use prices as a signaling mechanism of their qualities. Casado-Izaga (2000)
and Meagher and Zauner (2005) also study the consumer valuation uncertainty in the
context of horizontal diﬀerentiation. They show that the existence of uncertainty raises
the degree of product diﬀerentiation in this context.
Consumer valuations uncertainty was approached from diﬀerent angles in the vertical
diﬀerentiation context. Saak (2008) studies the setting where the consumers themselves
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lack precise knowledge of their valuations. Johnson and Myatt (2006b) studies how the
shifts in consumer valuations change the product line choices of the ﬁrms. They study
an extensive amount of functions and discuss their eﬀects on the ﬁrm’s proﬁts. However,
there is no uncertainty related to the valuation functions. The shift is known to the ﬁrm
and the authors discuss how the optimal strategy changes in existence of such a shift.
Since there is no study in the literature studying the eﬀects of customer valuation
uncertainty in the vertical diﬀerentiation context, we aim to ﬁll this gap with this study.
5.2 Single Recourse Analysis
We reformulate the problem to incorporate uncertainty. In the ﬁrst period, capacity allo-
cations will be determined. In the second period, committed to these capacity allocations,
prices and sales are determined.
5.2.1 Model
There are two periods: In period 1, the ﬁrm makes the decision on how to allocate
its capacity among the products (xi). For example, during the construction stage, the
ﬁrm has to decide how to allocate the budget (K) among diﬀerent types of production
facilities: the facility (xh) that manufactures the high quality product would cost more
than the facility (xl) that manufactures the low quality product (sh > sl). At this period
the valuations of the customers are not known by the ﬁrm. In a deterministic case, the
ﬁrm would know the distribution of the valuations of the customers. However, in this
model, the speciﬁcs of the distribution is also unknown to the ﬁrm. The ﬁrm knows that
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the market size is one and distributed uniformly between [θ¯− 1, θ¯] where θ¯ is distributed
uniformly between [1− , 1 + ].
At the beginning of period 2, the speciﬁcs of the customer valuation distribution is
revealed (θ¯ = θˆ). Given this information, the ﬁrm decides the production quantities and
prices (yi and pi) subject to the capacity commitments (xi) made in the ﬁrst period. The
mathematical formulation of the problem is as follows:
max
xi≥0
Eθ¯[Q(x, θ)]
subject to
∑
i sixi ≤ K
where Q(x, θˆ) = max
yi≥0
∑
i
yi(pi(θˆ, y)− ci)
subject to yi ≤ xi ∀i
The objective function of this problem is jointly concave on a convex set deﬁned by
linear constraints, therefore the optimal solution can be obtained by solving the ﬁrst
order conditions Bazaraa et al. (2006).
5.2.2 Single Product
We ﬁrst study the case where the ﬁrm has to make decisions for a single product with
quality q, unit cost c, and resource consumption rate s. Given the decisions of the
ﬁrst period, and after the customer valuation distribution’s speciﬁcs are revealed in the
second period, the ﬁrm has to decide the quantity that will be sold in the market. In the
following paragraphs, we present the results of this analysis.
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We will ﬁrst solve the second period problem where the ﬁrm knows the speciﬁcs of
the distribution for the customer valuations. After these speciﬁcs are revealed, the ﬁrm
has to decide the production (sales) quantity constrained by the capacity commitment
made during the ﬁrst period.
Proposition 35 Suppose the customer valuation is distributed uniformly between [θˆ −
1, θˆ]. Then, the optimal sales of a monopolist is as follows:
If max{1 − , c/q} ≤ θˆ < min{(2qx + c)/q, 1 + }, then y = (θˆq − c)/2q. Else if
θˆ ≥ max{1− , (2qx + c)/q}, then y = x.
If the market valuations are relatively low compared to the capacity commitment,
then the ﬁrm only sells a limited amount of the product in order to keep its price high.
In that case, capacity constraint is not binding (y < x). On the other hand, if the
valuations are high enough, the ﬁrm is better oﬀ selling all he could and adjust (increase)
the prices to get a demand that is equal to its maximum production (y = x).
Given these second period solutions, one could take the expectation over the valuation
realizations and ﬁnd the optimal solution in the ﬁrst period.
Proposition 36 i. When K < s(q−c+q)
2q
, the optimal strategy for the monopolist ﬁrm
is to dedicate all the capacity to production: x = K/s.
ii. When K ≥ s(q−c+q)
2q
, the optimal strategy for the monopolist ﬁrm is to produce a
certain amount and leave the remaining capacity excess: x = q − c + q/2q.
We see that the optimal capacity allocation (x = q − c + q/2q) under uncertainty
increases by /2 amount when compared to the deterministic case (x = q − c/2q). The
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risk neutral ﬁrm would like to go after the higher valuation that has a positive probability
of occurrence in order to get the higher proﬁts in return. Another point is that the ﬁrst
period decision comes at no expense to the ﬁrm. Then, an increase in the capacity
commitment helps the ﬁrm attract customers when the valuations are high.
5.2.3 Two Diﬀerentiated Products
We will now look at the problem when there are two products to share a single resource
and a heterogenous customer base.
i. Second Period
Given the decisions of the ﬁrst period, i.e. the capacity allocations (xh, xl), and after
the customer valuation distribution’s speciﬁcs are revealed in the second period, the ﬁrm
has to decide the quantities that will be sold in the market. In the following paragraphs,
we present the results of this analysis.
Proposition 37 Suppose cl/ql > ch/qh; and the customer valuation is distributed uni-
formly between [θˆ − 1, θˆ]. Then, the optimal sales of a monopolist is as follows:
If max{1− , ch/qh} ≤ θˆ < min{2xh + ch/qh, 1 + }, then yh = (θˆqh − ch)/2qh. Else
if θˆ ≥ max{1− , 2xh + ch/qh}, then yh = xh.
If max{1 − , ch/qh} ≤ θˆ < min{2xh + cl/ql, 1 + }, then yl = 0. Else if max{1 −
, 2xh + cl/ql} ≤ θˆ < min{2(xl + xh) + cl/ql, 1 + }, then yl = (θˆql − cl − 2qlxh)/2ql. Else
if θˆ ≥ max{1− , 2(xl + xh) + cl/ql},then yl = xl.
The market clearing prices are ph = qh (θˆ − yh) − ql yl and pl = ql (θˆ − yh − yl)
respectively.
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This proposition covers the instances where the cost to quality ratio favors the high
quality product. Indeed, the second stage favors the high quality product as well. If
the market valuations are too low compared to the capacity allocations, then the ﬁrm
only sells a limited amount of the high quality product in order to keep its price high.
In this case, capacity constraints are not binding (yi < xi). If the valuations get a little
better, then the ﬁrm optimally sells all the high quality product and does not cannibalize
its demand with low quality product for a while. Only if the market valuations are
high enough, the ﬁrm starts selling the low quality product. If the valuations are high
enough, the ﬁrm is better oﬀ selling all he could and adjusting (increase) the prices to
get a demand that is equal to its capacity (yi = xi). The sales would have a diﬀerent
priority when the cost to quality ratio is reversed.
Proposition 38 Suppose cl/ql < ch/qh and xl ≥ chql−clqh2ql(qh−ql) ; and the customer valuation
is distributed uniformly between [θˆ − 1, θˆ]. Then, the optimal sales of a monopolist is as
follows:
If max{1 − , cl/ql} ≤ θˆ < min{(ch − cl)/(qh − ql), 1 + }, then yh = 0. Else if
max{1 − , (ch − cl)/(qh − ql)} ≤ θˆ < min{2xh + (ch − cl)/(qh − ql), 1 + }, then yh =
(θˆqh−ch)−(θˆql−cl)
2(qh−ql) . Else if θˆ ≥ max{1− , 2xh + (ch − cl)/(qh − ql)}, then yh = xh.
If max{1−, cl/ql} ≤ θˆ < min{(ch−cl)/(qh−ql), 1+}, then yl = (θˆql−cl)/2ql. Else if
max{1−, (ch−cl)/(qh−ql)} ≤ θˆ < min{2xh+(ch−cl)/(qh−ql), 1+}, then yl = chql−clqh2ql(qh−ql) .
Else if max{1 − , 2xh + (ch − cl)/(qh − ql)} ≤ θˆ < min{2(xl + xh) + cl/ql, 1 + }, then
yl = (θˆql − cl − 2qlxh)/2ql. Else if θˆ ≥ max{1− , 2(xl + xh) + cl/ql}, then yl = xl.
The market clearing prices are ph = qh (θˆ − yh) − ql yl and pl = ql (θˆ − yh − yl)
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respectively.
This proposition covers the instances where the cost to quality ratio favors the low
quality product. In addition, the solution is valid when the capacity allocation of the low
quality product is below a certain threshold. We observe that the second stage also favors
the low quality product. If the market valuations are too low compared to the capacity
allocations, then the ﬁrm only sells a limited amount of the low quality product in order
to keep its price high. In this case, capacity constraints are not binding (yi < xi). If the
valuations get a little better, then the ﬁrm optimally sells all the low quality product.
Only if the market valuations are high enough, the ﬁrm starts selling the high quality
product. If the valuations are high enough, the ﬁrm is better oﬀ selling all he could and
adjusting (increase) the prices to get a demand that is equal to its capacity (yi = xi).
The sales may be diﬀerent when the capacity allocation for the low quality product is
greater.
Proposition 39 Suppose cl/ql < ch/qh and xl ≤ chql−clqh2ql(qh−ql) ; and the customer valuation
is distributed uniformly between [θˆ − 1, θˆ]. Then, the optimal sales of a monopolist is as
follows:
If max{1− , cl/ql} ≤ θˆ < min{(2qlxl + ch)/qh, 1 + }, then yh = 0. Else if max{1−
, (2qlxl + ch)/qh} ≤ θˆ < min{2(xh + xlql/qh) + ch)/qh, 1 + }, then yh = (θˆqh−ch)−2qlxl)2qh .
Else if θˆ ≥ max{1− , 2(xh + xlql/qh) + ch)/qh}, then yh = xh.
If max{1 − , cl/ql} ≤ θˆ < min{2xl + cl/ql, 1 + }, then yl = (θˆql − cl)/2ql. Else if
θˆ ≥ max{1− , 2xl + cl/ql}, then yl = xl.
The market clearing prices are ph = qh (θˆ − yh) − ql yl and pl = ql (θˆ − yh − yl)
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respectively.
This solution is valid when the capacity allocation of the low quality product is above
a certain threshold. We observe that the low quality product is still favored over the high
quality product and it is oﬀered for a longer range of valuations. Nevertheless, the ﬁrm
does not wait to sell all the low quality production but introduces high quality before
the full capacity production. Only if the valuations are high enough, the ﬁrm is better
oﬀ selling all he could and adjusting (increase) the prices to get a demand that is equal
to its capacity (yi = xi).
ii. First Period
In the ﬁrst period, the ﬁrm does not know the speciﬁcs of the customer valuations
distribution. The ﬁrm only knows that the market size is one and distributed uniformly
between [θ¯− 1, θ¯] where θ¯ is distributed uniformly between [1− , 1 + ]. The ﬁrm needs
to make capacity commitment decisions under this uncertainty. Once the distribution
is revealed in the second period, based on the product line decisions made in the ﬁrst
period, the ﬁrm can decide its production quantity and prices. In this section, we will
investigate the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst period decisions where the product mix choices and capacity
commitments are ﬁnalized.
Proposition 40 When cl/ql < ch/qh, (qh−ch) ≥ (ql−cl), the monopolist ﬁrm optimally
oﬀers two products at positive quantities:
xh =
(qh − ch)− (ql − cl) + (qh − ql)
2(qh − ql) xl =
chql − clqh
2ql(qh − ql)
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when K ≥ chql(−sh+sl)+cl(qlsh−qhsl)+(qh−ql)qlsh(1+)
2(qh−ql)ql .
Proposition 40 studies the cases where the cost to quality ratio is increasing and
capacity constraint is not binding. In this case, we have shown that the optimal strategy
is to diﬀerentiate and oﬀer both products in the market when there is no uncertainty.
In this proposition, we show that the strategy remains the same; nevertheless, with one
diﬀerence: the quantity of the high quality product increases with the level of uncertainty.
Note that there is a positive probability that the customer valuation distribution may
shift upwards with higher valuations at the high end of the customer segment. The
risk neutral ﬁrm would like to go after these high end customers who may have higher
valuations. In case the valuations shift downwards, the ﬁrm does not lose anything since
the ﬁrst period commitment comes at no expense when the capacity is not binding.
When the capacity constraint is binding, achieving the closed form solutions is not
analytically tractable. We will present some numerical examples and observe how the
results of the deterministic models change under uncertainty.
Figure 5.1 shows an example where the cost to quality ratio is increasing as is the case
in Proposition 40. However, we know from the deterministic case that when the capacity
constraint is binding, potential proﬁt per unit resource consumed becomes an important
economic driver behind the ﬁrm’s decisions. In this example, marginal proﬁt per unit
resource is better for the low quality product (ql − cl/sl > qh − ch/sh). In Figure Figure
5.1, the graph on the left is the optimal capacity commitment for the high quality product
for a given capacity level (K) and the graph on the right is the one for the low quality
product. Please note that the far end of each plot shows the capacity commitments at
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?FIGURE 5.1: Product Line Under Uncertainty when cl/ql < ch/qh and ql − cl/sl >
qh − ch/sh
inﬁnite capacity which creates a break in the line although there is none. Each graph
presents multiple lines each of which are plotted using diﬀerent uncertainty levels. As 
(eps) increases, the level of uncertainty increases as well.
In this case, the deterministic results suggest that the ﬁrm should focus on the low
quality product for scarce capacity whereas both products are oﬀered above a threshold
capacity. We observe the same behavior when there is uncertainty about the market,
too: The ﬁrm focuses on the low quality product for scarce capacity levels. We do not
observe any high quality commitment below a certain threshold. However, as the capacity
increases, the high quality product is oﬀered in the product line together with the low
quality product. In this medium range of capacity availability, the level of uncertainty
has a similar eﬀect as the Proposition 40. High quality commitment increases as the level
of uncertainty increases. However, since the capacity constraint is binding at this level,
the required resources are gained from decreasing the commitment of the low quality
product. Hence we observe that increasing uncertainty has an eﬀect to increase the high
quality production and decrease the low quality production for a range of capacity levels.
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?FIGURE 5.2: Product Line Under Uncertainty when cl/ql < ch/qh and ql − cl/sl <
qh − ch/sh
We also note that for large capacity levels (as seen in the far end of the graphs), the
low quality production remains the same for all uncertainty levels as shown earlier ana-
lytically. Again, the high quality commitment increases with uncertainty when capacity
is not binding.
Figure 5.2 shows another example where the cost to quality ratio is increasing. Nev-
ertheless, in this example, marginal proﬁt per unit resource is better for the high quality
product (ql − cl/sl < qh − ch/sh). Although we expect that the large capacity levels
should behave as presented in Proposition 40, it is not clear a priori how the uncertainty
will impact the results when the capacity constraint is binding.
In this case, the deterministic results suggest that the ﬁrm should focus on the high
quality product for scarce capacity whereas both products are oﬀered above a threshold
capacity. We observe the same behavior when there is uncertainty about the market,
too: The ﬁrm focuses on the high quality product for scarce capacity levels. The product
with less potential for proﬁt per unit resource consumed is dropped from the product
line.
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?FIGURE 5.3: Product Line Under Uncertainty when cl/ql > ch/qh and ql − cl/sl >
qh − ch/sh
We observe that increasing uncertainty has an eﬀect to increase the high quality
commitment for medium capacity levels like the previous example. This increase in
the high quality commitment comes at the expense of low quality commitment: the
commitment levels decrease as uncertainty increases for the low quality product.
Figure 5.3 shows an example where the cost to quality ratio is decreasing. This case
favors the high quality production when capacity is large enough. Yet, marginal proﬁt
per unit resource is better for the low quality product (ql− cl/sl > qh− ch/sh) which has
an adverse eﬀect when capacity is less.
In this case, the deterministic results suggest that the ﬁrm should focus on the low
quality product for scarce capacity whereas both products are oﬀered at medium capacity
levels and only high quality focus is optimal for large capacities. We observe the same
behavior when there is uncertainty about the customer valuations, too: The ﬁrm focuses
on the low quality product for scarce capacity levels, introduces high quality to the
product mix as capacity increases and eventually ceases the production of low quality
product all together above a certain threshold. As shown earlier analytically, the high
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quality commitment increases with uncertainty when capacity is not binding.
However, we observe that the low quality commitment increases with uncertainty
for a range of capacity levels. This increase comes at the expense of a decrease in the
high quality commitment at that range. Interestingly, in this case, the ﬁrm chooses to
increase the commitment for the product that has a greater potential to bring proﬁt per
unit resource consumed at the expense of the high quality product. This example shows
that the eﬀect of increasing uncertainty is not trivial for medium capacity levels.
5.3 Multiperiod Analysis
We further revise the stochastic market model and study a multiperiod setting where
the ﬁrm will have the option of changing prices in response to changing demand in each
period.
5.3.1 Model
We investigate the revenue management implications of the problem under uncertainty.
We extend the problem to three periods: In period 1, the ﬁrm makes the decision on how
to allocate its capacity among the products (xi). The ﬁrm also decides the reservation
limits (bi < xi) in the ﬁrst period. Reservation limit is the upper bound on the amount
of sales in the second period (y1i < bi). At this period the valuations of the customers are
not known by the ﬁrm. In a deterministic case, the ﬁrm would know the distribution of
the valuations of the customers. However, in this model, the speciﬁcs of the distribution
is also unknown to the ﬁrm. The ﬁrm knows that the market size is one: half of this
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market will arrive in the second period and remaining half will arrive in the third period,
possibly with diﬀerent valuation distributions. The customers are distributed uniformly
between [θ¯ − 1, θ¯] where θ¯ is stochastic and can take values between [1− , 1 + ].
We follow a scenario based approach in this case: there are 6 (2 high, 2 medium and 2
low) scenarios that could occur between [1−, 1+]. In the second period, low and medium
scenarios could occur equally likely and in the third period, high and medium scenarios
could occur equally likely. At the beginning of each following period, the speciﬁcs of
the customer valuation distribution is revealed (θ¯ = θˆ). Given this information, the
ﬁrm decides the production quantities and prices (yi and pi) subject to the capacity
commitments (xi) and reservation limits (bi) made in the ﬁrst period. The mathematical
formulation of the problem is as follows:
max
xi,bi≥0
Eθ¯1[Q1(x, b, θ¯)]
subject to
∑
i sixi ≤ K
bi ≤ xi ∀i
where Q1(x, b, θ¯1) = max
y1i≥0
∑
i
y1i (p
1
i (θ¯
1, y)− ci) + Eθ¯2 [Q2(x, b, θ¯)]
subject to y1i ≤ bi ∀i
where Q2(x, y, θ¯2) = max
y2i≥0
∑
i
y2i (p
2
i (θ¯
2, y)− ci)
subject to y2i ≤ xi − y1i ∀i
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FIGURE 5.4: Product Line with Revenue Management when cl/ql < ch/qh and ql −
cl/sl > qh − ch/sh
5.3.2 Analysis
Figure 5.4 shows an example where the cost to quality ratio is increasing. Marginal proﬁt
per unit resource is also better for the low quality product (ql − cl/sl > qh − ch/sh).
In this case, both the deterministic results and 2-period uncertainty model suggest
that the ﬁrm should focus on the low quality product for scarce capacity whereas both
products are oﬀered above a threshold capacity. We observe the same behavior when
there are multiple periods and more complex pricing options (i.e., revenue management),
too: The ﬁrm focuses on the low quality product for scarce capacity levels. We do not
observe any high quality commitment below a certain threshold. However, as the capacity
increases, the high quality product is oﬀered in the product line together with the low
quality product. In this medium range of capacity availability, the level of uncertainty
has a similar eﬀect as the Proposition 40 and 2-period uncertainty model. High quality
commitment increases as the level of uncertainty increases. However, since the capacity
constraint is binding at this level, the required resources are gained from decreasing the
commitment to the low quality product. Hence we observe that increasing uncertainty has
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?FIGURE 5.5: Product Line with Revenue Management when cl/ql < ch/qh and ql −
cl/sl < qh − ch/sh
an eﬀect to increase the high quality production and decrease the low quality production
for a range of capacity levels. We also note that for large capacity levels (as seen in the
far end of the graphs), the low quality production remains the same for all uncertainty
levels as shown earlier analytically. Again, the high quality commitment increases with
uncertainty when capacity is not binding.
Figure 5.5 shows another example where the cost to quality ratio is increasing. In
this example, marginal proﬁt per unit resource is better for the high quality product
(ql − cl/sl < qh − ch/sh).
In this case, the deterministic results and 2-period uncertainty model suggest that the
ﬁrm should focus on the high quality product for scarce capacity whereas both products
are oﬀered above a threshold capacity. We observe the same behavior when there are
multiple periods and more complex pricing options (i.e., revenue management), too: The
ﬁrm focuses on the high quality product for scarce capacity levels. The product with less
potential for proﬁt per unit resource consumed is dropped from the product line. We also
observe that increasing uncertainty has an eﬀect to increase the high quality commitment
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?FIGURE 5.6: Product Line with Revenue Management when cl/ql > ch/qh and ql −
cl/sl > qh − ch/sh
for medium capacity levels like the previous example. This increase in the high quality
commitment comes at the expense of low quality commitment: the commitment levels
decrease as uncertainty increases for the low quality product.
Figure 5.6 shows an example where the cost to quality ratio is decreasing. This case
favors the high quality production when capacity is large enough. However, marginal
proﬁt per unit resource is better for the low quality product (ql − cl/sl > qh − ch/sh). In
this case, the deterministic results and single-recourse model suggest that the ﬁrm should
focus on the low quality product for scarce capacity whereas both products are oﬀered
at medium capacity levels and only high quality focus is optimal for large capacities. We
observe the same behavior when there are multiple periods and more complex pricing
options (i.e., revenue management), too: The ﬁrm focuses on the low quality product for
scarce capacity levels, introduces high quality to the product mix as capacity increases
and eventually ceases the production of low quality product all together above a certain
threshold. We also observe that the high quality commitment increases with uncertainty
when capacity is not binding as is the case before.
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However, we observe that the low quality commitment increases with uncertainty
for a range of capacity levels. This increase comes at the expense of a decrease in the
high quality commitment at that range. Interestingly, in this case, the ﬁrm chooses to
increase the commitment for the product that has a greater potential to bring proﬁt per
unit resource consumed at the expense of the high quality product. This example shows
that the eﬀect of increasing uncertainty is not trivial for medium capacity levels.
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CHAPTER 6
Conclusions
In this dissertation, we study the optimal product line decisions of ﬁrms that are con-
strained by capacity. We characterize the conditions on the capacity and the costs that
lead to signiﬁcant deviations in the results from the existing literature. We solve the
problem in various market structures: monopoly, duopoly, oligopoly, and socially eﬃ-
cient markets. We also introduced uncertainty into the formulation.
Among other results, our key ﬁndings in Chapter 2 are as follows.
When there are increasing costs to quality, i.e., when the unit cost to quality ratio of
high quality product is larger than that of the low quality product, we ﬁnd that the ﬁrm
may be better oﬀ focusing on one product and oﬀering either the low or the high quality
product for suﬃciently small capacity levels. The focus depends on the maximum margin
as well as the capacity consumption per unit of each product type. This is in contrast
to the existing literature that argues that the ﬁrm should serve both products oﬀering
a diﬀerentiated product line in this case. When the ﬁrm’s capacity is suﬃciently large,
our results coincide with the existing literature.
When there are decreasing costs to quality, the ﬁrm’s optimal strategy is either to
oﬀer both products or only one of the products depending on its capacity. In this case,
the existing literature that disregards the capacity constraint shows that the ﬁrm should
always focus on the high quality product. While our results agree with the existing
literature when the ﬁrm’s capacity is suﬃciently large, we show that the ﬁrm might be
better oﬀ with a diametrically opposite policy focusing on the low quality product, when
its capacity is suﬃciently small, and for intermediate capacity levels the ﬁrm prefers
oﬀering both product types.
We also show that limited capacity can induce a monopoly to oﬀer the higher end
customers a better quality product compared to a social planner. Furthermore, a mo-
nopolist can cover a greater portion of the market than a social planner. These are in
contrast to existing literature which shows that the customers (except those at the high
end) get either a lower quality product or nothing at all from a monopoly compared to
a social planner’s assignment.
In Chapter 3, we extend the study for competitive markets. Among other results, our
key ﬁndings are as follows.
There exists a unique symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium for symmetric duopolist
ﬁrms even for limited capacity levels.
In competitive markets, the high quality product does not have to be oﬀered in all
equilibria as claimed in the literature. If the capacity adjusted proﬁt margin of the low
quality product is greater, then there exists a threshold capacity below which all ﬁrms
optimally oﬀer only the low quality product.
In response to increasing competition in the market, the incumbent ﬁrm may intro-
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duce or prune some products from the product line. When there is increasing cost to
quality ratio and unit proﬁt is greater for the high quality product, the ﬁrm introduces
new products to the market for a range of capacities in response to an increasing com-
petition. When there is decreasing cost to quality ratio and the capacity adjusted proﬁt
margin is greater for the low quality product, the ﬁrm prunes the low quality products
from the product mix in response to competitive pressures.
As opposed to the acquired wisdom in the literature, we show that the total industry
supply may decrease as the number of ﬁrms increase in the market for a speciﬁc range
of capacity levels when the potential proﬁt per unit resource consumed is greater for the
high quality product. Moreover, we show that the price of a product may increase as
the number of ﬁrms increase for a speciﬁc range of capacity levels if the product has
a low potential proﬁt per unit resource consumed and when the cost to quality ratio
is increasing and resource consumption ratio is small. On the other hand, the impact
of increasing competition could be increasing the product variety. For instance, when
the cost structures favor the high quality product, for a speciﬁc range of capacity levels
increasing competition force the ﬁrms to introduce the low quality product into the
product mix.
In Chapter 4, we study the proﬁtability issues of the focused strategy ﬁrms.
We observe that the ﬁrm with a high quality focus may earn almost as good as a
multiproduct ﬁrm. We also observe that the proﬁtability of the high quality ﬁrm could
go below 10% when the capacity is scarce. If the cost structure of the time that the
ﬁrm operates is supportive, then the ﬁrm will survive just ﬁne in competition with the
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traditional airlines. However, if the cost conditions change, this could be detrimental for
the ﬁrm.
We also ﬁnd that the multiproduct competitor ﬁrm may adjust its product line in
response to the high quality focused ﬁrm. While the optimal strategy for the competitor
would be oﬀering both products for high capacity levels in the symmetric game; we found
instances where the competitor ﬁrm may adjust its strategy in response to high quality
focused ﬁrm and actually focus on the low quality product for all capacity levels in this
asymmetric game.
We also observe that the results for the low quality focused ﬁrms are particularly
worse which leads to a conclusion that these ﬁrms should be extra careful to make sure
that they operate at the optimal range of cost, quality and capacity ranges.
In Chapter 5, we introduced uncertainty into the model. We observe similar behavior
as the deterministic cases when there is uncertainty about the market.
When cost to quality ratio favors the high quality product but the marginal per unit
resource is better for the low quality product, the ﬁrm focuses on the low quality product
for scarce capacity levels, introduces high quality to the product mix as capacity increases
and eventually ceases the production of low quality product all together above a certain
threshold. On the other hand, when cost to quality ratio favors the low quality product,
the ﬁrm focuses on the low quality product for scarce capacity levels and optimally oﬀers
both products to the market when there is ample capacity.
In the recourse stage, when the capacity commitment of the low quality product is
below a certain threshold and cost to quality ratio is increasing, we observe that the ﬁrm
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only sells a limited amount of the low quality product and no high quality products if the
market valuations are too low compared to the capacity commitments. If the valuations
get a little better, then the ﬁrm optimally sells all the low quality product. Only if the
market valuations are high enough, the ﬁrm starts selling the high quality product.
In the ﬁrst stage, when the cost to quality ratio is increasing and capacity constraint
is not binding, we have shown that the optimal strategy is to diﬀerentiate and oﬀer both
products in the market as is the case when there is no uncertainty. Nevertheless, there
is one diﬀerence: the quantity of the high quality product increases with the level of
uncertainty.
When the capacity constraint is binding, we present some numerical examples and
observe how the results of the deterministic models change under uncertainty. When the
cost to quality ratio is increasing and marginal proﬁt per unit resource is better for the
low quality product; for a medium range of capacity levels, high quality commitment
increases as the level of uncertainty increases. However, since the capacity constraint is
binding at this level, the required resources are gained from decreasing the commitment
of the low quality product. The increase in the high quality commitment comes at
the expense of low quality commitment: the commitment levels decrease as uncertainty
increases for the low quality product.
As a conclusion, we ﬁnd that the scarcity of capacity plays a critical role in deter-
mining the optimal product line. It can lead to expanding the product line with an
additional product type, and it can also lead to a reduction in the product line serving
fewer product types.
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Appendix A: Appendix for Chapter
2
Proof of Proposition 1. We will ﬁrst solve the general problem in Lemma A1 and
then present the solution that corresponds to the parameters given in the proposition.
Following the fact that xi = Di, the price-quantity equations (2.2) for the ﬁrm can be
solved for prices as follows:
ph = qh · (1− xh)− ql · xl pl = ql · (1− xl − xh)
Then, the formulation takes the following ﬁnal form where the Lagrangian variables that
will help with the solution are provided in the parentheses:
maxΠM = xh · (qh · (1− xh)− ql · xl − ch)
+xl · (ql · (1− xl − xh)− cl)
subject to
xh · sh + xl · sl ≤ K (λ)
xh ≥ 0 (μh)
xl ≥ 0 (μl)
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Note that Hessian(ΠM) = [
−2qh −2ql
−2ql −2ql
]. Given that qh > ql, the Hessian(Π
M) is
negative deﬁnite. Since the objective function of this problem is jointly concave on a
convex set deﬁned by linear constraints, the optimal solution can be obtained by solving
the ﬁrst order conditions together with the feasibility conditions citepbazaraa06. First
order conditions are as follows for this problem:
−ch + qh − 2qhxh − 2qlxl − shλ + μh = 0 (A-1)
−cl + ql − 2qlxh − 2qlxl − slλ + μl = 0 (A-2)
(K − shxh − slxl)λ = 0 (A-3)
xlμl = 0 (A-4)
xhμh = 0 (A-5)
where the feasibility conditions are as given below:
xh ≥ 0 xl ≥ 0 λ ≥ 0 μh ≥ 0 μl ≥ 0 K ≥ xh · sh + xl · sl (A-6)
Lemma A1 All solutions of the ﬁrst order conditions are as follows:
• Solution 1: xh = −ch+cl+qh−ql2(qh−ql) ; xl =
−clqh+chql
2(qh−ql)ql ;
λ = 0 ; μh = 0 ; μl = 0.
• Solution 2: xh = −−2Kqlsh+2Kqlsl−clshsl+qlshsl+chs
2
l−qhs2l
2(qls
2
h−2qlshsl+qhs2l )
;
xl = −2Kqlsh+cls
2
h−qls2h−2Kqhsl−chshsl+qhshsl
2(qls
2
h−2qlshsl+qhs2l )
;
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λ = −−2Kqhql+2Kq2l−chqlsh+clqlsh+qhqlsh−q2l sh−clqhsl+chqlsl−qls2h+2qlshsl−qhs2l ; μh = 0 ; μl = 0.
• Solution 3: xh = 0 ; xl = ql−cl2ql ;
λ = 0 ; μh = ch − cl − qh + ql ; μl = 0.
• Solution 4: xh = 0 ; xl = Ksl ;
λ = −2Kql+clsl−qlsl
s2l
; μh = ch − qh + 2Kqlsl −
sh(2Kql+clsl−qlsl)
s2l
; μl = 0.
• Solution 5: xh = −ch+qh2qh ; xl = 0 ;
λ = 0 ; μh = 0 ; μl =
clqh−chql
qh
.
• Solution 6: xh = Ksh ; xl = 0 ;
λ = −2Kqh+chsh−qhsh
s2h
; μh = 0 ; μl = cl − ql + 2Kqlsh −
(2Kqh+chsh−qhsh)sl
s2h
.
Proof. Since there are 3 constraints, there are 8 (23) possible solutions to the problem.
Among these, there are two cases that give the trivial solution (xh = 0 and xl = 0).
Thus, there are 6 solutions as listed.
Following threshold capacities are deﬁned in addition to thresholds (2.3)-(2.4) to
facilitate the presentation of the solution:
K¯M3 =
ql(ql − qh)sh + chql(−sl + sh) + cl(qhsl − qlsh)
2ql(ql − qh) (A-7)
K¯M4 =
(qh − ch)sh
2qh
(A-8)
K¯M5 =
(ql − cl)sl
2ql
(A-9)
When (ch/cl > qh/ql), for a monopolist the optimal product line conﬁguration is as
follows:
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i) For parameters ql − cl ≥ qh − ch, the solution is characterized as follows:
For K < K¯M5 , the only feasible solution to the equations (A-1)-(A-6) is the Solution 4
of Lemma A1: xh = 0 and xl =
K
sl
. For K ≥ K¯M5 , the only feasible solution to
the equations (A-1)-(A-6) is the Solution 3 of Lemma A1: xh = 0 and xl =
ql−cl
2ql
.
Hence, the result follows.
ii.a) For parameters ql − cl < qh − ch, and qh−chsh <
ql−cl
sl
, the solution is characterized as
follows:
For K < K¯1, the only feasible solution to the equations (A-1)-(A-6) is the Solution 4
of Lemma A1: xh = 0 and xl =
K
sl
. For K¯1 ≤ K < K¯M3 , the only feasible
solution to the equations (A-1)-(A-6) is the Solution 2 of Lemma A1: xh =
2Kql(−sl+sh)+sl(−chsl+qhsl+clsh−qlsh)
2(qhs
2
l+qlsh(−2sl+sh))
and xl =
2K(qhsl−qlsh)+sh(chsl−qhsl−clsh+qlsh)
2(qhs
2
l+qlsh(−2sl+sh))
. For
K ≥ K¯M3 , the only feasible solution to the equations (A-1)-(A-6) is the Solution 1
of Lemma A1: xh =
(qh−ch)−(ql−cl)
2(qh−ql) and xl =
qlch−qhcl
2ql(qh−ql) . Hence, the result follows.
ii.b) For parameters ql − cl < qh − ch, and qh−chsh ≥
ql−cl
sl
, the solution is characterized as
follows:
For K < K¯2, the only feasible solution to the equations (A-1)-(A-6) is the Solution 6
of Lemma A1: xh =
K
sh
and xl = 0. For K¯2 ≤ K < K¯M3 , the only feasible
solution to the equations (A-1)-(A-6) is the Solution 2 of Lemma A1: xh =
2Kql(−sl+sh)+sl(−chsl+qhsl+clsh−qlsh)
2(qhs
2
l+qlsh(−2sl+sh))
and xl =
2K(qhsl−qlsh)+sh(chsl−qhsl−clsh+qlsh)
2(qhs
2
l+qlsh(−2sl+sh))
. For
K ≥ K¯M3 , the only feasible solution to the equations (A-1)-(A-6) is the Solution 1
of Lemma A1: xh =
(qh−ch)−(ql−cl)
2(qh−ql) and xl =
qlch−qhcl
2ql(qh−ql) . Hence, the result follows.
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Proof of Proposition 2. Since the objective function of this problem is jointly concave
on a convex set deﬁned by linear constraints, the optimal solution can be obtained by
solving the ﬁrst order conditions (A-1)-(A-5) together with the feasibility conditions (A-
6) (Bazaraa et al. (2006)), where all feasible solutions are provided in Lemma A1 given
in the proof of Proposition 1.
In the following, we characterize the solutions that correspond to the parameters in
Proposition 2. Note that we use threshold capacities deﬁned in equations (2.3)-(2.4) and
(A-7)-(A-9) to facilitate the presentation of the solutions.
When (ch/cl ≤ qh/ql), for a monopolist the optimal product line conﬁguration is as
follows:
i) For parameters qh−ch
sh
< ql−cl
sl
, the solution is characterized as follows:
For K < K¯1, the only feasible solution to the equations (A-1)-(A-6) is the Solution 4
of Lemma A1: xh = 0 and xl =
K
sl
. For K¯1 ≤ K < K¯2, the only feasible
solution to the equations (A-1)-(A-6) is the Solution 2 of Lemma A1: xh =
2Kql(−sl+sh)+sl(−chsl+qhsl+clsh−qlsh)
2(qhs
2
l+qlsh(−2sl+sh))
and xl =
2K(qhsl−qlsh)+sh(chsl−qhsl−clsh+qlsh)
2(qhs
2
l+qlsh(−2sl+sh))
. For
K¯2 ≤ K < K¯M4 , the only feasible solution to the equations (A-1)-(A-6) is the
Solution 6 of Lemma A1: xh =
K
sh
and xl = 0. For K ≥ K¯M4 , the only feasible
solution to the equations (A-1)-(A-6) is the Solution 5 of Lemma A1: xh =
qh−ch
2qh
and xl = 0. Hence, the result follows.
ii) For parameters qh−ch
sh
≥ ql−cl
sl
, the solution is characterized as follows:
For K < K¯M4 , the only feasible solution to the equations (A-1)-(A-6) is the Solution 6
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of Lemma A1: xh =
K
sh
and xl = 0. For K ≥ K¯M4 , the only feasible solution to
the equations (A-1)-(A-6) is the Solution 6 of Lemma A1: xh =
qh−ch
2qh
and xl = 0.
Hence, the result follows.
Proof of Corollary 1. The proof directly follows from the proofs of Propositions 1 and
2. It is also straightforward to show that the derivative with respect to K is non-negative
in each case.
Proof of Proposition 3. We will ﬁrst characterize the solution of the social planner’s
problem in Lemma A2, then the result in the Proposition will follow from this Lemma.
The social planners’ problem in 2.6 leads to the following after solving for the integral
in the objective function (2.5), where the Lagrangian variables that will help with the
solution are provided in the parentheses:
maxΠS = xh · (qh · (1− xh
2
− ch))
+xl · (ql · (1− xh − xl
2
)− cl)
subject to
sh · xh + sl · xl ≤ K (λ)
xh ≥ 0 (μh)
xl ≥ 0 (μl)
Hessian(ΠS) = [
−qh −ql
−ql −ql
]. Given that qh > ql, the Hessian(Π
S) is negative deﬁnite.
Since the objective function of this problem is jointly concave on a convex set deﬁned
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by linear constraints, the optimal solution can be obtained by solving the ﬁrst order
conditions together with the feasibility conditions citepbazaraa06. First order conditions
are as follows for this problem:
−ch + qh − qhxh − qlxl − shλ + μh = 0 (A-10)
−cl − ql(−1 + xh + xl)− slλ + μl = 0 (A-11)
(K − shxh − slxl)λ = 0 (A-12)
xlμl = 0 (A-13)
xhμh = 0 (A-14)
where the feasibility conditions are given as below:
xh ≥ 0 xl ≥ 0 λ ≥ 0 μh ≥ 0 μl ≥ 0 K ≥ xh · sh + xl · sl (A-15)
We deﬁne the following threshold capacities to facilitate the presentation of the solution:
K¯S1 = 2K¯
M
1 (A-16)
K¯S2 = 2K¯
M
2 (A-17)
K¯S3 = 2K¯
M
3 (A-18)
K¯S4 = 2K¯
M
4 (A-19)
K¯S5 = 2K¯
M
5 (A-20)
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Lemma A2 a) For the parameters ql − cl ≥ qh − ch, the solution is as follows:
For K < K¯S5 , xh = 0 and xl =
K
sl
; for K ≥ K¯S5 , xh = 0 and xl = ql−clql .
b) For the parameters ql − cl < qh − ch, and qh−chsh <
ql−cl
sl
:
i) If (ch/cl > qh/ql), the solution is as follows:
For K < K¯S1 , xh = 0 and xl =
K
sl
;
for K¯S1 ≤ K < K¯S3 , xh = Kql(−sl+sh)+sl(−chsl+qhsl+clsh−qlsh)qhs2l+qlsh(−2sl+sh) and
xl =
K(qhsl−qlsh)+sh(chsl−qhsl−clsh+qlsh)
qhs
2
l +qlsh(−2sl+sh)
;
for K ≥ K¯S3 , xh = (qh−ch)−(ql−cl)qh−ql and xl =
qlch−qhcl
ql(qh−ql) .
ii) If (ch/cl ≤ qh/ql), the solution is as follows:
For K < K¯S1 , xh = 0 and x
SP
l =
K
sl
;
for K¯S1 ≤ K < K¯S2 , xh = Kql(−sl+sh)+sl(−chsl+qhsl+clsh−qlsh)qhs2l+qlsh(−2sl+sh) and
xl =
K(qhsl−qlsh)+sh(chsl−qhsl−clsh+qlsh)
qhs
2
l +qlsh(−2sl+sh)
;
for K¯S2 ≤ K < K¯S4 , xh = Ksh and xl = 0;
for K ≥ K¯S4 , xh = qh−chqh and xl = 0.
c) For the parameters qh−ch
sh
≥ ql−cl
sl
:
i) If (ch/cl > qh/ql), the solution is as follows:
For K < K¯S2 , xh =
K
sh
and xl = 0;
for K¯S2 ≤ K < K¯S3 , xh = Kql(−sl+sh)+sl(−chsl+qhsl+clsh−qlsh)qhs2l+qlsh(−2sl+sh) and
xl =
K(qhsl−qlsh)+sh(chsl−qhsl−clsh+qlsh)
qhs
2
l +qlsh(−2sl+sh)
;
for K ≥ K¯S3 , xh = (qh−ch)−(ql−cl)qh−ql and xl =
qlch−qhcl
ql(qh−ql) .
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ii) If (ch/cl ≤ qh/ql), the solution is as follows:
For K < K¯S4 , xh =
K
sh
and xl = 0; for K ≥ K¯S4 , xh = qh−chqh and xl = 0.
Proof. Proof follows the same method as in Lemma A1 and Propositions 1 and 2.
Following Propositions 1 and 2 and Lemma A2, when qh−ch > ql−cl and qh−chsh <
ql−cl
sl
,
both the monopoly ﬁrm and the social planner oﬀers only the low quality product below
a threshold capacity, but they oﬀer both product types (high and low quality) above that
threshold. The threshold for the monopoly ﬁrm and the social planner are K¯1 and K¯
S
1
respectively where K¯S1 = 2K¯1. Thus, for all K¯1 < K < K¯
S
1 , the monopolist serve the
high quality product while the social planner does not serve it, hence the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 4. Following Propositions 1 and 2 and Lemma A2, when
qh−ch
sh
> ql−cl
sl
and cl/ql ≤ ch/qh, the strategies for both the monopoly ﬁrm and the social
planner is to oﬀer only high quality product below a threshold capacity, but to oﬀer both
product types above that threshold. The threshold for the monopoly ﬁrm is K¯2 and
it is K¯S2 for the social planner where K¯
S
2 = 2K¯2. For K¯2 < K < min{K¯S2 , K¯M3 }, the
optimal strategy for the monopolist ﬁrm is to oﬀer both high and low quality product
types (xMh > 0 and x
M
l > 0), while the social planner serves only the high quality product
(xSPh > 0 and x
SP
l = 0). Notice that both the monopolist and the social planner use their
whole capacity in this case. Thus, shx
M
h + slx
M
l = K = shx
SP
h ⇒ xMh + x
M
l
sh/sl
= xSPh ⇒
xMh + x
M
l > x
SP
h .
Proof of Proposition 5. The proof follows from Propositions 1 and 2 and Lemma
A2:
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i) When ql − cl ≥ qh − ch, both monopoly and social planner assignments are same
(xh = 0 and xl = K/sl) for all K < K¯
M
5 .
ii) When ql − cl < qh − ch and qh−chsh <
ql−cl
sl
, both monopoly and social planner
assignments are same (xh = 0 and xl = K/sl) for all K < K¯1.
iii) When qh−ch
sh
= ql−cl
sl
and ch/cl > qh/ql, both monopoly and social planner assign-
ments are same (xMh =
2Kql(−sl+sh)+sl(−chsl+qhsl+clsh−qlsh)
2(qhs
2
l+qlsh(−2sl+sh))
=
Kql(−sl+sh)+sl(−chsl+qhsl+clsh−qlsh)
qhs
2
l+qlsh(−2sl+sh)
= xSPh and x
M
l =
2K(qhsl−qlsh)+sh(chsl−qhsl−clsh+qlsh)
2(qhs
2
l+qlsh(−2sl+sh))
= K(qhsl−qlsh)+sh(chsl−qhsl−clsh+qlsh)
qhs
2
l+qlsh(−2sl+sh)
= xSPl ) for all K < K¯
M
3 .
iv) When qh−ch
sh
> ql−cl
sl
and ch/cl > qh/ql, both monopoly and social planner assign-
ments are same (xh = K/sh and xl = 0) for all K < K¯2.
v) When qh−ch
sh
> ql−cl
sl
and ch/cl < qh/ql, both monopoly and social planner assign-
ments are same (xh = K/sh and xl = 0) for all K < K¯
M
4 .
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Appendix B: Appendix for Chapter
3
Lemma B1 Asymmetric pure strategy Nash equilibriums are not optimal for the game
described in Section 3.2.1.
Proof.
The objective function 3.1 is strictly concave with linear constraints. Hence, following
KKT conditions are necessary and suﬃcient to ﬁnd the optimal quantities:
∂yf V1 = 0
∂ye V1 = 0
λ (K − se ye − sf yf) = 0
μf yf = 0
μe ye = 0
The best response functions for Firm 1 and corresponding Lagrangian multipliers are
as follows:
A: Strategy is to oﬀer both classes at the unconstrained quantity.
yf = − ce−cf+(qe−qf )(−1+zf )2(qe−qf ) ; ye =
−cf qe+ce qf+qe (−qe+qf ) ze
2 qe (qe−qf )
μf = 0 ; μe = 0 ; λ = 0
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B: Strategy is to oﬀer both classes at the capacity constrained quantity.
yf = −2 K qe (se−sf )+se (cf se−ce sf+qe sf+qe se ze−qe sf ze+qf se (−1+zf )−qe sf zf )2 (qf s2e+qe sf (−2 se+sf ))
ye =
2 K (qf se−qe sf )+sf (cf se−ce sf+qe sf+qe se ze−qe sf ze+qf se (−1+zf )−qe sf zf )
2 (qf s2e+qe sf (−2 se+sf ))
μf = 0 ; μe = 0
λ =
2 K qe (qe−qf )−ce qf se+cf qe (se−sf )+ce qe sf−q2e sf+qe qf sf+q2e se ze−qe qf se ze+q2e sf zf−qe qf sf zf
qf s2e+qe sf (−2 se+sf )
C: Strategy is to oﬀer only high quality product at the unconstrained quantity.
yf = − cf+qe ze+qf (−1+zf )2 qf ; ye = 0
μf = 0 ; λ = 0
μe =
−cf qe+ce qf+qe (−qe+qf ) ze
qf
D: Strategy is to oﬀer nothing.
yf = 0 ; ye = 0 ; λ = 0
μf = cf + qe ze + qf (−1 + zf ) ; μe = ce + qe (−1 + ze + zf)
E: Strategy is to oﬀer only high quality product at the capacity constrained quantity.
yf =
K
sf
; ye = 0
λ = −2 K qf+sf (cf+qe ze+qf (−1+zf ))
s2f
; μf = 0
μe = ce − qe + 2 K qesf + qe ze −
se (2 K qf+sf (cf+qe ze+qf (−1+zf )))
s2f
+ qe zf
F: Strategy is to oﬀer only low quality product at the unconstrained quantity.
yf = 0 ; ye = − ce+qe (−1+ze+zf )2 qe
μf = −ce + cf − (qe − qf)(−1 + zf) ; μe = 0 ; λ = 0
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G: Strategy is to oﬀer only low quality product at the capacity constrained quantity.
yf = 0 ; ye =
K
se
μf = cf − qf + 2 K qese + qe ze + qf zf −
sf (2 K qe+se (ce+qe (−1+ze+zf )))
s2e
μe = 0 ; λ = −2 K qe+se (ce+qe (−1+ze+zf ))s2e
We analyze the asymmetric equilibriums one by one as follows: We assign diﬀerent
strategies for each ﬁrm and solve the best response functions together to get the closed
form solutions for the equilibrium quantities. Then, we check the feasibility and optimal-
ity conditions (the Lagrangian multipliers, the capacity constraint and the nonnegativity
constraints) where applicable. If there are contradictions among these conditions, then
the equilibrium is infeasible. In some cases where we cannot prove contradiction, we
showed that there is incentive for either or both ﬁrms to move away from the equilib-
rium. Hence, the suggested equilibrium is not stable even if it were feasible. In the
following part of the proof, W.L.O.G. we have assigned qe = 1 and qf = q representing
the quality ratio and se = 1 and sf = s representing the capacity usage ratio.
- Firm 1: Strategy A, Firm 2: Strategy B
λ ≥ 0 requires cf + (ce + q) s ≥ 3 K (−1 + q) + ce q + s + cf s
On the contrary; ye+s yf < K requires cf +(ce+q) s < 3 K (−1+q)+ce q+s+cf s
- Firm 1: Strategy A, Firm 2: Strategy C
ye > 0 requires ce q < cf
On the contrary; μe ≥ 0 requires ce q ≥ cf .
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- Firm 1: Strategy A, Firm 2: Strategy D
μf ≥ 0 and μe ≥ 0 cannot be satisﬁed.
- Firm 1: Strategy A, Firm 2: Strategy E
Equilibrium quantities and corresponding proﬁt functions are as follows:
ye = − cf qe−ce qf2 q2e−2 qe qf ; yf =
K (−qe+qf )+(−ce+cf+qe−qf ) sf
2 (qe−qf ) sf ; zf =
K
sf
; ze = 0
V1 =
K2 (−1+q) q+2 K (cf−q) (−1+q) s+(c2f−2 cf (−1+ce+q)+q (−1+c2e+q)) s2
4 (−1+q) s2 ;
V2 = −K(K q+(cf−q) s)2 s2
We claim that Firm 2 can do better if they decrease the amount of high quality
products by Δ > 0 amount while increasing low quality products by Δ amount
(z′e = Δ and z
′
f =
K
s
−Δ). In the new scenario, both the prices and the proﬁts of
the ﬁrms change. We need to know whether there are any incentives (increase in
the proﬁt) under the new quantities for Firm 2.
V ′2 =
K2 q+s2 Δ (−1+ce−cf+q+2(−1+q)Δ)+K s (cf−q+3 Δ−3 q Δ)
2 s2
V ′2 > V2 ⇔ K > s (ce−cf+(−1+q) (1+2 Δ))3 (−1+q)
s yf + ye < K requires K >
cf−ce q−cf s+(−1+ce+q) s
3 (−1+q)
K >
cf−ce q−cf s+(−1+ce+q) s
3 (−1+q) ≥
s (ce−cf+(−1+q) (1+2 Δ))
3 (−1+q) ⇔ cf > ce q + 2 (−1 + q) s Δ
Due to ye > 0 condition; we know that cf > ce q. Then there exists small enough
Δ > 0 such that cf > ce q + 2 (−1 + q) s Δ. This proves that (V ′2 > V2) and Firm
2 has incentive to move away from this asymmetric equilibrium and earn more
proﬁt. Hence, this asymmetric equilibrium is not stable, hence it is not an optimal
equilibrium.
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- Firm 1: Strategy A, Firm 2: Strategy F
yf > 0 requires q − cf > 1− ce
On the contrary; μf ≥ 0 requires q − cf ≤ 1− ce.
- Firm 1: Strategy A, Firm 2: Strategy G
μf ≥ 0 requires cf−q+s−ce s3 (−1+s) ≥ K
ye + s yf < K requires K >
cf−cf s+(−1+q) s+ce (−q+s)
3 (−1+q)
⇒ cf−q+s−ce s
3 (−1+s) >
cf−cf s+(−1+q) s+ce (−q+s)
3 (−1+q) ⇒ 1− ce > q − cf
However, yf > 0 requirement 1− ce < q − cf is a contradiction.
- Firm 1: Strategy C, Firm 2: Strategy B
λ ≥ 0 requires K ≤ q (−3 ce (q−s)+2 (−1+q) s)−cf (s+q (−3+2 s))
6 (−1+q) q
ze > 0 requires K > −s (cf (q+s)+q (−q+s−2 ce s))3 q (q−s)
⇒ q (−3 ce (q−s)+2 (−1+q) s)−cf (s+q (−3+2 s))
6 (−1+q) q > −s (cf (q+s)+q (−q+s−2 ce s))3 q (q−s) ⇒ cf−ce qq−s > 0
μe ≥ 0 requires K ≥ (−1+q) (q−s) s−ce (3 q
2+2 q (−3+s) s+s2)+cf (−q (−3+s)+s (−5+3 s))
3 (−1+q) (q−s)
⇒ q (−3 ce (q−s)+2 (−1+q) s)−cf (s+q (−3+2 s))
6 (−1+q) q ≥
(−1+q) (q−s) s−ce (3 q2+2 q (−3+s) s+s2)+cf (−q (−3+s)+s (−5+3 s))
3 (−1+q) (q−s)
⇒ cf−ce q
q−s ≤ 0 is a contradiction.
- Firm 1: Strategy D, Firm 2: Strategy B
λ ≥ 0 requires K ≤ cf−cf s+(−1+q) s+ce (−q+s)
2 (−1+q)
On the contrary; μe ≥ 0 requires K ≥ cf−cf s−(−1+ce)(−3+s) s+q (1−2 ce+s)2 (−1+q)
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However, K ≥ cf−cf s−(−1+ce)(−3+s) s+q (1−2 ce+s)
2 (−1+q) >
cf−cf s+(−1+q) s+ce (−q+s)
2 (−1+q) ≥ K is a
contradiction.
- Firm 1: Strategy E, Firm 2: Strategy B
ze > 0 requires 3 K (q − s) > s (q − cf − s(1− ce))
On the contrary; μe ≥ 0 requires 3 K (q − s) ≤ s (q − cf − s(1− ce)).
- Firm 1: Strategy F, Firm 2: Strategy B
λ ≥ 0 requires K ≤ −−1+q+ce (1+2 q−3 s)+3 cf (−1+s)+3 s−3 q s
6 (−1+q)
zf > 0 requires K >
1+2 cf−2 q+s−ce (1+s)
3 (−1+s)
⇒ −−1+q+ce (1+2 q−3 s)+3 cf (−1+s)+3 s−3 q s
6 (−1+q) >
1+2 cf−2 q+s−ce (1+s)
3 (−1+s)
⇒ q − cf > 1− ce
μf ≥ 0 requires K ≥ 2 q
2+(−1+ce) s (−5+3 s)−q (2+ce (−3+s)+5 s−3 s2)−cf (1+2 q−6 s+3 s2)
3 (−1+q) (−1+s)
⇒ −−1+q+ce (1+2 q−3 s)+3 cf (−1+s)+3 s−3 q s
6 (−1+q) ≥
2 q2+(−1+ce) s (−5+3 s)−q (2+ce (−3+s)+5 s−3 s2)−cf (1+2 q−6 s+3 s2)
3 (−1+q) (−1+s)
⇒ q − cf ≤ 1− ce is a contradiction.
- Firm 1: Strategy G, Firm 2: Strategy B
zf > 0 requires K >
s (1−ce)−(q−cf )
3 (s−1)
On the contrary; μf ≥ 0 requires K ≤ s (1−ce)−(q−cf )3 (s−1) .
- Firm 1: Strategy D, Firm 2: Strategy C
μf ≥ 0 cannot be satisﬁed.
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- Firm 1: Strategy E, Firm 2: Strategy C
λ ≥ 0 requires K ≤ s (q−cf )
3 q
On the contrary; ze + s zf < K requires K >
s (q−cf )
3 q
.
- Firm 1: Strategy F, Firm 2: Strategy C
μe ≥ 0 requires ce ≥ 1+3 cf−q1+2 q
μf ≥ 0 requires ce ≤ cf+2 cf q−2 (−1+q) q3 q
However, ce ≥ 1+3 cf−q1+2 q > cf+2 cf q−2 (−1+q) q3 q ≥ ce is a contradiction.
- Firm 1: Strategy G, Firm 2: Strategy C
We have the following feasibility conditions for this problem:
zf > 0 requires q − cf > K
sf zf < K requires K >
(−cf+q) s
2 q+s
μe ≥ 0 requires K ≥ cf−ce q−1+q
μf ≥ 0 requires K ≤ cf (q+s)+q (−q+s−2 ce s)−s+q (−3+4 s)
λ ≥ 0 requires K ≤ cf+q−2 ce q−1+4 q
All these feasibility conditions create the following conditions on the parameter
sets:
q − cf > cf − ce q−1 + q (B-1)
q − cf > (−cf + q) s
2 q + s
(B-2)
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cf (q + s) + q (−q + s− 2 ce s)
−s + q (−3 + 4 s) ≥
cf − ce q
−1 + q (B-3)
cf (q + s) + q (−q + s− 2 ce s)
−s + q (−3 + 4 s) >
(−cf + q) s
2 q + s
(B-4)
cf + q − 2 ce q
−1 + 4 q ≥
cf − ce q
−1 + q (B-5)
cf + q − 2 ce q
−1 + 4 q >
(−cf + q) s
2 q + s
(B-6)
For each parameter set, there is a diﬀerent condition where we fail to ﬁnd a feasible
K level. When (q > c), conditions (B-4) and (B-6) fail to hold. When (c > q and
1 − ce > q − cf), conditions (B-1) and (B-5) fail to hold. When (c > q > s and
q − cf > 1− ce), condition (B-3) fails to hold.
When (c > q and s > q and q − cf > 1− ce), condition (B-5) holds if
(q − cf )− (1− ce) ≥ 2 ce (c− q).
However, condition (B-6) holds if
2 ce (c− q) > s (q − cf − 1 + ce) + (s− 1) (q − cf ) > (q − cf )− (1− ce)
which is a contradiction to condition (B-5).
- Firm 1: Strategy E, Firm 2: Strategy D
μf ≥ 0 requires K ≥ s (q−cf )q
On the contrary; λ ≥ 0 requires K ≤ s (q−cf )
2 q
.
However, K ≥ s (q−cf )
q
>
s (q−cf )
2 q
≥ K is a contradiction.
- Firm 1: Strategy F, Firm 2: Strategy D
μe ≥ 0 cannot be satisﬁed.
124
- Firm 1: Strategy G, Firm 2: Strategy D
μe ≥ 0 requires K ≥ 1− ce
On the contrary; λ ≥ 0 requires K ≤ (1− ce)/2.
However, K ≥ 1− ce > (1− ce)/2 ≥ K is a contradiction.
- Firm 1: Strategy E, Firm 2: Strategy F
Equilibrium quantities and corresponding proﬁt functions are as follows:
ye = 0; yf =
K
sf
; zf = 0; ze =
1
2
(1− ce
qe
− K
sf
)
V1 =
K (K (qe−2 qf )+(ce−2 cf−qe+2 qf ) sf )
2 s2f
; V2 =
(K qe+(ce−qe) sf )2
4 qe s2f
We claim that Firm 1 can do better if they decrease the amount of high quality
products by Δ > 0 amount while increasing low quality products by Δ amount
(y′e = Δ and y
′
f =
K
sf
−Δ). In the new scenario, both the prices and the proﬁts of
the ﬁrms change. We need to know whether there are any incentives (increase in
the proﬁt) under the new quantities for Firm 1.
V ′1 =
K2 (qe−2 qf )+K sf (ce−2 cf−qe+2 qf−4 qe Δ+4 qf Δ)+2 s2f Δ (−ce+cf+(qe−qf ) (1+Δ))
2 s2f
V ′1 > V1 ⇔ K > s (q−cf−1+ce+(q−1) Δ)2 (−1+q)
Due to μf ≥ 0 condition; K ≥ s (q−cf−1+ce)(−1+q) >
s (q−cf−1+ce)
2 (−1+q) . Then there exists small
enough Δ > 0 such that K >
s (q−cf−1+ce+(q−1) Δ)
2 (−1+q) . This proves that Firm 1 has
incentive to move away from this asymmetric equilibrium and earn more proﬁt.
Hence, this asymmetric equilibrium is not an optimal, stable equilibrium.
- Firm 1: Strategy G, Firm 2: Strategy E
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μf ≥ 0 requires K (q − s (2 s− 1)) ≥ s (q − cf − s (1− ce))
On the contrary; μe ≥ 0 requires s (q − cf − s (1− ce)) ≥ K (2 q − s (1 + s)).
⇒ K (q − 2 s2 + s) ≥ K (2 q − s2 − s) ⇒ (q − 2 s2 + s) ≥ (2 q − s2 − s) ⇒ 0 ≥
q + s2 − 2 s > 0 is a contradiction.
- Firm 1: Strategy G, Firm 2: Strategy F
ze > 0 requires K < 1− ce
On the contrary; ze + s zf < K requires K > 1− ce.
Proof of Proposition 6. In Lemma B1, we proved that the solution is not asymmetric.
Then, we can solve the problem with symmetric best response functions and characterize
the solution for diﬀerent cost, quality and size parameters. We will solve the problem in
Lemma B2 for all cases and then ﬁnd out which ones correspond to each case listed in
the Proposition 6.
Lemma B2 The equilibrium quantities and feasibility conditions are as follows:
AA: Strategy is to oﬀer both classes at the unconstrained quantity.
yf = zf =
−ce+cf+qe−qf
3 (qe−qf ) ; ye = ze = −
cf qe−ce qf
3 q2e−3 qe qf
ce + q > 1 + cf ; ce q < cf ; sf yf + se ye < K
BB: Strategy is to oﬀer both classes at the capacity constrained quantity.
yf = zf =
3 K qe (−se+sf )+se (−cf se+qf se+ce sf−qe sf )
3 (qf s2e+qe sf (−2 se+sf ))
ye = ze =
3 K (qf se−qe sf )+sf (cf se−qf se−ce sf+qe sf )
3 (qf s2e+qe sf (−2 se+sf ))
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q + 3 K (−1 + s) + ce s > cf + s ; 3 K q + s (cf + s) > s (3 K + q + ce s) ;
cf + (ce + q) s ≥ 3 K (−1 + q) + ce q + s + cf s
CC: Strategy is to oﬀer only high quality product at the unconstrained quantity.
yf = zf =
qf−cf
3 qf
; ye = ze = 0
ce q ≥ cf ; sf yf < K
DD: Strategy is to oﬀer nothing.
This is not a feasible equilibrium since both μf < 0 and μe < 0.
EE: Strategy is to oﬀer only high quality product at the capacity constrained quantity.
yf = zf =
K
sf
; ye = ze = 0
s (−cf + q + (−1 + ce) s) ≥ 3 K (q − s) ; 3 K q + cf s ≤ q s
FF: Strategy is to oﬀer only low quality product at the unconstrained quantity.
yf = zf = 0 ; ye = ze =
qe−ce
3 qe
1 + cf ≥ ce + q ; se ye < K
GG: Strategy is to oﬀer only low quality product at the capacity constrained quantity.
yf = zf = 0 ; ye = ze =
K
se
cf + s ≥ q + 3 K (−1 + s) + ce s ; ce + 3 K <= 1
Proof. Proof follows directly from the proof of Lemma B1.
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Following additional threshold capacities are deﬁned to facilitate the presentation of
the solution:
K¯D1 = 2/3K¯
M
1 (B-7)
K¯D2 = 2/3K¯
M
2 (B-8)
K¯D3 = 2/3K¯
M
3 (B-9)
K¯D4 = 2/3K¯
M
4 (B-10)
K¯D5 = 2/3K¯
M
5 (B-11)
When (ch/cl > qh/ql), for a duopolist, the optimal product line conﬁguration is as
follows:
i) For parameters ql − cl ≥ qh − ch, the solution is characterized as follows:
For K < K¯D5 , the only feasible solution is the Solution GG of Lemma B2.
For K ≥ K¯D5 , the only feasible solution is the Solution FF of Lemma B2. Hence,
the result follows.
ii.a) For parameters ql − cl < qh − ch, and qh−chsh <
ql−cl
sl
, the solution is characterized as
follows:
For K < K¯D1 , the only feasible solution is the Solution GG of Lemma B2.
For K¯D1 ≤ K < K¯D3 , the only feasible solution is the Solution BB of Lemma B2.
For K ≥ K¯D3 , the only feasible solution is the Solution AA of Lemma B2. Hence,
the result follows.
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ii.b) For parameters ql − cl < qh − ch, and qh−chsh ≥
ql−cl
sl
, the solution is characterized as
follows:
For K < K¯D2 , the only feasible solution is the Solution EE of Lemma B2.
For K¯D2 ≤ K < K¯D3 , the only feasible solution is the Solution BB of Lemma B2.
For K ≥ K¯D3 , the only feasible solution is the Solution AA of Lemma B2. Hence,
the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 7. All feasible solutions of this problem are provided in Lemma
B2 given in the proof of Proposition 6. In the following, we characterize the solutions that
correspond to the parameters in Proposition 7. Note that we use threshold capacities
deﬁned in equations (B-7)-(B-8) and (B-9)-(B-11) to facilitate the presentation of the
solutions.
When (ch/cl ≤ qh/ql), for a duopolist the optimal product line conﬁguration is as
follows:
i) For parameters qh−ch
sh
< ql−cl
sl
, the solution is characterized as follows:
For K < K¯D1 , the only feasible solution is the Solution GG of Lemma B2.
For K¯D1 ≤ K < K¯D2 , the only feasible solution is the Solution BB of Lemma B2.
For K¯D2 ≤ K < K¯D4 , the only feasible solution is the Solution EE of Lemma B2.
For K ≥ K¯D4 , the only feasible solution is the Solution CC of Lemma B2. Hence,
the result follows.
ii) For parameters qh−ch
sh
≥ ql−cl
sl
, the solution is characterized as follows:
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For K < K¯D4 , the only feasible solution is the Solution EE of Lemma B2.
For K ≥ K¯D4 , the only feasible solution is the Solution CC of Lemma B2. Hence,
the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 8.
Following Propositions 1, 2, 6 and 7, when qh − ch > ql − cl and qh−chsh <
ql−cl
sl
, both
in the monopoly case and the duopoly cases, the ﬁrm oﬀers only the low quality product
below a threshold capacity; K¯1 and K¯
D
1 respectively where K¯
D
1 = 2/3 K¯1. When there
is increasing cost to quality ratio, the solution is to oﬀer both product types (high and
low quality) above those thresholds. Thus, there is increasing cost to quality ratio, for
all K¯D1 < K < K¯1, the solution in the duopoly market is to oﬀer both products while the
solution in the monopoly market remains to be to oﬀer only low quality product. When
there is decreasing cost to quality ratio, the solution in the duopoly case is to oﬀer only
high quality product when K > K¯D2 . Since K¯
D
1 < K¯
D
2 , when there is decreasing cost to
quality ratio, it is clear that in the range K¯D1 < K < min{K¯1, K¯D2 }, the solution in the
duopoly market for the ﬁrm is to oﬀer both products while the solution in the monopoly
market remains to be to oﬀer only low quality product. Hence, the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 9.
Following Propositions 1, 2, 6 and 7, when qh−ch
sh
> ql−cl
sl
and there is increasing cost
to quality ratio, both the monopoly case and the duopoly case solutions are to oﬀer
only the high quality product below a threshold capacity; K¯2 and K¯
D
2 respectively where
K¯D2 = 2/3 K¯2. The ﬁrm oﬀers both product types (high and low quality) above those
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thresholds. Thus, for all K¯D2 < K < K¯2, in the duopoly case both products are oﬀered
while in the monopoly case solution remains to be to oﬀer only high quality product.
Hence, the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 10.
Following Propositions 1, 2, 6 and 7, when (qh − ch)/sh < (ql − cl)/sl and there is
decreasing cost to quality ratio, both the monopoly case and the duopoly case solutions
are to oﬀer only the high quality product above a threshold capacity; K¯2 and K¯
D
2 respec-
tively where K¯D2 = 2/3 K¯2. The ﬁrm oﬀers both product types (high and low quality)
below those thresholds. Thus, for all K¯D2 < K < K¯2, in the duopoly case oﬀering only
high quality product is the optimal solution while in the monopoly case solution remains
to be oﬀering both products. Hence, the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 11. Following threshold capacities are deﬁned in addition to
thresholds presented earlier to facilitate the presentation of the proof:
K¯TD1 = 2K¯
D
1 (B-12)
K¯TD2 = 2K¯
D
2 (B-13)
K¯TD3 = 2K¯
D
3 (B-14)
K¯TD4 = 2K¯
D
4 (B-15)
K¯TD5 = 2K¯
D
5 (B-16)
Following Propositions 1, 2, 6 and 7, when (qh − ch > ql − cl) , and (qh − ch)/sh <
(ql − cl)/sl, both in the monopoly case and the duopoly cases, the ﬁrm oﬀers only the
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low quality product below a threshold capacity; K¯1 and K¯
TD
1 respectively where K¯
TD
1 =
4/3 K¯1. When there is increasing cost to quality ratio, the solution is to oﬀer both
product types (high and low quality) above those thresholds. Thus, there is increasing
cost to quality ratio, for all K¯1 < K < K¯
TD
1 , the solution in the merger is to oﬀer both
products while the solution in the duopoly market is to oﬀer only low quality product.
When there is decreasing cost to quality ratio, the solution in the merger case is to oﬀer
only high quality product when K > K¯2. Since K¯1 < K¯2, when there is decreasing cost
to quality ratio, it is clear that in the range K¯1 < K < min{K¯2, K¯TD1 }, the solution in the
monopoly market for the ﬁrm is to oﬀer both products while the solution in the duopoly
market remains to be to oﬀer only low quality product. Hence, the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 12. Following Propositions 1, 2, 6 and 7, when qh−ch
sh
> ql−cl
sl
and there is increasing cost to quality ratio, both the monopoly case and the duopoly
case solutions are to oﬀer only the high quality product below a threshold capacity; K¯2
and K¯TD2 respectively where K¯
TD
2 = 4/3 K¯2. The optimal oﬀerings are both product
types (high and low quality) above those thresholds. Thus, for all K¯2 < K < K¯
TD
2 , in
the merger case both products are oﬀered while in the duopoly case solution remains to
be to oﬀer only high quality product. Hence, the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 13. Following Propositions 1, 2, 6 and 7, when (qh − ch)/sh <
(ql − cl)/sl and there is decreasing cost to quality ratio, both the monopoly case and
the duopoly case solutions are to oﬀer only the high quality product above a threshold
capacity; K¯2 and K¯
TD
2 respectively where K¯
TD
2 = 4/3 K¯2. The optimal oﬀerings are both
product types (high and low quality) below those thresholds. Thus, for all K¯2 < K <
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K¯TD2 , in the merger case oﬀering only high quality product is the optimal solution while
in the duopoly case solution remains to be oﬀering both products. Hence, the result
follows.
Proof of Proposition 14.
Following Propositions 1, 2, 6 and 7, when (qh − ch)/sh > (ql − cl)/sl and there
is increasing cost to quality ratio, the strategies for both the monopoly ﬁrm and the
duoplists is to oﬀer only high quality product below a threshold capacity, but to oﬀer
both product types above that threshold. The threshold for the monopoly ﬁrm is K¯2
and it is K¯TD2 for the merger where K¯
TD
2 = 4/3K¯2. For K¯2 < K < min{K¯TD2 , K¯3}, the
optimal strategy for the monopolist ﬁrm is to oﬀer both high and low quality product
types (xh > 0 and xl > 0), while the duopolist serve only the high quality product
(yh > 0, zh > 0 and yl = 0, zl = 0). Notice that both the monopolist and the duopolists
use their whole capacity in this case. Thus, shxh+slxl = K = sh(yh+zh) ⇒ xh+ xlsh/sl =
yh + zh ⇒ xh + xl > yh + zh.
The average quality oﬀered in the market when there are two competing duopolists is
exactly qh. On the other hand, when there is only one integrated monopolist, the average
quality oﬀered in the market is (xhqh + xlql)/(xh + xl) < qh.
Proof of Proposition 15. We solve the problem with symmetric best response
functions and characterize the solution for diﬀerent cost, quality and size parameters.
Following additional threshold capacities are deﬁned to facilitate the presentation of the
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solution:
K¯
(n)
1 = 2/(n + 1)K¯
M
1 (B-17)
K¯
(n)
2 = 2/(n + 1)K¯
M
2 (B-18)
K¯
(n)
3 = 2/(n + 1)K¯
M
3 (B-19)
K¯
(n)
4 = 2/(n + 1)K¯
M
4 (B-20)
K¯
(n)
5 = 2/(n + 1)K¯
M
5 (B-21)
K¯
T (n)
1 = 2n/(n + 1)K¯
M
1 (B-22)
K¯
T (n)
2 = 2n/(n + 1)K¯
M
2 (B-23)
K¯
T (n)
3 = 2n/(n + 1)K¯
M
3 (B-24)
K¯
T (n)
4 = 2n/(n + 1)K¯
M
4 (B-25)
K¯
T (n)
5 = 2n/(n + 1)K¯
M
5 (B-26)
(B-27)
When (ch/cl > qh/ql), for an oligopolist, the optimal product line conﬁguration is as
follows:
i) For parameters ql − cl ≥ qh − ch, the solution is characterized as follows:
For K < K¯
(n)
5 , the only feasible solution is wh = 0 and wl = K/se.
For K ≥ K¯(n)5 , the only feasible solution is wh = 0 and wl = qe−ce(n+1)qe . Hence, the
result follows.
ii.a) For parameters ql − cl < qh − ch, and qh−chsh <
ql−cl
sl
, the solution is characterized as
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follows:
For K < K¯
(n)
1 , the only feasible solution is wh = 0 and wl = K/se.
For K¯
(n)
1 ≤ K < K¯(n)3 , the only feasible solution is
wh =
−K(1+n)qe(se−sf)+se(−cfse+qfse+cesf−qesf)
(1+n)(qfse2+qesf(−2se+sf))
and wl =
K(1+n)(qfse−qesf)+sf(cfse−qfse−cesf+qesf)
(1+n)(qfse2+qesf(−2se+sf)) .
For K ≥ K¯(n)3 , the only feasible solution is wh = −ce+cf+qe−qf(1+n)(qe−qf) and wl = −cfqe+ceqf(1+n)qe(qe−qf) .
Hence, the result follows.
ii.b) For parameters ql − cl < qh − ch, and qh−chsh ≥
ql−cl
sl
, the solution is characterized as
follows:
For K < K¯
(n)
2 , the only feasible solution is wh = K/sf and wl = 0.
For K¯
(n)
2 ≤ K < K¯(n)3 , the only feasible solution is
wh =
−K(1+n)qe(se−sf)+se(−cfse+qfse+cesf−qesf)
(1+n)(qfse2+qesf(−2se+sf))
and wl =
K(1+n)(qfse−qesf)+sf(cfse−qfse−cesf+qesf)
(1+n)(qfse2+qesf(−2se+sf)) .
For K ≥ K¯(n)3 , the only feasible solution is wh = −ce+cf+qe−qf(1+n)(qe−qf) and wl = −cfqe+ceqf(1+n)qe(qe−qf) .
Hence, the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 16. We characterize the solutions that correspond to the
parameters in Proposition 7. When (ch/cl ≤ qh/ql), for an oligopolist the optimal product
line conﬁguration is as follows:
i) For parameters qh−ch
sh
< ql−cl
sl
, the solution is characterized as follows:
135
For K < K¯
(n)
1 , the only feasible solution is wh = 0 and wl = K/se.
For K¯
(n)
1 ≤ K < K¯(n)2 , wh = −K(1+n)qe(se−sf)+se(−cfse+qfse+cesf−qesf)(1+n)(qfse2+qesf(−2se+sf)) and wl =
K(1+n)(qfse−qesf)+sf(cfse−qfse−cesf+qesf)
(1+n)(qfse2+qesf(−2se+sf)) .
For K¯
(n)
2 ≤ K < K¯(n)4 , the only feasible solution is wh = K/sf and wl = 0.
For K ≥ K¯(n)4 , the only feasible solution is wh = qf−cf(n+1)qf and wl = 0. Hence, the
result follows.
ii) For parameters qh−ch
sh
≥ ql−cl
sl
, the solution is characterized as follows:
For K < K¯
(n)
4 , the only feasible solution is wh = K/sf and wl = 0.
For K ≥ K¯(n)4 , the only feasible solution is wh = qf−cf(n+1)qf and wl = 0. Hence, the
result follows.
Proof of Proposition 17.
Following Propositions 15 and 16, when qh − ch > ql − cl and qh−chsh <
ql−cl
sl
, the
ﬁrm oﬀers only the low quality product below a threshold capacity; K¯(n)1 and K¯
(n+1)
1
respectively where K¯
(n+1)
1 = (n+1)/(n+2) K¯
(n)
1 . When there is increasing cost to quality
ratio, the solution is to oﬀer both product types (high and low quality) above those
thresholds. Thus, there is increasing cost to quality ratio, for all K¯
(n+1)
1 < K < K¯
(n)
1 , the
solution in the n+1 ﬁrm market is to oﬀer both products while the solution in the n-ﬁrm
market remains to be to oﬀer only low quality product. When there is decreasing cost to
quality ratio, the solution in the duopoly case is to oﬀer only high quality product when
K > K¯
(n+1)
2 . Since K¯
(n+1)
1 < K¯
(n+1)
2 , when there is decreasing cost to quality ratio, it is
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clear that in the range K¯
(n+1)
1 < K < min{K¯(n)1 , K¯(n+1)2 }, the solution in the n+1 ﬁrm
market is to oﬀer both products while the solution in the n-ﬁrm market remains to be
to oﬀer only low quality product. Hence, the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 18.
Following Propositions 15 and 16, when qh−ch
sh
> ql−cl
sl
and there is increasing cost
to quality ratio, both the n-ﬁrm case and the n+1 ﬁrm case solutions are to oﬀer only
the high quality product below a threshold capacity; K¯
(n)
2 and K¯
(n+1)
2 respectively where
K¯
(n+1)
2 = (n+1)/(n+2) K¯
(n)
2 . The ﬁrm oﬀers both product types (high and low quality)
above those thresholds. Thus, for all K¯
(n+1)
2 < K < K¯
(n)
2 , in the n+1 ﬁrm case both
products are oﬀered while in the n-ﬁrm case solution remains to be to oﬀer only high
quality product. Hence, the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 19.
Following Propositions 15 and 16, when (qh − ch)/sh < (ql − cl)/sl and there is
decreasing cost to quality ratio, both the n ﬁrm and the n+1 ﬁrm case solutions are to oﬀer
only the high quality product above a threshold capacity; K¯
(n)
2 and K¯
(n+1)
2 respectively
where K¯
(n+1)
2 = (n + 1)/(n + 2) K¯
(n)
2 . The ﬁrm oﬀers both product types (high and low
quality) below those thresholds. Thus, for all K¯
(n+1)
2 < K < K¯
(n)
2 , in the n+1 ﬁrm case
oﬀering only high quality product is the optimal solution while in the n-ﬁrm case solution
remains to be oﬀering both products. Hence, the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 20. When (qh − ch)/sh < (ql − cl)/sl,
If ch/qh > cl/ql, then following Proposition 15 when each ﬁrm has K capacity: For
0 < K < K¯
(n)
1 , w
∗
h = 0⇒ ∂nw∗h = 0.
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For K¯
(n)
1 ≤ K < K¯(n)3 , w∗h = −K(1+n)ql(sl−sh)+sl(−chsl+qhsl+clsh−qlsh)(1+n)(qhs2l+qlsh(−2sl+sh)) ⇒ ∂nw
∗
h > 0. For
K ≥ K¯(n)3 , ∂nw∗h < 0.
If ch/qh ≤ cl/ql, then following Proposition 16 when each ﬁrm has K capacity: For
total industry capacity of 0 < K < K¯
(n)
1 , w
∗
h = 0 ⇒ ∂nw∗h = 0. For K¯(n)1 ≤ K < K¯(n)2 ,
w∗h =
−K(1+n)ql(sl−sh)+sl(−chsl+qhsl+clsh−qlsh)
(1+n)(qhs
2
l+qlsh(−2sl+sh))
⇒ ∂nw∗h > 0. For K¯(n)2 ≤ K < K¯(n)4 , w∗h =
K/sh ⇒ ∂nw∗h = 0. For K ≥ K¯(n)4 , ∂nt∗h < 0.
Hence, the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 21.
When (qh−ch)/sh > (ql−cl)/sl and ch/qh > cl/ql, then following Proposition 15 when
each ﬁrm has K capacity: For 0 < K < K¯
(n)
2 , w
∗
l = 0⇒ ∂nw∗l = 0. For K¯(n)2 ≤ K < K¯(n)3 ,
w∗l =
K(1+n)(qhsl−qlsh)+sh(chsl−qhsl−clsh+qlsh)
(1+n)(qhs
2
l+qlsh(−2sl+sh))
⇒ ∂nw∗l > 0. For K ≥ K¯(n)3 , ∂nw∗l < 0. Hence,
the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 22. Following Propositions 15 and 16, when (qh − ch > ql − cl)
, and (qh − ch)/sh < (ql − cl)/sl, the ﬁrm oﬀers only the low quality product below
a threshold capacity; K¯
T (n)
1 and K¯
T (n+1)
1 respectively. When there is increasing cost to
quality ratio, the solution is to oﬀer both product types (high and low quality) above those
thresholds. Thus, there is increasing cost to quality ratio, for all K¯
T (n)
1 < K < K¯
T (n+1)
1 ,
the solution in the n-ﬁrm case is to oﬀer both products while the solution in the n+1 ﬁrm
market is to oﬀer only low quality product. When there is decreasing cost to quality ratio,
the solution in the n-ﬁrm case is to oﬀer only high quality product when K > K¯
T (n)
2 .
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Since K¯
T (n)
1 < K¯
T (n)
2 , when there is decreasing cost to quality ratio, it is clear that in the
range K¯
T (n)
1 < K < min{K¯T (n)2 , K¯T (n+1)1 }, the solution in the n-ﬁrm market for the ﬁrm
is to oﬀer both products while the solution in the n+1 ﬁrm market remains to be to oﬀer
only low quality product. Hence, the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 23. Following Propositions 15 and 16, when qh−ch
sh
> ql−cl
sl
and there is increasing cost to quality ratio, both the n-ﬁrm case and the n+1 ﬁrm case
solutions are to oﬀer only the high quality product below a threshold capacity; K¯
T (n)
2
and K¯
T (n+1)
2 respectively. The optimal oﬀerings are both product types (high and low
quality) above those thresholds. Thus, for all K¯
T (n)
2 < K < K¯
T (n+1)
2 , in the n-ﬁrm case
both products are oﬀered while in the n+1 case solution remains to be to oﬀer only high
quality product. Hence, the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 24. Following Propositions 15 and 16, when (qh − ch)/sh <
(ql−cl)/sl and there is decreasing cost to quality ratio, both the n-ﬁrm case and the n+1
ﬁrm case solutions are to oﬀer only the high quality product above a threshold capacity;
K¯
T (n)
2 and K¯
T (n+1)
2 respectively. The optimal oﬀerings are both product types (high and
low quality) below those thresholds. Thus, for all K¯
T (n)
2 < K < K¯
T (n+1)
2 , in the n ﬁrm
case oﬀering only high quality product is the optimal solution while in the n+1 ﬁrm case
solution remains to be oﬀering both products. Hence, the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 25.
i) When qh−ch
sh
< ql−cl
sl
:
- If ch/qh > cl/ql, then following Proposition 15 when each ﬁrm has K/n capac-
ity and t∗h = nw
∗
h: For total industry capacity of 0 < K < K¯
T (n)
1 , ∂nt
∗
h = 0. For
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total industry capacity of K¯
T (n)
1 ≤ K < K¯T (n)3 , ∂nt∗h < 0. For total industry
capacity of K ≥ K¯T (n)3 , ∂nt∗h > 0. Hence, the result follows.
- If ch/qh ≤ cl/ql, then following Proposition 16 when each ﬁrm has K/n capac-
ity and t∗h = nw
∗
h: For total industry capacity of 0 < K < K¯
T (n)
1 , ∂nt
∗
h = 0.
For total industry capacity of K¯
T (n)
1 ≤ K < K¯T (n)2 , ∂nt∗h < 0. For total indus-
try capacity of K¯
T (n)
2 ≤ K < K¯T (n)4 , ∂nt∗h = 0. For total industry capacity of
K ≥ K¯T (n)4 , ∂nt∗h > 0. Hence, the result follows.
ii) When qh−ch
sh
> ql−cl
sl
:
- If ch/qh > cl/ql, then following Proposition 15 when each ﬁrm has K/n capac-
ity and t∗l = nw
∗
l : For total industry capacity of 0 < K < K¯
T (n)
2 , ∂nt
∗
l = 0. For
total industry capacity of K¯
T (n)
2 ≤ K < K¯T (n)3 , ∂nt∗l < 0. For total industry
capacity of K ≥ K¯T (n)3 , ∂nt∗l > 0. Hence, the result follows.
- If ch/qh ≤ cl/ql, then following Proposition 16 for all capacity levels w∗l = 0,
hence ∂nt
∗
l = 0. Hence, the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 26. When ch/qh > cl/ql and qh/sh > ql/sl;
i) If qh−ch
sh
< ql−cl
sl
; then following Proposition 15 when each ﬁrm has K/n capacity
and p∗h = qh(1 − nw∗h) − ql(nw∗l ): For total industry capacity of 0 < K < K¯T (n)1 ,
∂np
∗
h = 0. For total industry capacity of K¯
T (n)
1 < K < K¯
T (n)
3 , ∂np
∗
h > 0. For total
industry capacity of K ≥ K¯T (n)3 , ∂np∗h < 0. Hence, the result follows.
ii) If qh−ch
sh
> ql−cl
sl
; then following Proposition 15 when each ﬁrm has K/n capacity and
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p∗l = ql(1− nw∗h − nw∗l ): For total industry capacity of 0 < K < K¯T (n)2 , ∂np∗l = 0.
For total industry capacity of K¯
T (n)
2 < K < K¯
T (n)
3 , ∂np
∗
l > 0. For total industry
capacity of K ≥ K¯T (n)3 , ∂np∗l < 0. Hence, the result follows.
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Appendix C: Appendix for Chapter
4
Proof of Proposition 31. The problem can be re-written as follows:
max
xh≥0
πh = (ph(xh)− ch)xh
subject to shxh ≤ K.
The objective function of this problem is strictly concave on a convex set deﬁned by
linear constraints, therefore the optimal solution can be obtained by solving the ﬁrst
order conditions (Bazaraa et al. (2006)). First order conditions are as follows for this
problem:
−ch + qh − 2qhxh − shλ + μ = 0
(K − shxh)λ = 0
xhμ = 0
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where the feasibility conditions are as given below:
xh ≥ 0 λ ≥ 0 μ ≥ 0 K ≥ shxh
The solution of the ﬁrst order conditions yield 3 alternatives:
Solution 1: xh =
qh−ch
2qh
;λ = 0;μ = 0.
Solution 2: xh =
K
sh
;λ = −2Kqh+(−ch+qh)sh
s2h
;μ = 0.
Solution 3: xh = 0;λ = 0;μ = ch − qh.
Combined with the feasibility conditions, the result in the proposition follows.
Proof of Proposition 32. The parametric set we investigate is ql − cl > qh − ch
and ch/cl > qh/ql > sh/sl. In this parametric set, the intuitive and trivial optimal
solution is focusing on the low quality. Then, the lower bound that is achieved under
these conditions would be a lower bound for all other cost conditions. Let’s start by
calculating the proﬁt ratios for all capacity levels. There are 3 regions that needs to be
studied in this case: 0 < K ≤ K¯M4 , K¯M4 < K ≤ K¯M5 , and K > K¯M5 .
For 0 < K ≤ K¯M4 , π∗h = −K(Kqh+(ch−qh)sh)s2h and π
∗ = −K(Kql+(cl−ql)sl)
s2l
. In this region,
although both proﬁts are increasing in K, the ratio
π∗h
π∗ is decreasing.
At K¯M4 , π
∗
h assumes its highest value at π
∗
h =
(qh−ch)2
4qh
and remains the same thereafter.
For K¯M4 < K ≤ K¯M5 , π∗ keeps increasing. This leads to further decrease of the ratio π
∗
h
π∗ .
At K¯M5 , π
∗ assumes its highest value at π∗ = (ql−cl)
2
4ql
and remains the same thereafter.
Hence, the smallest proﬁt ratio is achieved in this region at
π∗h
π∗ =
ql (qh−ch)2
qh (ql−cl)2 . Hence, the
result follows.
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Proof of Proposition 33. The problem can be re-written as follows:
max
xl≥0
πl = (pl(xl)− cl)xl
subject to slxl ≤ K.
The objective function of this problem is strictly concave on a convex set deﬁned by
linear constraints, therefore the optimal solution can be obtained by solving the ﬁrst
order conditions (Bazaraa et al. (2006)). First order conditions are as follows for this
problem:
−cl + ql − 2qlxl − slλ + μ = 0
(K − slxl)λ = 0
xlμ = 0
where the feasibility conditions are as given below:
xl ≥ 0 λ ≥ 0 μ ≥ 0 K ≥ slxl
The solution of the ﬁrst order conditions yield 3 alternatives:
Solution 1: xl =
ql−cl
2ql
;λ = 0;μ = 0.
Solution 2: xl =
K
sl
;λ = −2Kql+(−cl+ql)sl
s2l
;μ = 0.
Solution 3: xl = 0;λ = 0;μ = cl − ql.
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Combined with the feasibility conditions, the result in the proposition follows.
Proof of Proposition 34. The parametric set we investigate is qh/ql > ch/cl > sh/sl.
In this parametric set, the intuitive and trivial optimal solution is focusing on the high
quality. Then, the lower bound that is achieved under these conditions would be a lower
bound for all other cost conditions. Let’s start by calculating the proﬁt ratios for all
capacity levels. There are 3 regions that needs to be studied in this case: 0 < K ≤ K¯M5 ,
K¯M5 < K ≤ K¯M4 , and K > K¯M4 .
For 0 < K ≤ K¯M5 , π∗l = −K(Kql+(cl−ql)sl)s2l and π
∗ = −K(Kqh+(ch−qh)sh)
s2h
. In this region,
although both proﬁts are increasing in K, the ratio
π∗l
π∗ is decreasing.
At K¯M5 , π
∗
l assumes its highest value at π
∗
h =
(ql−cl)2
4ql
and remains the same thereafter.
For K¯M5 < K ≤ K¯M4 , π∗ keeps increasing. This leads to further decrease of the ratio π
∗
l
π∗ .
At K¯M4 , π
∗ assumes its highest value at π∗ = (qh−ch)
2
4qh
and remains the same thereafter.
Hence, the smallest proﬁt ratio is achieved in this region at
π∗l
π∗ =
qh (ql−cl)2
ql (qh−ch)2 . Hence, the
result follows.
Lemma C1 The best response functions of the high quality focused ﬁrm Z are as follows:
Solution 1: zh = − ch+qlyl+qh(−1+yh)2qh and λz = 0 and μz = 0.
Solution 2: zh =
K
sh
and λz = −2Kqh+sh(ch+qlyl+qh(−1+yh))s2h and μz = 0.
Solution 3: zh = 0 and λz = 0 and μz = ch + qlyl + qh(−1 + yh).
Moreover, the feasibility conditions are as given below:
zh ≥ 0 λz ≥ 0 μz ≥ 0 K ≥ shzh
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Proof. The Lagrangian of the problem can be written as follows:
πz = −zh(ch + qlyl + qh(−1 + yh + zh)) + λz(K − shzh) + μzzh
The objective function of the problem is strictly concave on a convex set deﬁned by
linear constraints, therefore the optimal solution can be obtained by solving the ﬁrst
order conditions (Bazaraa et al. (2006)). First order conditions are as follows for this
problem:
−ch + qh − qlyl − qhyh − 2qhzh − shλz + μz = 0
λz(K − shzh) = 0
μzzh = 0
The solution of the ﬁrst order conditions yield 3 alternatives as presented in the
lemma.
Lemma C2 The best response functions of the multiproduct ﬁrm Y to the high quality
ﬁrm Z are as follows:
Solution 1: yl = − chql−clqh2q2l −2qlqh and yh = −
cl−ch+(ql−qh)(−1+zh)
2(ql−qh) and λy = 0 and μh = 0 and
μl = 0.
Solution 2: yl =
2K(qhsl−qlsh)+sh(chsl−sh(cl+ql(−1+zh))+qhsl(−1+zh))
2(qhs
2
l+qlsh(−2sl+sh))
and
yh = −2Kql(sl−sh)+sl(chsl−sh(cl+ql(−1+zh))+qhsl(−1+zh))2(qhs2l+qlsh(−2sl+sh)) and
λy =
(2Kql(ql−qh)−clqhsl+chql(sl−sh)+clqlsh−q2l sh+qlqhsh+q2l shzh−qlqhshzh)
(qhs
2
l+qlsh(−2sl+sh))
and μh = 0 and μl =
0.
Solution 3: yl = 0 and yh = − ch+qh(−1+zh)2qh and λy = 0 and μh = 0 and μl = cl −
chql
qh
.
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Solution 4: yl = 0 and yh = 0 and λy = 0 and μh = ch + qh(−1 + zh) and μl =
cl + ql(−1 + zh).
Solution 5: yl = 0 and yh = K/sh and λy = −2Kqh+sh(ch+qh(−1+zh))s2h and μh = 0 and
μl = cl − ql + 2Kqlsh −
sl(2Kqh+sh(ch+qh(−1+zh)))
s2h
+ qlzh.
Solution 6: yl = − cl+ql(−1+zh)2ql and yh = 0 and λy = 0 and μh = −cl + ch − (ql −
qh)(−1 + zh) and μl = 0.
Solution 7: yl = K/sl and yh = 0 and λy = −2Kql+sl(cl+ql(−1+zh))s2l and
μh =
2Kql(sl−sh)+sl(chsl−sh(cl+ql(−1+zh))+qhsl(−1+zh))
s2l
and μl = 0.
Moreover, the feasibility conditions are as given below:
yh ≥ 0 yl ≥ 0 λy ≥ 0 μh ≥ 0 μl ≥ 0 K ≥ shyh + slyl
Proof. The Lagrangian of the problem can be written as follows:
πy = −yh(ch + qlyl + qh(−1 + yh + zh)) + yl(−cl − ql(−1 + yl + yh + zh))+
(K − slyl − shyh)λy + ylμl + yhμh
The objective function of the problem is jointly concave on a convex set deﬁned by
linear constraints, therefore the optimal solution can be obtained by solving the ﬁrst
order conditions (Bazaraa et al. (2006)). First order conditions are as follows for this
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problem:
−ch − 2qlyl − qh(−1 + 2yh + zh)− shλy + μh = 0
−cl − ql(−1 + 2yl + 2yh + zh)− slλy + μl = 0
λy(K − slyl − shyh) = 0
μhyh = 0
μlyl = 0
The solution of the ﬁrst order conditions yield 7 alternatives as presented in the lemma.
Lemma C3 The best response functions of the low quality focused ﬁrm Z are as follows:
Solution 1: zl = − cl+ql(−1+yl+yh)2ql and λz = 0 and μz = 0.
Solution 2: zl =
K
sl
and λz = −2Kql+sl(cl+ql(−1+yl+yh))s2l and μz = 0.
Solution 3: zl = 0 and λz = 0 and μz = cl + ql(−1 + yl + yh).
Moreover, the feasibility conditions are as given below:
zl ≥ 0 λz ≥ 0 μz ≥ 0 K ≥ slzl
Proof. The Lagrangian of the problem can be written as follows:
πz = −clzl − qlzl(−1 + yl + yh + zl) + λz(K − slzl) + μzzl
The objective function of the problem is strictly concave on a convex set deﬁned by
linear constraints, therefore the optimal solution can be obtained by solving the ﬁrst
order conditions (Bazaraa et al. (2006)). First order conditions are as follows for this
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problem:
−cl − ql(−1 + yl + yh + 2zl)− slλz + μz = 0
λz(K − slzl) = 0
μzzl = 0
The solution of the ﬁrst order conditions yield 3 alternatives as presented in the
lemma.
Lemma C4 The best response functions of the multiproduct ﬁrm Y to the low quality
ﬁrm Z are as follows:
Solution 1: yl =
−chql+clqh+ql(−ql+qh)zl
2ql(ql−qh) and yh =
−cl+ch+ql−qh
2(ql−qh) and λy = 0 and μh = 0
and μl = 0.
Solution 2: yl =
(2K(qhsl−qlsh)+sh(chsl−qhsl−clsh+qlsh+qlslzl−qlshzl))
(2(qhs
2
l+qlsh(−2sl+sh)))
and
yh =
(2Kql(−sl+sh)+sl(−chsl+qhsl+clsh−qlsh−qlslzl+qlshzl))
(2(qhs
2
l+qlsh(−2sl+sh)))
and
λy =
(2Kql(ql−qh)−clqhsl+chql(sl−sh)+clqlsh−q2l sh+qlqhsh+q2l slzl−qlqhslzl)
(qhs
2
l +qlsh(−2sl+sh))
and μh = 0 and μl = 0.
Solution 3: yl = 0 and yh = 0 and λy = 0 and μh = ch − qh + qlzl and μl =
cl + ql(−1 + zl).
Solution 4: yl = 0 and yh = − ch−qh+qlzl2qh and λy = 0 and μh = 0 and μl =
−chql+clqh+ql(−ql+qh)zl
qh
.
Solution 5: yl = 0 and yh = K/sh and λy = −2Kqh+sh(ch−qh+qlzl)s2h and μh = 0 and
μl = cl − ql + 2Kqlsh + qlzl −
sl(2Kqh+sh(ch−qh+qlzl))
s2h
.
Solution 6: yl = − cl+ql(−1+zl)2ql and yh = 0 and λy = 0 and μh = −cl + ch + ql − qh and
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μl = 0.
Solution 7: yl = K/sl and yh = 0 and λy = −2Kql+sl(cl+ql(−1+zl))s2l and μh = ch − qh +
2Kql
sl
− sh(2Kql+sl(cl+ql(−1+zl)))
s2l
+ qlzl and μl = 0.
Moreover, the feasibility conditions are as given below:
yh ≥ 0 yl ≥ 0 λy ≥ 0 μh ≥ 0 μl ≥ 0 K ≥ shyh + slyl
Proof. The Lagrangian of the problem can be written as follows:
πy = −yh(ch + qh(−1 + yh) + ql(yl + zl)) + yl(−cl − ql(−1 + yl + yh + zl))+
(K − slyl − shyh)λy + ylμl + yhμh
The objective function of the problem is jointly concave on a convex set deﬁned by
linear constraints, therefore the optimal solution can be obtained by solving the ﬁrst
order conditions (Bazaraa et al. (2006)). First order conditions are as follows for this
problem:
−ch + qh − 2qlyl − 2qhyh − qlzl − shλy + μh = 0
−cl − ql(−1 + 2yl + 2yh + zl)− slλy + μl = 0
λy(K − slyl − shyh) = 0
μhyh = 0
μlyl = 0
The solution of the ﬁrst order conditions yield 7 alternatives as presented in the lemma.
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Appendix D: Appendix for Chapter
5
Proof of Proposition 35. We can re-write the second period problem that the ﬁrm
has to solve as follows:
Q(x, θˆ) = maxy≥0,p≥0 y(p− c)
subject to y ≤ x
y ≤ D(p)
where D(p) = θˆ − p
q
This problem can be solved through Lagrangian methods since it is a concave function
on linear constraints. Then, the Lagrangian is as follows:
Lagrangian = (p− c)y + λ(x− y) + λm((θˆ − p
q
)− y) + μpp + μyy
.
The ﬁrst order conditions are as follows:
y − λm
q
+ μp = 0 ; −c + p − λ− λm + μy = 0 ; λ(x− y) = 0 ; λm((θˆ − pq )− y) = 0 ;
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μpp = 0 ; μyy = 0.
The feasibility conditions are as follows:
y ≥ 0 ; p ≥ 0 ; λ ≥ 0 ; λm ≥ 0 ; μp ≥ 0 ; μy ≥ 0 ; y ≤ x ; y ≤ θˆ − pq .
The solution of the ﬁrst order conditions together with the feasibility conditions yield
the following alternatives:
Solution 1: y = x ; p = q(θˆ − x) ; λ = −c + q(θˆ − 2x) ; λm = qx ; μp = 0 ; μy = 0
Solution 2: y = θˆq−c
2q
; p = 1/2(θˆq + c) ; λ = 0 ; λm = 1/2(θˆq − c) ; μp = 0 ; μy = 0
Further check of the feasibility conditions yield the result in the Proposition.
Proof of Proposition 36. Given the second period solutions by Proposition 35, we
take the expectation over the valuation realizations and ﬁnd the optimal solution for the
ﬁrst period.
Eθ¯[Q(x, θ)] =
∫ 2qx+c
q
(c/q or 1−)(p2 − c)y2( 12)dθ +
∫ 1+
2qx+c
q
(p1 − c)y1( 12)dθ.
where y1 = x ; p1 = q(θ − x) ; y2 = θq−c2q ; p2 = 1/2(θq + c).
We can ﬁnd the unconstrained solution by taking the ﬁrst order derivatives of the
above expectation.
∂xEθ¯[Q(x, θ)] =
(c+q(−1+2x−))2
4q
= 0. ⇒ x∗ = −c+q+q
2q
.
A ﬁrm that implements a capacity-unconstrained solution needs to have at least
K ≥ sx∗ = s(−c+q+q
2q
) level of availability. Since the proﬁts are increasing in x, the ﬁrm
dedicates all its capacity to production (x∗ = K/s) below that threshold K < s(−c+q+q
2q
).
Hence, the result follows.
Lemma D1 Following are the alternative solutions for a 2-product monopolist subject
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to the capacity commitments (xh, xl) made in the ﬁrst period:
Solution 1: yh =
K−slxl
sh
; yl = 1/2(θˆ − cl/ql − 2K/sh + (2slxl)/(sh) ;
ph = 1/2sh(−2Kqh+2Kql+clsh+2θˆqhsh− θˆqlsh+2qhslxl−2qlslxl); pl = 1/2(cl+ θˆql)
λh = 1/sh(−2Kqh + 2Kql − chsh + clsh + θˆqhsh − θˆqlsh + 2qhslxl − 2qlslxl) ; λl = 0 ;
λmh = 1/2(−cl + θˆql) + (qh−ql)(K−slxl)sh ; λml = 1/2(−cl + θˆql) ;
μph = 0 ; μpl = 0 ; μyh = 0 ; μyl = 0.
Solution 2: yh = − ch−θˆqh+2qlxl2qh ; yl = xl ;
ph = 1/2(ch + θˆqh) ; pl =
ql(ch+θˆqh+2(−qh+ql)xl)
2qh
;
λh = 0 ; λl =
−clqh+ql(ch+2(−qh+ql)xl)
qh
;
λmh = 1/2(−ch + θˆqh) ; λml = ql(−ch+θˆqh+2(qh−ql)xl)2qh ;
μph = 0 ; μpl = 0 ; μyh = 0 ; μyl = 0.
Solution 3: yh =
K−slxl
sh
; yl = xl ;
ph =
−Kqh+θˆqhsh−qlshxl+qhslxl
sh
; pl =
ql(−K+θˆsh+(−sh+sl)xl)
sh
;
λh =
−2Kqh−chsh+θˆqhsh−2qlshxl+2qhslxl
sh
; λl =
−2Kql−clsh+ql(θˆsh−2shxl+2slxl)
sh
;
λmh =
Kqh+qlshxl−qhslxl
sh
; λml =
ql(K+(sh−sl)xl)
sh
;
μph = 0 ; μpl = 0 ; μyh = 0 ; μyl = 0.
Solution 4: yh = 0 ; yl = (θˆql − cl)/(2ql) ;
ph = 1/2(cl + 2θˆqh − θˆql) ; pl = 1/2(cl + θˆql) ;
λh = 0 ; λl = 0 ;
λmh = 1/2(−cl + θˆql) ; λml = 1/2(−cl + θˆql) ;
μph = 0 ; μpl = 0 ; μyh = ch − cl − θˆqh + θˆql ; μyl = 0.
Solution 5: yh = 0 ; yl = xl ;
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ph = θˆqh − qlxl ; pl = ql(θˆ − xl) ;
λh = 0 ; λl = −cl + ql(θˆ − 2xl) ;
λmh = qlxl ; λml = qlxl ;
μph = 0 ; μpl = 0 ; μyh = ch − θˆqh + 2qlxl ; μyl = 0.
Solution 6: yh =
−ch+cl+θˆ(qh−ql)
2(qh−ql) ; yl = −
clqh−chql
2qhql−2q2l
;
ph = 1/2(ch + θˆqh) ; pl = 1/2(cl + θˆql) ;
λh = 0 ; λl = 0 ;
λmh = 1/2(−ch + θˆqh) ; λml = 1/2(−cl + θˆql) ;
μph = 0 ; μpl = 0 ; μyh = 0 ; μyl = 0.
Solution 7: yh = (θˆqh − ch)/2qh ; yl = 0 ;
ph = 1/2(ch + θˆqh) ; pl =
(ch+θˆqh)ql
2qh
;
λh = 0 ; λl = 0 ;
λmh = 1/2(−ch + θˆqh) ; λml = −chql+θˆqhql2qh ;
μph = 0 ; μpl = 0 ; μyh = 0 ; μyl = cl − chqlqh .
Solution 8: yh = (K − slxl)/sh ; yl = 0 ;
ph =
qh(−K+θˆsh+slxl)
sh
; pl =
ql(−K+θˆsh+slxl)
sh
;
λh =
−2Kqh−chsh+θˆqhsh+2qhslxl
sh
; λl = 0 ;
λmh =
qh(K−slxl)
sh
; λml =
ql(K−slxl)
sh
;
μph = 0 ; μpl = 0 ; μyh = 0 ; μyl =
2Kql+clsh−θˆqlsh−2qlslxl
sh
.
Moreover, the feasibility conditions are as given below:
yh ≥ 0 ; yl ≥ 0 ; ph ≥ 0 ; pl ≥ 0 ; λh ≥ 0 ; λl ≥ 0 ; λmh ≥ 0 ; λml ≥ 0 ; μph ≥ 0 ;
μpl ≥ 0 ; μyh ≥ 0 ; μyl ≥ 0 ; yh ≤ xh ; yl ≤ xl ; yh ≤ θˆ − ph−plqh−ql ; yl ≤
ph−pl
qh−ql −
pl
ql
.
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Proof. We can re-write the second period problem that the ﬁrm has to solve as follows:
Q(x, θˆ) = maxyi≥0
∑
i yi(pi(θˆ, y)− ci)
subject to yi ≤ xi ∀i
yh ≤ θˆ − ph−plqh−ql
yl ≤ ph−plqh−ql −
pl
ql
This problem can be solved through Lagrangian methods since it is a concave function
on linear constraints. Then, the Lagrangian is as follows:
Lagrangian = (ph−ch)yh+(pl−cl)yl+λh(xh−yh)+λl(xl−yl)+λmh((θˆ− ph − pl
qh − ql )−yh)
+λml((
ph − pl
qh − ql )−
pl
ql
)− yl) + μphph + μplpl + μyhyh + μylyl
The ﬁrst order conditions are as follows:
yh − λmhqh−ql +
λml
qh−ql + μph = 0 ;
yl +
λmh
qh−ql − λml( 1qh−ql + 1ql ) + μpl = 0 ;
−cl + pl − λl − λml + μyl = 0 ;
−ch + ph − λh − λmh + μyh = 0 ;
λh(xh − yh) = 0 ; λl(xl − yl) = 0 ; λmh((θˆ − ph−plqh−ql )− yh) = 0 ;
λml((
ph−pl
qh−ql )−
pl
ql
)− yl) = 0 ; μphph = 0 ; μplpl = 0 ; μyhyh = 0 ; μylyl = 0.
The feasibility conditions are as follows:
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yh ≥ 0 ; yl ≥ 0 ; ph ≥ 0 ; pl ≥ 0 ; λh ≥ 0 ; λl ≥ 0 ; λmh ≥ 0 ; λml ≥ 0 ; μph ≥ 0 ;
μpl ≥ 0 ; μyh ≥ 0 ; μyl ≥ 0 ; yh ≤ xh ; yl ≤ xl ; yh ≤ θˆ − ph−plqh−ql ; yl ≤
ph−pl
qh−ql −
pl
ql
.
The solution of the ﬁrst order conditions and careful investigation of the feasibility
conditions yield the result in the Lemma.
Proof of Proposition 37. Suppose cl/ql > ch/qh; and the customer valuation is
distributed uniformly between [θˆ − 1, θˆ]. Then, the optimal sales of a monopolist is as
follows:
If max{1 − , ch/qh} ≤ θˆ < min{2xh + ch/qh, 1 + }, then following Lemma D1, the
only feasible solution to the problem is Solution 7.
If max{2xh + ch/qh, 1− } ≤ θˆ < min{1 + , 2xh + cl/ql}, then following Lemma D1,
the only feasible solution to the problem is Solution 8.
If max{2xh + cl/ql, 1− } ≤ θˆ < min{1+ , 2(xl +xh)+ cl/ql}, then following Lemma
D1, the only feasible solution to the problem is Solution 1.
If max{2(xl + xh) + cl/ql, 1 − } ≤ θˆ, then following Lemma D1, the only feasible
solution to the problem is Solution 3.
Hence, the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 38. Suppose cl/ql < ch/qh and xl ≥ chql−clqh2ql(qh−ql) ; and the cus-
tomer valuation is distributed uniformly between [θˆ − 1, θˆ]. Then, the optimal sales of a
monopolist is as follows:
If max{1− , cl/ql} ≤ θˆ < min{(ch − cl)/(qh − ql), 1 + }, then following Lemma D1,
the only feasible solution to the problem is Solution 4.
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If max{(ch − cl)/(qh − ql), 1 − } ≤ θˆ < min{1 + , 2xh + (ch − cl)/(qh − ql)}, then
following Lemma D1, the only feasible solution to the problem is Solution 6.
If max{2xh + (ch − cl)/(qh − ql), 1 − } ≤ θˆ < min{1 + , 2(xl + xh) + cl/ql}, then
following Lemma D1, the only feasible solution to the problem is Solution 1.
If max{2(xl + xh) + cl/ql, 1 − } ≤ θˆ, then following Lemma D1, the only feasible
solution to the problem is Solution 3.
Hence, the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 39. Suppose cl/ql < ch/qh and xl ≤ chql−clqh2ql(qh−ql) ; and the cus-
tomer valuation is distributed uniformly between [θˆ − 1, θˆ]. Then, the optimal sales of a
monopolist is as follows:
If max{1− , cl/ql} ≤ θˆ < min{2xl + cl/ql, 1+ }, then following Lemma D1, the only
feasible solution to the problem is Solution 4.
If max{2xl + cl/ql, 1 − } ≤ θˆ < min{1 + , (2qlxl + ch)/qh}, then following Lemma
D1, the only feasible solution to the problem is Solution 5.
If max{(2qlxl + ch)/qh, 1 − } ≤ θˆ < min{1 + , 2(xh + xl(ql/qh)) + ch/qh}, then
following Lemma D1, the only feasible solution to the problem is Solution 2.
If max{2(xh + xl(ql/qh)) + ch/qh, 1 − } ≤ θˆ, then following Lemma D1, the only
feasible solution to the problem is Solution 3.
Hence, the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 40.
Given the second period solutions by Proposition 38, we take the expectation over
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the valuation realizations and ﬁnd the optimal solution for the ﬁrst period.
Eθ¯[Q(x, θ)] =
∫ ch−cl
qh−ql
(cl/ql or 1−)((ph1−ch)yh1+(pl1−cl)yl1)( 12)dθ+
∫ 2xh+ ch−clqh−ql
ch−cl
qh−ql
((ph2−ch)yh2+
(pl2−cl)yl2)( 12)dθ+
∫ 2(xl+xh)+cl/ql
2xh+
ch−cl
qh−ql
((ph3−ch)yh3+(pl3−cl)yl3)( 12)dθ+
∫ 1+
2(xl+xh)+cl/ql
((ph4−
ch)yh4 + (pl4 − cl)yl4)( 12)dθ .
where yl1 =
θql−cl
2ql
; yh1 = 0 ; ph1 = 1/2(2θqh − (θql − cl)) ; pl1 = θql+cl2 .
yh2 =
(θqh−ch)−(θql−cl)
2(qh−ql) ; yl2 =
chql−clqh
2ql(qh−ql) ; ph2 = 1/2(θqh + ch) ; pl2 = 1/2(θql + cl) .
yh3 = xh ; yl3 =
θql−cl−2qlxh
2ql
; ph3 = θqh−xh(qh−ql)−1/2(θql−cl) ; pl3 = 1/2(θql+cl).
yh4 = xh ; yl4 = xl ; ph4 = qh(θ − xh)− qlxl ; pl4 = ql(θ − xh − xl) .
We can ﬁnd the unconstrained solution by taking the ﬁrst order derivatives of the
above expectation.
∂xhEθ¯[Q(x, θ)] =
1
4(qh−ql)ql (c
2
l qh− 2clql(ch +2(−qh + ql)xl)+ ql(c2h +2ch(qh− ql)(−1+
2xh − ) + q2h(1− 2xh + )2 + 4q2l xl(1− 2xh − xl + )− qhql(4x2h − 4x2l + 4xl(1 + ) + (1 +
)2 − 4xh(1 + 2xl + )))) = 0.
∂xlEθ¯[Q(x, θ)] =
(cl+ql(−1+2xh+2xl−))2
4ql
= 0.
Simultaneous solution of these conditions yield the optimal solution for the un-
constrained case: xh =
ch−cl−qh+ql−qh+ql
2(−qh+ql) and xl =
−clqh+chql
2(qh−ql)ql . Since the ﬁrm needs
K ≥ shxh + slxl capacity in order to be able to oﬀer these quantities, the result follows.
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